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ABSTRACT 
This thesis develops an explanatory typology, called the "National Security Strategic 
Personality theory (NSSP)". This theory is aimed at revealing how the operationalisation of 
national security, against threats with agency, is different from state to state. In developing this 
theory, the author focuses on identifying Nigerian state behaviour towards its perceived 
malicious threats, from 1960 through 2014. The NSSP theory is the result of an informed 
development of existing theoretical frameworks namely; Strategic Culture, and National 
Strategic Personality, into a coherent analytical tool. 
This framework utilises a constructivist ontology, to carefully extract viable elements 
(such as the state, security and referent objects) of the strategic culture and national strategic 
personality theoretical frameworks respectively. The NSSP framework then proceeds to 
reapply the extracted concepts, into an explanatory typology, so as to maximise their 
explanatory and predictive efficiency. 
The National Security Strategic Personality framework proposes that national security 
strategies of states, indeed share discernible similarities, but also possess distinct differences 
in character. This proposition is based on a systemic investigation into state behaviour against 
malicious threats, which identifies where state behaviour occurs, why such behaviour occurs, 
and how it occurs. The framework then proposes that the similarities and differences which one 
observes amounts to unique strategic personalities that can be documented. The hypotheses put 
forward in this thesis ascertain that: 
 Every State possesses a unique National Security Strategic Personality which guides 
state actions against its perceived malicious threats to its referent objects. 
 The unique National Security Strategic Personalities of states can be identified and 
adequately characterised by utilising the three elements of the National Security 
Strategic Personality Theoretical Framework  
The three elements proposed to be of fundamental importance to understanding the personality 
of national security strategies, are: 
Orientation, the physical location which a state considers as being within its theatre of 
operations, within which one can observe state behaviour. 
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Inflationary Containment, active and passive coercive means enacted by a state, 
which enables one to identify what referent objects the state prioritises. 
Compression, the strategic means which a state chooses to control or exterminate its 
perceived malicious threats. 
Orientation, Inflationary Containment and Compression are treated as independent 
variables which enable us to characterise the individual dimensions of a National Security 
Strategic Personality. Together, the characterised independent variables provide us with a 
comprehensive understanding of the characteristics of the National Security Strategic 
Personality as a whole, which is identified as a dependent variable. 
The development of an explanatory typological theory and the case study method of 
evaluation go hand-in-hand. The typological nature of the NSSP theory enables researchers to 
identify the NSSP of a state at any given time, while the implementation of case study analysis 
enables the researcher to comparatively analyse and distinguish between NSSPs of a state 
which may change over time.  
The researcher views the case study method of analysis, as the most appropriate tool to 
superimpose the NSSP theory on the selected case studies to evaluate its validity. The 
employment of the case study method in this thesis, facilitates comparative analysis of four 
phases of governance in Nigeria. These comparative observations highlight the creation and 
normalisation of essential aspects of Nigeria's national security strategy, which have a 
significant impact on the nature of Nigeria's response to national security threats today. This 
method also increases the probability of identifying developmental patterns, by ascertaining 
the aspects of Nigeria's National Security Strategic Personality which have persisted over the 
period under review, and also detects the aspects of the NSSPs which have been relatively 
flexible. 
The author believes that analysing state behaviour against threats with agency, enables one 
to understand the nature of state strategic behaviour against them. This analysis enables crisp 
scholarly characterisation of the true nature of what, up until now, we have believed to be a fog 
of strategic culture that influences the delivery of national security. The identification and 
characterisation of National Security Strategic Behaviour is capable of empowering scholars 
with more accurate predictive capabilities when anticipating the future of the security strategy 
of an observed state. These predictive capabilities would be reliably based on the observed 
dynamics of state behaviour. 
Olamide Samuel - 1401236 - University of Buckingham 
 iii 
  
Olamide Samuel - 1401236 - University of Buckingham 
 iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I was fortunate to have been surrounded by the most considerate and helpful individuals during 
the course of this research. I would like to extend my sincerest gratitude to the following people 
for their help and support:  
At the University of Buckingham, Professor Julian Richards proved to be the most insightful 
and engaging supervisor, who was a constant source of encouragement and guidance during 
this research. Professor Anthony Glees, from whom conversations and critical engagements 
originally sparked the author's interest in the subject, and Dr Vassilis Kappis for his invaluable 
comments and feedback.  
I also wish to thank my wife Natasha, for the thoughtful and supportive role she played, 
especially through the most difficult phases of this work. 
I would like to acknowledge my father Mr Bayode Samuel, for encouraging and enabling me 
to embark on this research in the first place. I just wish he had been alive to witness the 
completion of this work, which is dedicated to him. I also wish to thank my mother Mrs Remi 
Samuel, for all her thoughts and prayers. 
To Lieutenant General Tukur Yusuf Buratai, Major General Adeosun, Mr Kabir Adamu, 
Colonel Sagir Musa, Brigadier S.K. Usman, and Captain A. Isa, who assisted me in 
innumerable ways during the course of this work.  




Olamide Samuel - 1401236 - University of Buckingham 
 vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Abstract ....................................................................................................................................... i 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................... iv 
List of Tables ............................................................................................................................ xi 
List of Figures .......................................................................................................................... xii 
Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................................................ xiii 
1 Chapter One: Introduction .................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 1 
1.2 Research Objectives .................................................................................................... 3 
1.3 Methodology ............................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined. 
1.3.1 Explanatory Typology ......................................................................................... 4 
1.3.2 The Case-Study Method ...................................................................................... 6 
1.3.3 Fuzzy-Set ............................................................................................................. 6 
1.4 Selected Case Studies .................................................................................................. 7 
1.5 Data Sources .............................................................................................................. 10 
1.6 Structure of This Dissertation ................................................................................... 10 
2 Chapter Two: Literature Review ...................................................................................... 14 
2.1 Conceptual Discourse ................................................................................................ 14 
2.1.1 The Role of Subjective Perceptions in Determining National Security Agendas
 14 
2.1.2 A Constructivist Approach to Security and National Security .......................... 16 
2.1.3 Security and the subjectivity of Referent Objects.............................................. 20 
2.1.4 Different Versions of National Security Exist ................................................... 25 
2.1.5 Culture, Strategy and Strategic Culture ............................................................. 28 
2.1.6 Culture and Strategy as Intervening Variables .................................................. 31 
2.1.7 The Cultural approach to Strategic Studies ....................................................... 33 
2.1.8 Strategic Culture ................................................................................................ 35 
2.1.9 The Unravelling of Strategic Culture ................................................................. 41 
2.1.10 Origins of the National Security Strategic Personality Typology ..................... 48 
2.2 A Theory Mindful of Mistakes Past .......................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 
Olamide Samuel - 1401236 - University of Buckingham 
 vii 
2.3 Conclusion ................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined. 
3 Chapter Three: Introducing The National Security Strategic Personality Theoretical 
Framework (NSSP) .................................................................................................................. 52 
3.1 Objectives of the Theory ........................................................................................... 52 
3.2 Functions of the National Security Strategic Personality Theoretical Framework ... 53 
3.3 The Sub-Elements of the National Security Strategic Personality Theoretical 
Framework ........................................................................................................................... 54 
3.3.1 The State (Active, Exertive) .............................................................................. 55 
3.3.2 Prioritised Referent Object(s) (Passive, Reactionary) ....................................... 58 
3.3.3 Malicious Non-State Actors (Active, Transfer) ................................................. 60 
3.3.4 Observable State Strategic Behaviour (Passive, Exertive) ................................ 65 
3.4 Elements of the National Security Strategic Personality Framework ....................... 68 
3.4.1 Inflationary Containment ................................................................................... 68 
3.4.2 Compression ...................................................................................................... 69 
3.4.3 Orientation ......................................................................................................... 69 
3.5 Elements of the National Security Strategic Personality Theoretical Framework as 
Independent Variables .......................................................................................................... 70 
3.5.1 Orientation as an Independent Variable ............................................................. 71 
3.5.2 Inflationary Containment as an Independent Variable ...................................... 71 
3.5.3 Compression as an Independent Variable .......................................................... 74 
3.6 National Security Strategic Personality as a Dependent Variable ............................ 78 
3.7 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 80 
4 Chapter Four: Empirical Validation of the NSSP Theoretical Framework ...................... 81 
4.1 A Brief Introduction to Nigeria ................................................................................. 82 
4.1.1 The Imposition of Unity..................................................................................... 83 
4.1.2 The Foundations of Elitism in Nigeria ............................................................... 84 
4.1.3 Nigeria’s Role and Identity in the World ........................................................... 86 
4.2 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 88 
5 Chapter Five: A Guide to implementing the NSSP Theoretical Framework - The 
Formation Case-Study ............................................................................................................. 90 
5.1 Methodology ............................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined. 
Olamide Samuel - 1401236 - University of Buckingham 
 viii 
5.2 The First Within Case Episode 1960 – 1967 (FORMATION) ................................. 90 
5.3 Assessment Question 1 - Delineating between the State and its Proposed MNSAs . 91 
5.3.1 The State ............................................................................................................ 91 
5.3.2 Malicious Non-State Actors ............................................................................... 93 
5.4 Assessment Question 2 ORIENTATION: Where Can One observe the presence of 
Inflationary Containment and Compression by the State? ................................................... 96 
5.5 Research Findings: Assessment of Orientation ....................................................... 103 
5.6 Assessment Question 3 (INFLATIONARY CONTAINMENT): What Referent 
Objects within reach of the MNSA have been observed to be granted priority by the State?
 106 
5.7 Research Findings: Assessment of Inflationary Containment ................................ 109 
5.8 Assessment Question 4 (COMPRESSION): What Strategic Means have been 
Observed to be repeatedly utilised by the State to eliminate the vital interests of the MNSA?
 114 
5.9 Research Findings: Assessment of Compression .................................................... 116 
5.10 The National Security Strategic Personality of Nigeria during the “Formative Period”
 126 
5.11 Lessons learnt from Formation Case Study ............................................................ 126 
6 Chapter Six: The Secession Case Study 1967-1970 ....................................................... 129 
6.1 Methodology ............................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined. 
Military Incursion into Nigerian Politics ........................................................................... 129 
6.2 Assessment Question 1 - Delineating between the State and its Proposed MNSAs
 133 
6.2.1 The State .......................................................................................................... 133 
6.2.2 Malicious Non- State Actors ............................................................................ 136 
6.3 Chronology of the 1967-1970 SECESSION CASE STUDY ................................. 137 
1966: The Return of Northern Dominance ..................................................................... 137 
The Aburi Conference of 1967 ....................................................................................... 139 
1967: Eastern Secession ................................................................................................. 140 
1968-1969: Repercussions of Strategy ........................................................................... 144 
1970: End of Secession................................................................................................... 146 
Olamide Samuel - 1401236 - University of Buckingham 
 ix 
6.4 Assessment Question 2 ORIENTATION: Where Can One observe the presence of 
Inflationary Containment and Compression by the State? ................................................. 148 
6.5 Research Findings: Assessment of Orientation ....................................................... 149 
6.6 Assessment Question 3 (INFLATIONARY CONTAINMENT): What Referent 
Objects within reach of the MNSA have been observed to be granted priority by the State?
 151 
6.7 Research Findings: Assessment of Inflationary Containment ................................ 157 
6.8 Assessment Question 4 (COMPRESSION): What Strategic Means have been 
Observed to be repeatedly utilised by the State to eliminate the vital interests of the MNSA?
 159 
6.9 Research Findings: Assessment of Compression .................................................... 161 
6.10 The National Security Strategic Personality of Nigeria during the “Secession Period”
 168 
6.11 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 168 
7 Chapter Seven: Lasting Effects of Formation and Secession on the Nigerian State, from 
1970 to 1999 .......................................................................................................................... 170 
7.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 170 
7.2 Nigeria from 1970-1979 .......................................................................................... 170 
7.3 Findings ................................................................................................................... 188 
7.3.1 Military Preservation of Civilian Elitism ......................................................... 192 
8 Chapter Eight: The Explosion Case Study 2009-2014 ................................................... 195 
8.1 Methodology ............................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined. 
8.2 Assessment Question 1 - Delineating between the State and its Proposed MNSAs
 195 
The State ......................................................................................................................... 195 
Malicious Non- State Actors .......................................................................................... 195 
8.3 Chronology of the Explosion Case Study ............................................................... 196 
8.3.1 2009.................................................................................................................. 196 
8.3.2 2010.................................................................................................................. 199 
8.3.3 2011.................................................................................................................. 201 
Olamide Samuel - 1401236 - University of Buckingham 
 x 
8.3.4 2012.................................................................................................................. 203 
8.3.5 2013.................................................................................................................. 206 
8.3.6 2014.................................................................................................................. 213 
8.4 Assessment of Orientation ...................................................................................... 215 
8.5 Assessment of Inflationary Containment ................................................................ 223 
8.6 Assessment of Compression against MNSAs 2009-2014 ....................................... 228 
8.7 The National Security Strategic Personality of Nigeria during the “Explosion Period”
 235 
8.8 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 235 
9 Chapter Nine: Conclusion .............................................................................................. 237 
9.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 237 
9.2 Highlights of The Study .......................................................................................... 237 
9.3 Summary of Major Findings ................................................................................... 239 
9.3.1 The State .......................................................................................................... 239 
9.3.2 MNSAs ............................................................................................................ 240 
9.3.3 Nigerian NSSP as a Dependent Variable ......................................................... 242 
9.4 Recommendations ................................................................................................... 246 
10 Bibliography ............................................................................................................... 249 
10.1 Books ....................................................................................................................... 249 
10.2 Articles .................................................................................................................... 253 
10.3 Newspaper Publications .......................................................................................... 254 
10.4 Online Newspaper Articles ..................................................................................... 256 
10.5 Dissertations ............................................................................................................ 258 




Olamide Samuel - 1401236 - University of Buckingham 
 xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Independent Variable Measurement: Orientation ...................................................... 71 
Table 2. Independent Variable Measurement: Inflationary Containment ............................... 74 
Table 3. Independent Variable Measurement: Compression ................................................... 77 
Table 4. Dependent Variable Measurement: National Security Strategic Personality ............ 80 
Table 5. Independent Variable Measurement: Orientation .................................................... 104 
Table 6. Independent Variable Measurement: Inflationary Containment ............................. 113 
Table 7. Independent Variable Measurement: Compression ................................................. 124 
Table 8. Dependent Variable Measurement: NSSP ............................................................... 126 
Table 9. Independent Variable Measurement: Orientation .................................................... 149 
Table 10. Independent Variable Measurement: Inflationary Containment ........................... 158 
Table 11. Independent Variable Measurement: Compression ............................................... 165 
Table 12. Dependent Variable Measurement: Compression ................................................. 168 
Table 13. Distribution of Power in Nigeria 1960-1999 ......................................................... 190 
Table 14. Coup Executors versus Benefactors ...................................................................... 191 
Table 15. MNSA Activity in Nigeria 2103 ............................................................................ 207 
Table 16. MNSA Activity in Nigeria 2014 ............................................................................ 213 
Table 17. Independent Variable Measurement: Orientation .................................................. 216 
Table 18. Independent Variable Measurement: Inflationary Containment ........................... 223 
Table 19. Independent Variable Measurement: Compression ............................................... 229 
Table 20. Dependent Variable Measurement: NSSP ............................................................. 235 
Table 21. Nigerian NSSP in Formation ................................................................................. 245 
Table 22. Nigerian NSSP in Secession .................................................................................. 245 








Olamide Samuel - 1401236 - University of Buckingham 
 xii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. The Hierarchy of Referent Objects. .......................................................................... 60 
Figure 2. Malicious Non-State Actors ..................................................................................... 63 
Figure 3. The Spectrum of Compressive Severity. .................................................................. 77 
Figure 4. The spectrum of Compressive Severity (Adapted to include some examples of 
strategic means). ...................................................................................................................... 77 
Figure 5. Seats in the Nigerian Parliament October 1960 ....................................................... 92 
Figure 6. The Nigerian State, Jan. 1966................................................................................. 134 
Figure 7. The Nigerian State, Jul. 1966 ................................................................................. 136 
The Figure 8. spectrum of Compressive Severity (Adapted). ............................................... 160 
Figure 9. MNSA activity in Nigeria, 2009 ............................................................................ 198 
Figure 10. MNSA activity in Nigeria, 2010 .......................................................................... 201 
Figure 11. MNSA activity in Nigeria, 2011 .......................................................................... 203 
Figure 12. MNSA activity in Nigeria, 2012 .......................................................................... 206 
Figure 13 MNSA activity in Nigeria, 2013. .......................................................................... 212 
Figure 14. MNSA activity in Nigeria, 2014 .......................................................................... 215 
 
  
Olamide Samuel - 1401236 - University of Buckingham 
 xiii 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
AG - Action Group 
BBC - British Broadcasting Corporation 
BH - Boko- Haram 
C4 - Composition-4 plastic explosive 
CNN - Cable News Network 
FGN - Federal Government of Nigeria 
FMG - Federal Military Government 
IED - Improvised Explosive Device 
JTF - Joint Task Force 
MEND - Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
MNSA - Malicious Non-State Actor 
MOSOP - Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People 
NA - Native Authority 
NCNC - The National Council of Nigerian Citizens 
NDPVF - Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force 
NNA - Nigerian National Alliance 
NP - Native Police 
NPC - Northern People's Congress 
NSSP - National Security Strategic Personality 
NYSC - Nigerian Youth Service Corps 
SIOP - Single Integrated Operations Plan 
SMC - Supreme Military Council of Nigeria 
UMBC - United Middle Belt Congress 
UPGA - United Progressive Grand Alliance 
WAI - War Against Indiscipline
Olamide Samuel - 1401236 - University of Buckingham 
 1 
1 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Drawing on a historically and theoretically contextualised understanding of the aims of 
the strategic culture theory as well as the national strategic personality theory, this research 
develops an explanatory typology, aimed at revealing distinctions in the operationalisation of 
National Security, in Nigeria. At a casual glance, it is apparent to an observer that similarities 
and differences exist in the way threats are handled among different states. The author believes 
that these similarities and differences are as a result of distinct approaches to national security 
amongst states, and, should be identified in the resultant actions of states operationalising 
national security, positing that it is their actions, which could reasonably serve as indicators to 
identify and characterise a National Security Strategic Personality of a state. This thesis, 
therefore, investigates the existence and character of a National Security Strategic Personality, 
taking a case study approach to identify if indeed, the Nigerian state possesses such an NSSP. 
By keeping track of the coercive moves carried out by states against malicious non-
state actors over time, specific patterns of strategy, which include the habitual behaviours of 
states, and conditioned responses to threats, emerge. These patterns of strategy, help to expose 
deeply rooted assumptions about the efficiency of their means and even enable us to identify 
attempts at innovation and change -when the favoured strategic means have proven to be less 
effective than anticipated. Furthermore, these patterns of strategy, could either be attributed to 
the material context within which the operating system of the state functions, the social context, 
or both. The author believes that if these patterns of strategy are collated, such a collation of 
information can serve as the basis for much more accurate examinations and interpretations of 
state strategy, surpassing both cultural interpretations and realist interpretations, with regards 
to the nature, the degree of flexibility and ideological limits of its operationalisation of national 
security strategies. 
This research is unique because it identifies the point of theoretical intersection between 
material and ideational variables, as state behaviour. By asking the simple questions, where, 
why, and how, in observed instances of state behaviour against non-state actors, the researcher 
has made it possible to subject state behaviour to systematic investigation. This means that now, 
state behaviour of this kind, can be dissected, compared and aggregated in a theoretically 
meaningful fashion. Identifying the where, why, and how, dimensions of state behaviour as 
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variables serves a crucial function. This approach enables us to understand the actions of the 
state in question, utilising rationalist epistemology in addition to utilising constructivist 
ontology as a lens to approach the subject. This new approach focuses primarily on the 
observed strategic behaviour of states utilising coercive means and the use of force against 
non-state actors, that have been construed to be malicious threats. As an ‘explanan', this focus 
on state strategic coercive behaviour is limited to focusing on strategic behaviour aimed 
primarily at malicious non-state actors which are perceived to be at odds with the state's 
interests, thus enabling observation and analysis of state behaviour against non-conventional 
threats such as terrorism, insurgencies and organised crime. This in itself grants this thesis an 
aura of novelty.  
Rosenau lamented a lack of comprehensive systems of testable generalisations, the near 
absence of general theory, and pointed scholars in the direction of creating such theories 
through careful observation and comparison.1  The National Security Strategic Personality 
theoretical framework follows the direction of Rosenau's intuition, existing as an explanatory 
and predictive power on models of state interaction with non-state actors within the context of 
national security provision. Another reason this thesis is unique, lies in its focus on observing 
and documenting numerous instances of state strategic behaviour, in a manner that enables an 
accurate characterisation of state strategic personality. Therefore, the NSSP theory, is one born 
out of aggregate exploration and confirmation, proposing a national security strategic 
personality which, firstly, is not limited to the time-frame of instances observed. Instead, it 
documents perennial patterns of repeated behaviour, perennial enough to be reasonably 
characterised as a strategic personality. Secondly, the national security strategic personality 
framework is not only resistant to variances in observed strategic behaviours of the Nigerian 
state over the case study periods. Instead, it includes these variances in behaviour over the 
documentation periods, as it appreciates the insights which stem from these variances. These 
variances are valuable because they could indicate critical revisions of national security 
strategy, such as an attempt at rapid innovation, a process of gradual change, or a rapid response 
to overwhelming stimuli, amongst other things. The national security strategic personality 
theory, therefore, seeks to serve as an analytical, conventional constructivist theory within 
international security studies, which is primarily focused on explaining the operationalisation 
                                                 
1 Rosenau, James N. (1966) “Pre-theories and theories of Foreign Policy,” in Approaches in Comparative and 
International Politics, ed. R. Barry Farrell, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. 
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of national security, as a socially constructed reality. It is expected that this theory, would be 
subjected to rigorous, empirical testing.  
Strategic culture as a theoretical framework, aims to serve similar purposes to the 
proposed purposes of the national security strategic personality framework. Certain shared 
preconceived assumptions –for example, assumptions about states possessing unique 
approaches to the use of force, which vary from state to state, or the potential power of 
anticipation which both theoretical frameworks offer concerning state strategy, place both 
theoretical frameworks in competition for the same spatial allocation. It is for this reason, that 
the author deems it necessary to subject strategic culture to utmost scrutiny, assessing the 
theoretical rigor with which strategic culture was developed, and exposing key shortcomings 
observable in the strategic culture theoretical framework, which have rendered it problematic 
and inefficient as an analytical tool capable of interpreting state behaviour with respect to 
national security strategy against its perceived malicious actors.  
In addition, very limited attempts have focused on analysing the strategic culture, or 
strategic personality of Nigeria, with most theoretical lenses often producing perplexing results 
when they are applied in the Nigerian context. As a result, Nigeria is often absent in wider 
scholarly literature as a subject of intellectual investigation, both in strategic culture and 
national security discourse. This is in part due to understandable misconceptions of countries 
such as Nigeria, and numerous other countries in the global south, which are still stubbornly 
perceived, almost exclusively as post-colonies, notwithstanding the qualities of these states 
which qualify them as sovereign entities, worthy of analytical investigation on par with actual 
states. It is against this background that the author believes that an alternative theoretical 
framework is significantly required, which is accommodating enough to at least permit a more 
scientific analysis of the various national security styles which exist in such countries today. 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES 
The research questions which foundationally necessitate this work, are:  
 Is there a need for a National Security Strategic Personality (NSSP) approach to 
national security? 
 Can an NSSP explanatory typology theory, surpass strategic culture 
interpretations of National Security? 
 To propose the specific need for the NSSP theory in the wider academic literature 
Olamide Samuel - 1401236 - University of Buckingham 
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 What is the structure and design of the NSSP theory? 
 What are the resultant characteristics of the NSSP of Nigeria? 
The core objectives of this research are:  
 To propose the need for a constructivist approach to national security 
 To propose an explanatory typology theory, which will surpass strategic culture 
interpretations of National Security 
 To propose the specific need for the NSSP theory in the wider academic literature 
 To Elaborate on the structure and design of the NSSP theory 
 To empirically validate the NSSP theory 
 To exhaustively understand the NSSP of Nigeria 
1.3 METHODOLOGY 
This research is primarily guided by constructivist ontology, utilising a qualitative 
research strategy to identify the NSSP of Nigeria. In doing so, the researcher combines 
historical analysis, and qualitative case study to interpret gathered data.  
Analysis of Nigeria’s NSSP from its inception in 1960, through 2014, is no simple task. 
Firstly, it involves the linkage of strategic culture, as well as national security as concepts, in 
order to propose that various national security strategic types, exist. Furthermore, it 
reconceptualises and adapts the national strategic personality typology, as a means through 
which one can characterise such variances in national security strategy. This task then applies 
the NSSP theory to case studies spanning most of Nigeria’s history, in order to identify the 
existence and character of its NSSP. Nigeria as a country is an especially difficult state to 
analyse in this manner, due to the complexity of its history. Nigeria’s history has been 
characterised by colonial, military and civilian rule in its relatively short period of time. 
Therefore, such a tedious task of combing through Nigeria’s history is expected to yield highly 
insightful results, which in the authors opinion, justifies the immense efforts required to achieve 
this task.  
1.3.1 Explanatory Typology 
This thesis therefore, is largely qualitative in its methodological approach. More 
specifically, it introduces an explanatory typological theory which is characterised by the 
informed development of existing theoretical frameworks namely; Strategic Culture, and 
National Strategic Personality, into a coherent analytical tool. As Elman proposed, an 
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explanatory typology is a kind of typological theory which makes predictions based on 
combinations of different values of the theory’s variables. Explanatory typologies then place 
collected data in relevant cells for either congruence testing, or in the case of this thesis, 
empirical validation, in order to determine whether data collected is consistent with the 
proposed hypotheses. If the theory is valid, one should reasonably expect collected data to 
correspond with the proposed hypotheses, and insightful information should be derivable from 
the empirical validation process.2 
Bennett and Elman, identify the utility of explanatory typologies in efficiently achieving 
such a task, as it is a methodology well suited for capturing temporal effects, or indeed 
enhancing fields within academic literature which are “empty, theoretically unlikely, 
unsurprising, or overdetermined.”3  The NSSP theory, as an explanatory typology should 
enhance research into the identification of various national security types, which, in academic 
literature, can be considered to be theoretically unlikely. This is because, national security is 
based on the concept of security which has been characterised by many within the discipline 
an essentially contested subject. 4  This notion that the concept of security is essentially 
contested, has, in many ways, hindered academic progress towards the contemplation of 
national security types, rendering such contemplation as theoretically unlikely, as shall be 
explained in the next chapter. 
Ragin, also explains that explanatory typologies enable researchers to specify 
configurations of variables in a manner in which the researcher can capture configurative 
causation.5 This thesis separates the three principal elements of National Security Strategic 
Personality, which are useful in capturing the configuration of national security strategy over 
a specific period of time. These proposed variables are; Orientation, Inflationary Containment 
and Compression, which are treated as independent variables which cause the characteristics 
of a state’s NSSP. These elements are explained in detail, with specific attention given to their 
origins, nature, relevance to understanding the NSSP, and their causation of the character of 
the NSSP of a state in question.  
                                                 
2 Elman C, ‘Explanatory Typologies in Qualitative Studies of International Politics’ (2005) 59 International 
Organisation. 293-326 
3 Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, ‘Qualitative Research: Recent Developments in Case Study Methods’ (2006) 
9 Annual Review of Political Science. 455-476 
4 See: Paul Williams, ‘Security Studies’, Security Studies: An introduction (1st edn, Routledge 2008) 
5 Ragin C, Fuzzy Set Social Science (Chicago Press 2000) 
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1.3.2 The Case-Study Method 
Within this thesis, the development of an explanatory typological theory and the case 
study method of evaluation go hand-in-hand. As highlighted by George and Bennett, 
typological theories and case study analysis are very compatible methodologically, as such a 
combination enables the a researcher to identify not only types of phenomena, but also links 
between successive types.6 So while the typological nature of the NSSP theory should enable 
a researcher to identify the NSSP of a state at any given time, the implementation of case study 
analysis enables the researcher to comparatively analyse and distinguish between NSSPs of a 
state which may change over time. It is for this reason that this method of analysis has been 
applied utilising the guidelines proposed by George and Bennett in the Development of the 
Social Sciences.  
The researcher views the case study method of analysis, as the most appropriate tool to 
superimpose the NSSP theory on the selected case studies to evaluate its validity.7 This method 
also permits the researcher to adequately evaluate if the National Security Strategic 
Personalities unearthed, reasonably correspond in the context of real-world examples, when 
superimposed on the actual strategic behaviour of observed states. 
The employment of the case study method in the 5th to 8th chapters, facilitates 
comparative analysis of four phases of governance in Nigeria. These comparative observations 
highlight the creation and normalisation of essential aspects of Nigeria's national security 
strategy, which have a significant impact on the nature of Nigeria's response to national security 
threats today. This method also increases the probability of identifying developmental patterns, 
by ascertaining the aspects of Nigeria's National Security Strategic Personality which have 
persisted over the period under review, and also detects the aspects of the NSSPs which have 
been relatively flexible. 
1.3.3 Fuzzy-Set 
Ragin, proposed the fuzzy-set methodology in his work ‘The Comparative Method’ 
within which the applicability of mathematical sets in case analysis was highlighted. 8 
Essentially, fuzzy-set analysis incorporates the inclusion of measurement scales in case study 
                                                 
6 Alexander L George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies And Theory Development In The Social Sciences (MIT 
Press 2005). 
7 Alexander L George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies And Theory Development In The Social Sciences (MIT 
Press 2005). 
8 Ragin C, The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies (University of 
California Press 1987)  
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analysis in a novel way. Fuzzy set analysis, qualitatively analyses cases according to their 
conformity with a particular category, and characterises cases based on the degree of similarity 
to, or variance from such a category. For example, rather than categorise a state as developed 
or developing, the fuzzy scale measurement would consider descriptive factors such as the 
state’s GDP, GDP per capita, and its human development index. These considerations would 
then enable a researcher to determine the extent to which that state can be categorised as either 
developed or developing.   
This method of qualitative analysis is central to this thesis because, this method 
primarily enables the researcher to quantify the proposed NSSP independent variables. The 
orientation, inflationary containment and compression variables are the independent variables 
as shall be seen in the third chapter. Fuzzy set is unique because of its utility in minimising the 
risks of errors that stem from inference, while providing the researcher with the necessary 
control of the value of independent variables, and adequate variation required by the research 
problem.9 The control of the independent variables is necessary because, all three independent 
variables have to be specific enough to enable their surgical application, in a manner which 
permits the researcher to identify and isolate specific state actions, and adequately categorise 
state actions into their accurate categories.  
1.4 SELECTED CASE STUDIES 
The cases chosen were required to be theoretically relevant, and encapsulated periods 
of time when the decision making processes of states are challenged by malicious national 
security issues pertinent to the immediate survival of a prioritised referent object. To enable 
the researcher to observe state strategic behaviour at points in time where the implications of 
making critical decisions, are costly, and when significant intellectual resources are dedicated 
to the decision making process. Therefore, the case studies that would be carried out, broadly 
encompass periods of Nigerian government, spanning from 1960, through 2014. More 
specifically, the case study periods would be compartmentalised into various case episodes 
Based on aforementioned criteria, these specific cases have been identified which serve 
as adequate models for observation: 
                                                 
9 Alexander L George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies And Theory Development In The Social Sciences (MIT 
Press 2005). 
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1. 1960-1967, described as the Formation Period. In this case study, in-depth analysis 
is carried out with focus on identifying Nigeria's political origins, considerations 
and ultimate concerns within that period. It is essential to include the formation 
period as part and parcel of the case study analysis, as it is during this period, that 
one can identify specific developments and trends that would ultimately influence 
subsequent discourse and operationalisation of Nigerian National Security 
Strategic Personality, which enables us to understand the genesis of its orientation 
or physical scope of Nigeria's National Security Concerns. It is also from this 
period of formation that one can begin to identify a broad set of characteristics and 
organisational objectives that would be socially constructed as proximal threats to 
Nigerian National Security. 
2. 1967-1970 described as the Secession Period: This period of analysis covers much 
of the subsequent events that led up to the Nigerian Civil war, as well as the 
personalities and their considerations that imminently resulted in the eruption of 
the war. This period of analysis is essential, more so, because it illustrated the 
experimental beginnings of the Inflationary Containment, (i.e. the interests of 
Nigeria's National Security Agenda) and Compression, (i.e. the modus operandi of 
Nigerian National Security) aspects of Nigerian NSSP, as it is recognised today. 
3. 1970-1999: This period of analysis, covers the subsequent fall-out of the Nigerian 
Civil war, Nigeria's attempts at unification. This period of analysis also explores 
the various exchanges of power between Nigeria's military and civilian elite. 
During this period, the exponential increase of violent and non-violent power 
tussles between civilians and the Military laid the foundations of its current civil-
military relations configuration. 
4. 2009-2014 described as the Explosion Period: This period of analysis, investigates 
the re-emergence of multiple MNSAs, and an intensification of their interactions 
with referent objects, taking into consideration the precedents laid out by the 
Nigerian state in the Formation and Secession periods of analysis, in necessitating 
an unambiguous resurgence of MNSAs with readily identifiable aims, objectives 
and means. The importance of this period of analysis lies within the realisation that 
there seems to be an intensification of interactions not only between MNSAs and 
referent objects but between MNSAs and the State. This period also highlights the 
exponential intensification of MNSA activity within Nigerian territory as a result 
of the consolidation of domestic and alien MNSA efforts. During this period of 
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investigation, all elements of Nigerian NSSP are observed critically, to determine 
if their operationalisation is indeed in line with the previous NNSP trends as 
identified, or if perhaps, the elements of Nigerian NSSP are reset and realigned to 
account for contemporary MNSAs. 
1.4.1 Rationale for selected case studies 
The choice of Nigeria as a case study reflects the availability and accessibility of relevant 
and reliable data on the subject matter to the researcher. In addition, the level of familiarity of 
the researcher with the cultural landscape and the subject of observation can only be regarded 
as an additional advantage in understanding the various phenomena which could have 
discouraged previous researchers in the past from exploring the subject. The potential 
downsides of the researcher’s familiarity with the subject matter, might be evident in the 
criticism of Nigerian NSSP, where one might identify the researcher’s inclination towards the 
protection of people as prioritised referents of Nigerian NSSP. However, this bias is mitigated 
by the conscious evaluation of the interests, which Nigerian NSSP seeks to preserve. The 
choice of Nigeria as the subject of observation, also has academic and scientific value. This is 
because, the author believes that the diversity of literature within international security would 
be enhanced with the inclusion of non-western perspectives, or non-western subjects of 
observation. Chronological gaps, such as the period between 1999 and 2009, can be explained 
simply, as a result of consistent NSSP strategy implemented by the Nigerian state, in the period 
2009 to 2014. This is because, the Nigerian state from 1999 to 2014, faced largely similar 
MNSAs, but more crucially, operated the same system of government (the presidential system), 
allowing enhanced continuity in the nature of its NSSP, as opposed to previous case studies, 
where Nigeria witnessed extensive reconfigurations of its systems of government, resulting in 
markedly different eras of government within the country. The case studies conclude in 2014, 
as this was the point in time when this research was initiated, and the researcher thought it 
important to analyse Nigerian NSSP ‘till date’. The inclusion of events occurring after that cut-
off date, would have invariably compounded the analysis of Nigerian NSSP, possibly risking 
the inclusion of incomplete information, gathered from on-going events.  In applying the NSSP 
theory in this thesis, it is utilised as a means to understand Nigeria's national security strategy 
specifically. However, this does not mean that the applicability of the NSSP theory is limited 
to the Nigerian context. Rather, the NSSP theory is expected to be a suitable explanatory 
typology in the wider context of analysing the national security strategy of states, by focusing 
on observable state behaviour.  
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1.5 DATA SOURCES 
To exhaustively unearth and analyse the National Security Strategic Personality of 
Nigeria, in the First, Second, Third and Fourth Republics, this research draws on existing 
scholarly debates within the realm of national security studies, strategic culture and national 
strategic personality, analysing the hitherto explanations for phenomena akin to the National 
Security Strategic Personality. To achieve this, analysis resorted to a sample of authoritative 
literature on strategic culture, national strategic personality, strategic coercion, as well as 
historical literature on the National security configuration in Nigeria, in order to situate the 
NSSP theory within wider literature. The case studies are furnished with insight gained from 
collecting relevant, declassified official documents and archives from the Nigerian Police 
Force and the Nigerian Army. The case studies are also furnished with insight from archival 
and contemporary News media coverage and biographical sources which have also been 
consulted. 
Primarily, data gathered in this research originated from archives which span the case 
study periods.  Concerning the interviews, respondents were purposefully sampled, focusing 
on key individuals drawn from the military and civilian population. This sampling method has 
been adopted, because the focus of the NSSP framework does not necessarily require 
interaction with individual respondents except in cases where individual respondents involved 
are accessible, and where these individuals were critical stakeholders in the Nigerian political 
scene over the course of the case study period. Their insights served to reasonably furnish the 
research with original opinions and information. 
1.6 STRUCTURE OF THIS DISSERTATION (DATA PRESENTATION) 
For the researcher to fulfil the aforementioned research objectives, the following steps 
are taken in the second and third chapters. The first step in the second chapter involves the 
clarification of the ontological approach to this research, focusing on a conventional 
constructivist interpretation of security and national security as concepts. The second step taken 
in the second chapter focuses on the strategic culture theoretical framework. This step, tracks 
the development of the theoretical framework, identifying the issues which necessitated the 
strategic culture theoretical framework, to further understand how the strategic culture theory 
has evolved through its first three generations, citing the recurrent reconceptualisation of the 
theory. In tracking the rise and demise of the strategic culture framework, the researcher 
identifies the foundational intent of the strategic culture framework, and makes a case for the 
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revision of this approach. In this process, the author is mindful of the similarities of the strategic 
culture theory, and a conventional constructivist approach to the seemingly distinct 
operationalisation of national security across states, carefully extracting the positive 
contributions of the strategic culture theory, and identifying how these contributions can be 
adapted in order to generate the national security strategic personality theory. This chapter also 
highlights the typology of the national strategic personality theory proposed by Ziemke and 
revises this typological approach, which has been adapted to inform the epistemological 
approach the NSSP theoretical framework.  
The first step in the third chapter focuses on the epistemological approach of the NSSP 
theory, through the identification of the sub-elements of the NSSP theory, which make up the 
elements of the theory. It goes further, to explain how these sub-elements can be extracted from 
case-studies. The second step involves the delineation of the three principal elements of 
National Security Strategic Personality, explaining in detail, what these proposed elements are, 
how these elements are relevant to understanding the NSSP, and how these elements should be 
applied to case studies, to identify the character of the NSSP of the state within that case study. 
These three proposed elements are: Orientation, Inflationary Containment and Compression. 
These three elements are explained in detail and are treated as independent variables, which 
make up the NSSP. 
Because these elements are treated as independent variables, they are placed on 
measurement scales, which characterise each element of the NSSP. These measured 
independent variables, determine the nature of the NSSP which is the dependent variable. The 
relationship between these three elements is also expanded upon, as the sum-total of these 
characterised elements, determines the nature of the NSSP. The implication of this is that each 
measured element of NSSP, is only in part, a determinant factor in the character of the NSSP 
and serve as limited analytical tools in isolation of each other, as each element can only provide 
an observable breakdown for measuring a specific dimension of a National Security Strategic 
Personality. 
In the fourth chapter, the researcher identifies the case studies which will be used to test 
the empirical validity of the NSSP theoretical framework. The first case study, however, 
contains a detailed guide to the application of the NSSP theory. Subsequent case studies are 
examined in the 5th, 6th and 8th chapter, focused on the extraction and characterisation of the 
NSSP dependent variable, and the associated findings.  
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In the fifth chapter, the author utilises the NSSP theory to qualitatively analyse Nigerian 
state behaviour against MNSAs from 1960 to 1967. Firstly, the author provides a central 
narrative of events of significance which occurred from 1960-1967. This is followed by the 
delineation between the Nigerian state an MNSAs. After this, the author recalls significant 
events from the central narrative, within which observable state behaviour is analysed in three 
ways. Firstly, significant events were recalled so as to identify the location of state behaviour. 
State behaviour was then placed on the Orientation measurement scale to identify if the 
Nigerian state was introverted, or extroverted in the period under review. Secondly events were 
recalled so as to characterise the focus of Nigerian state inflationary containment. State 
behaviour was then tabularised to show if Nigerian NSSP is people-centric or interest-centric 
in nature. Finally, events were recalled with specific focus on the severity of observable state 
behaviour, to characterise Nigerian state compression. Observable state behaviour was then 
tabularised to enable the researcher to identify if Nigerian NSSP was constraining, coercive or 
compressive in the 1960-1967 formation case study. The values of Orientation, Inflationary 
Containment and Compression in this case study, were then collated to identify the overall 
characteristics of Nigerian NSSP in the formation period. The author proceeded to document 
overall observations and insight which was gained from the formation case study. In the sixth 
chapter, the author also utilised the case study method to empirically validate the explanatory 
typology.  
The sixth chapter begins with a brief historical account of Nigeria’s first military coup. This 
account is followed by the delineation between the Nigerian state an MNSAs, after which it is 
followed by a central narrative of events of significance which occurred from 1967-1970. After 
this, the author recalls significant events from the central narrative, within which observable 
state behaviour is analysed. Findings are then tabularised to enable the researcher to identify if 
Nigerian NSSP was constraining, coercive or compressive in this case study. The values of 
Orientation, Inflationary Containment and Compression in this case study, were then collated 
to identify the overall characteristics of Nigerian NSSP in the formation period. The author 
proceeds to document overall observations and insight which was gained from the secession 
case study. 
In the 7th chapter, cross-case studies are carried out to track the evolution of Nigerian NSSP 
from across a case-study periods.  
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In the eighth chapter, the author utilises the NSSP theory to qualitatively analyse Nigerian 
state behaviour against MNSAs from 2009-2014. The author also utilises the case study method 
to empirically validate the NSSP explanatory typology. This chapter begins with the 
delineation between the Nigerian state an MNSAs, after which it is followed by a central 
chronology of events of significance from 2009 to 2014. However, data presentation is quite 
unique in comparison with the preceding chapters. Over the course of this chapter, the reader 
would notice the author’s reliance on tabular presentation of events. This was as a result of the 
copious amounts of data analyzed within this chapter. Instances of MNSA activity in 2013 and 
2014, was characterised and represented chronologically in tabular forms. Furthermore, the 
representation of Orientation, Inflationary Containment and Compression, followed this trend. 
Within these tables, the author has separated the characteristics of Observed State behaviour, 
for ease of understanding. The 9th and concluding chapter highlights the influence of Nigerian 
NSSP on the evolution of the Nigerian State, and draws on the findings of the previous chapters, 
highlighting the relevance and challenges of applying the NSSP framework, in policy 
implementation and academic advancement within the field of international security studies.  
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2 CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter proposes the need for a conventional constructivist ontological approach to 
national security, and proposes the need for a relatively rationalist epistemological approach in 
the form of an explanatory typology theory, which will serve surpass strategic culture 
interpretations of national security provision. In achieving these research objectives, this 
chapter provides an in-depth review of literature suggesting that a nexus between the provision 
of national security, and perceptually subjective cultural understandings of national security 
exists. In reviewing this literature, the author first examines existing literature on the nature of 
security and national security, from a conventional constructivist’s perspective. This literature 
review goes further to elucidate upon the nature of national security provision, and how 
different it could be, from state to state. The author proposes that viewing national security 
provision, as a result of a state’s national strategic personality, would enable more adequate 
scholarly characterisation of national security as a whole. The author then proceeds to perform 
an in-depth analysis of the strategic culture theoretical framework and the national strategic 
personality theoretical frameworks, critically appraising their utility and validity hitherto. 
2.1 CONCEPTUAL DISCOURSE 
2.1.1 The Social Construction of National Security Agendas 
A significant number of states in today's world are threatened by the expansion of 
terrorist networks, the activities of drug cartels, and the contagion of political instability present 
in other states. On the other hand, a proportionately significant number of states seem to be just 
as threatened by the spread of free speech, the rise of feminism, and the popularity of non-
governmental organisations which champion human equality. For example, the United States 
of America is most notable for its conquests worldwide, engaged in various military battles 
against the rise of terrorism in any corner of the world that it might emerge. The United States 
maintains that it is fighting against terrorism and protecting citizens, such as those in Iraq, from 
being harmed by terrorists, even if it warrants the justification of US soldiers accidentally 
murdering members the civilian population during their assignments. The so-called collateral 
damage is viewed as an unavoidable eventuality in a war which must go on…after all, 
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"Sometimes civilians bear the brunt of military action, but we do all we can…"1 The United 
States also maintains that it remains committed to crushing drug-smuggling cartels on the 
South-American continent. The US achieves its victories against cartels, by sending in its 
covert operatives, to sabotage and dismantle the cartels' influence on various governments in 
the region. The US vehemently engages in public condemnation of the use of drugs and 
substances peddled by drug cartels, which, from an objective standpoint, are just as dangerous 
to human health as the consumption of alcohol, which is legal in the US today. On the other 
hand, there is The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has been notably criticised for its 
policy which bans women from driving vehicles.2 It is surprising to see that Saudi Arabia has 
even on occasion, deployed police officers to roadblocks to ensure that women are unable to 
drive in Saudi territory.3 The Kingdom of Sweden takes a much different approach from the 
US in ensuring that the Islamic State is defeated in Northern Iraq. This however has been 
characterised by its deployment of only 35 soldiers outside its territory to fight the war on terror. 
In contrast to the United States deployment of thousands of soldiers in the past, Sweden has 
sent an infinitesimal number of troops, even though we know that Sweden is very capable of 
sending hundreds of troops to the region if need be.4  
Why is it, that some states actively pursue the war on terror in every corner of the world, 
while others do not even have legislation on terrorism in their constitutions? Why do some 
states try to defeat only the terrorist networks which exist within their territorial borders, when 
clearly, terrorism has proven to be a highly contagious threat which permeates borders 
seamlessly? Why do some states implement measures befitting of an anti-cartel operation, to 
stop women from driving? Positing these sort of questions enables one to realise that, states 
embark on all manner of operations against entities which they view as threats, utilising all 
kinds of subtle as well as conspicuous means to eliminate or neutralize these threats. It is also 
evident that many states embark on campaigns against their perceived threats, claiming to be 
protecting 'humanity', 'democracy', 'our way of life', or some other sort of revered ideal. In the 
                                                 
1Missy Ryan, 'The US Military Has Announced That Civilian Casualties In Iraq And Syria Have More Than 
Doubled Its Previous Estimate' (The Independent, 2017) <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-
east/us-military-civilian-casualties-iraq-syria-double-previous-estimate-a7409091.html> accessed 4 September 
2017. 
2 It must be noted that prior to the publication of this work, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia lifted the ban on women 
drivers.  
3  'Saudi Arabian Women Vow To Keep Up Campaign Against Driving Ban' (the Guardian, 2017) 
<https://web.archive.org/web/20131108015809/http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/27/saudia-arabian-
women-drivers-campaign-ban> accessed 23 August 2017. 
4 Sveriges Radio, 'Sweden To Increase Support In Fight Against ISIS - Radio Sweden' (Sverigesradio.se, 2017) 
<http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=2054&artikel=6479322> accessed 14 May 2017. 
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actual course of events, the actions of many states greatly contradict their proposed aims for 
engaging these threats in the first place. Within this confusing, even chaotic landscape, we are 
repeatedly reminded that all these campaigns, are said to be in the interests of 'national security'. 
one could easily be led to conclude that any issue, can potentially become a national security 
issue, depending on the perceptual subjectivity of value systems of the country in which it 
arises. If all these various activities, can be regarded as pursuing the same national security we 
frequently hear of, it is only reasonable to conclude that there are either very different types of 
national security or at the very least, very different perceptions of what it means. As we can 
see, these attitudes have substantial consequences for the actions of states that claim to be 
pursuing their national security interests. If there are different conceptions of national security, 
which could explain the observations made earlier, then theoretically, one can reasonably 
aspire to distinguish one style of national security from another. It is at this junction, that the 
author proposes a constructivist ontology, as the most comprehensive means through which 
one can understand why, and how states differ in their subjective approaches to national 
security provision. 
2.1.2 A Constructivist Approach to Security and National Security 
Before one can aspire to understand national security exhaustively, it is essential to, 
first of all, understand what security is. The complexity of security as a concept means that its 
clarification is a requirement for anyone attempting to discuss national security. Security has 
been defined as a state of feeling safe and the absence of fear, anxiety, danger, poverty and 
oppression and that that security is the preservation of core values and the absence of threats 
to these values.5 Security was also defined by Zabadi as a state within which people or things 
are not exposed to the danger of physical or moral aggression, accident, theft or decline. Zabadi 
also viewed the state as the primary provider of security towards its citizens, utilising power 
and force to provide security if need be.6 
Constructivism is not a theory of international relations or security. It is more of a 
‘broader social theory which then informs how we might approach the study of security’.7  The 
author believes that one could regard constructivism as an ontology; a set of assumptions 
                                                 
5 Alli WO, 'The changing environment of Nigeria’s foreign policy', Beyond 50 Years of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: 
Issues, Challenges and Prospects. (Nigeria Institute of International Affairs 2010)  
6 Istifanus Sonsare Zabadi, Understanding Security And Security Sector Dynamics (John Hopkins University Press 
2005). 
7 Matt McDonald, 'Constructivism', Security Studies (1st edn, Routledge 2008).  
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regarding the world and human agency.8 Constructivists examine how the human world, and 
occurrences therein, are socially constructed:9 “Constructed by the very ideas that actors share 
with themselves and others about the world they live in, and (given these ‘things’) what they 
can and should do.”10 These ideas which the author refers to, do not consist entirely of ideas 
within people's minds. Instead, these ideas refer to those identified by Durkheim, which exist 
tangibly in the social world, in the form of ethical norms, language and religious beliefs 
amongst others.11  Constructivism highlights the role of ideas and social structures which 
consist of identities and norms.12 The utility of a constructivist insight lies in its ability to 
provide meaning. Lantis, citing Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner, reiterates the proposition 
that “Constructivism recognizes the importance of ‘inter-subjective structures which give the 
material world meaning” identifying these inter-subjective structures as socially constructed 
concepts such as “norms, culture, identity and ideas”. These socially constructed concepts give 
meaning to the identities of humans, their roles in human organisation, the implication of 
organisational behaviour and by extension, their role in state behaviour as a whole.13 Much like 
other concepts in international relations, when it comes to the concept of security, the ability 
of constructivism to challenge the rationalist framework that undergirds security theory, as well 
as other theories in international relations, grants it great importance as an ontology.14 
As Wendt understands, when it comes to rationalist accounts of politics, the variables 
of interest to scholars such as military power, institutions and domestic preferences should not 
only be relevant to those interested in conceptualising security because of their utility as 
objective facts, instead, they should be considered as important because of the specific social 
meanings attached to them.15 Meanings which are attached to them are as a result of a complex 
and specific construction of history, unique to each state, which Slaughter believes scholars 
                                                 
8 Slaughter A, in Wolfrum, R. 'Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law' (2011) Oxford University 
Press.<http://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/slaughter/files/722_intlrelprincipaltheories_slaughter_2011
0509zg.pdf> accessed 3 May 2015 
9 James David Armstrong, Theo Farrell and Hélène Lambert, International Law and International Relations (1st 
edn, Cambridge University Press 2015). 
10 James David Armstrong, Theo Farrell and Hélène Lambert, International Law and International Relations (1st 
edn, Cambridge University Press 2015). 
11  John Gerard Ruggie, “what makes the world hang together? Neo-utilitarianism and the social constructivist 
challenge’, International Organisation 52 (1998), 857-861. 
12 James David Armstrong, Theo Farrell and Hélène Lambert, International Law and International Relations (1st 
edn, Cambridge University Press 2015). 
13 Peter J Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen Krasner, “International Organisation and the Study of 
World Politics,” International Organisation 52, no. 4 (1998): 679 
14 Slaughter A, in Wolfrum, R. 'Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law' (2011) Oxford University 
Press.<http://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/slaughter/files/722_intlrelprincipaltheories_slaughter_2011
0509zg.pdf> accessed 3 May 2015 
15 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory Of International Politics (Cambridge University Press 2014). 
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can utilise to explain states’ behaviour meaningfully. If one were to dig deeper into some of 
the ideas proposed by Wendt in his classic piece on the Social Construction of Power Politics, 
one would realize that various mechanisms of security provision observable in many societies 
today, serve as prime examples in which we discover that the protection of societal interests 
and value have been influenced by socially constructed, knowledgeable practice, over time.16 
For example, without preconceived socially constructed ideas about security, one would be 
unable to answer the following questions casually: Who should provide security? Who should 
they provide it to? What can they do or not do for security to be provided? How should they 
provide security? Therefore, a constructivist perspective enables us to understand the concept 
of security within a broader social context, and more importantly, question the relative ideas 
of security within the broader social context. This approach allows us to understand just how 
subjective the meaning of concepts like security are within various human communities, and 
how this subjectivity goes on to influence their manifestation across these various communities. 
Instead of utilising the simplified methodology to analyse the concept of security, which 
includes the identification and comparison of security definitions from academia, the author 
uses the constructivist ontology, to explore the conditions under which phenomena resembling 
security exists, within which we can reasonably identify the provision of security. 
With these definitions in mind, let us consider security as a result of social construction, 
constructed by the idea that humans are capable of protecting and preserving those values and 
things which they revere. These values and objects could be the preservation of wealth, the 
preservation of a sense of immunity to bodily harm, or even the ability of one to secure his 
living premises from intrusion by other humans, to preserve a sense of privacy. Now, let us 
consider these values being threatened by a burglar, whose sole aim is to acquire the wealth of 
others through coercion and intimidation. In attempting to obtain wealth, the burglar 
inadvertently invades the living premises of an individual, perhaps threatening physical bodily 
harm in the process of coercing the individual to give up his/her acquired wealth, and eventually, 
if the burglar is successful, would acquire the wealth of the individual which is within reach. 
This is an example of a security matter, and in reading this, one would expect that there are 
institutions and mechanisms in place, to prevent this type of interruption to an individual's 
ability to preserve his/her values. Perhaps the institution that comes to mind is the Police Force 
or private security guards. Alternatively, perhaps the mechanisms that come to mind include 
                                                 
16 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” (1992) 46 
International Organisation 
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the availability of burglar-proof doors and windows, an advanced electronic security system, 
or even a double-barrelled shotgun in the victim's possession. As different as these institutions 
and mechanisms may seem, they are easily identified as security measures which can be 
considered by an individual to protect his/her wealth, person and privacy. Indeed, the 
differences in security measures would depend upon the society within which the individual is 
embedded in, and socialised in. If this individual is in the United Kingdom, for example, the 
possession of a double-barrelled shotgun would not appear to be a viable consideration, as 
within the United Kingdom, it would be legally and normally unacceptable for an individual to 
possess a shotgun. However, if this individual was in the United States, the possession of a 
double-barrelled shotgun might be legally acceptable if the shotgun is licensed to the individual, 
and depending of the state within the United States, it might be culturally acceptable to possess 
a shotgun at home, if a sizeable chunk of the population within that state considers it normal to 
possess and utilize a shotgun for personal protection from intruders –take the state of Texas for 
example. Conversely, if an individual's ability to protect his/her wealth, person and privacy is 
threatened by a hurricane or earthquake, it is not usually considered as a security matter because 
of the magnitude of the threat to one's values, in relation to the perception of one's ability to 
deal with the threat. In Japan, for example, it might be an issue which could be mitigated by 
advances in architectural design, whereas in Zimbabwe it might be a matter which might be 
resolved by praying to God or relevant Gods.  
So why is it, that the idea that humans are capable of protecting their revered values 
and objects, seems invalidated in the face of threats of such magnitude? Why is it that threats 
of this magnitude, are not primarily considered as security matters? Perhaps this is because, as 
suggested earlier, in viewing security as a social construction, it is based on an idea regarding 
humans and their perception of themselves and their capabilities to protect their revere values 
within the world they live in. Therefore, in examining security as an idea, perhaps one would 
require a theory or an ontology that accommodates and expands on the role ideas have to play 
in our conceptualisation of security. Understanding security from a social constructivist's 
perspective unearths the role of ideas about security, which can help us understand how and 
why national security varies from state to state. This perspective, therefore, places significance 
on proposing a refined, constructivist understanding of the concept of security as a priority 
concern, if one is to be able to understand how and why national security varies from state to 
state. 
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2.1.3 The social construction of Referent Objects 
Observing security as a socially constructed phenomenon, one can assert that, for 
security to exist, there are necessary precursors. Firstly, one must understand that security is 
primarily hinged on the existence of personalities with agency, as it is a concept that is hinged 
on the existence of at least a group of personalities which interact with each other. A social 
community of rational personalities which interact must exist. Their interactions, usually are 
mediated by social norms, identities and ideas of social and functional stratification. 
Furthermore, this community must be intellectually sophisticated enough to the extent that 
there is a possibility of the creation and preservation of value. Security is mostly acknowledged 
as the result, a state of equilibrium, achieved if the conscious alleviation of threats to referent 
objects within a community is successful. As a social construction, security is something that 
can only manifest within a social context, in which personalities that can create and depend on 
value, are present. Williams proposes that: "Security is most commonly associated with the 
alleviation of threats to cherished values; especially those [threats] which, if left unchecked, 
threaten the survival of a particular referent object in the near future."17  
It is interesting to note at this point, that security is not an intersubjective reality that 
exists exclusively in human communities, as knowledge stemming from anthropology has 
revealed to us that even amongst primates, a primary importance of social organisation and 
social adaptation is to optimize the possibility of the existence of individual members of such 
society. Take African savannah baboons, for example. The adaptive strategies of social living 
are indicated in the defensive strategies these primates have developed. A typical ground 
dwelling baboon would rarely last more than a few days in the wild isolated from other animals 
of its kind because, an individual baboon's ability to defend itself from predators is significantly 
reduced in isolation. What is observable instead with animals of this kind, is the development 
of social organisation, based on hierarchy, specialisation of social functions and even 
prioritised referent objects. When African savannah baboons are roaming the African plains, 
one can identify a tightly held formation, in which the intelligent positioning of subordinate 
males serves as a formative external barrier, and the positioning of the youngest juveniles in 
the centre of the troop, surrounded by females and dominant males, clearly indicates a 
specialisation of social functions optimised for the protection of their prioritised referent 
objects, young juveniles.18 
                                                 
17 Paul Williams, 'Security Studies', Security Studies: An Introduction (1st edn, Routledge 2008).p.5. 
18 Spradley, J. and McCurdy, D. Anthropology--the cultural perspective. (Wiley 1975) p.62. 
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Human beings, being members of the same taxonomic order primata, categorised based 
on over 200 various homologous traits,19 are also observed to share some of this instinctive 
inclination to create referent objects and attach meanings and value to them. The primary 
difference is that Humans have always been concerned with experimentation when security is 
concerned, modifying and readjusting the configuration of a much more complicated society 
in ways which could potentially maximise security within their communities. Human beings 
are also capable of attaching and discarding value, in relation to their immediate and ultimate 
interests. This means that there is some degree of variance concerning what humans within a 
specific social community attach value to, and what other humans outside the construct of that 
social community attach value to. Within a particular society, a particular issue could be 
elevated to become a matter which concerns the security of that entire society, while another 
society might not even recognise such an issue as a threat. In many ways this subjectivity of 
threat perception has been addressed by scholars such as Waever, who first outlined the process 
of securitisation within societies.20 However, while Waever's securitisation theory appreciates 
the socially constructed nature of security agendas, securitisation theory is yet to expand on the 
implications of this social construction across societies with markedly different values.21 Much 
like distinct cultures being results of their isolated development over time, the author suggests 
that security too, could be a result of markedly different discursive constructions of threats, in 
distinct societies over time.  
Furthermore, the state of complete security is a state of non-permanence. The security 
of valuables from perceived threats is dependent upon the conscious and continual provision 
of security by an entity or entities to a prioritised referent object, from routine and elevated 
threats. The possibility of ensuring the security of people, and objects of value, is a primary 
function of societal interaction and is what permits the longevity of society, and indeed the 
members of said society. Williams citing Booth, states that security can be equated to a more 
sophisticated form of survival, which encompasses the possibility of an entity to exist in 
circumstances that are unrestricted by life 'determining' factors, and so coined the term 
"survival plus".22 The preservation of property, territory, rights, states and institutions (all of 
                                                 
19 Traits which are similar and imply common ancestry. 
20 Ole Waever, 'Securitisation and desecuritisation', On Security (Columbia University Press 1995) pp46-86 
21 However, new research concerning the existence of Macrosecuritisations at the system level, which influence 
securitisation processes at the state level, have been proposed by Buzan and Waever See: Barry Buzan & Ole 
Waever, ‘Macrosecuritisation and security constellations: reconsidering scale in securitisation theory’, Review of 
International Studies 35:2 (2009), 253-76. 
22 Paul Williams, 'Security Studies an introduction', Security Studies: An Introduction (1st edn, Routledge 2008). 
p.6. 
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which are social constructs), are implementable within societies where specific kinds of human 
interaction such as cooperation, organisation, division of labour and specialisation of social 
functions exist.  These interactions, therefore, represent an extension of the inherent need of 
humans to at least preserve a status quo. A status quo, which at least permits us to be able to 
make calculated decisions on more sophisticated issues, within the context of familiar, 
relatively stable parameters. For example, one cannot reasonably ponder on the decision to go 
shopping at a supermarket, during a severe hurricane, when even the continued preservation of 
that supermarket is in jeopardy.23 As Baldwin noted, the primacy of the role of security lies in 
the fact that it is a "prerequisite for the enjoyment of other values such as prosperity, freedom, 
or whatever."24 
The ideological subjectivity evident within the concept of security also manifests itself 
in other ways. For example, human societies do not exist in isolation. Kingdoms, Nations, 
Colonies etc. have always existed within wider contexts, and in many instances, the provision 
of security within one society can unwittingly result in the gradual fragmentation of perceptions 
of security of an adversarial society. Without social construction, societies would be unable to 
attach meaning to the material resources other societies acquire to enhance the provision of 
their Security. As Wendt states ‘material resources only acquire meaning for human action 
through the shared knowledge in which they are embedded’25 An example of this is the United 
States' subjective perception of Nuclear weapons. The idea that Nuclear weapons are a 
catastrophic threat stems from the understanding of the capabilities of nuclear weapons. In the 
same vein, the idea that the United Kingdom is one of the United States’ closest allies, means 
that the material acquisition of nuclear weapons by the United Kingdom is not perceived as a 
threat to United States’ interests. However, the idea that the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea is an enemy (due to DPRK’s repeated threats of nuclear warfare), means that its 
acquisition of nuclear weapons is perceived as a threat to the United States’ interests. Rivalry, 
friendship and enmity are all ideas about the configuration of interacting entities.26 The primary 
difference between friendship and enmity lies in the compatibility or otherwise, of the socially 
constructed identities of entities which interact. This leads one to realize just how important 
                                                 
23 Concerning human personalities, security can be viewed as a more sophisticated form of survival. However, 
when dealing with entities that are not fundamentally human; for example, the security of the territorial 
sovereignty of a Nation, the concept of security and that of survival can be viewed as more or less similar and 
interchangeable. 
24 David A. Baldwin, 'The Concept Of Security' (1997) 23 Review of International Studies. 
25 Alexander Wendt, 'Constructing International Politics' (1995) 20 International Security. 
26Alexander Wendt, 'Constructing International Politics' (1995) 20 International Security. 
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subjectivity is, as a dynamic which fundamentally affects our understanding of security. This 
is why the author believes that an exhaustive definition of security could most likely hail 
primarily from constructivist approaches to the subject. But, Baldwin reminds us of the 
fundamental difference between specifying the conditions under which security can be attained 
and actually understanding and defining the concept of security,27 citing Lasswell and Kaplan 
who posit that, conceptual clarification logically precedes the search for the necessary 
conditions of security.28 
Security as a concept, is one of those multifaceted concepts which can be approached 
from various perspectives. Some scholars have even equated the term security, with beauty; 
stating that much like beauty, security is an elastic and subjective term, capable of meaning 
different things to different observers. 29  However, unlike other multifaceted concepts in 
political science, definitional debates about the conceptualisation of security, seem to be absent. 
Rather, the debates within security studies seem to focus more on normative and empirical 
arguments such as, the range of issues which could be classified as security issues,30 the search 
for an ultimate referent object of security,31 and the level of analysis most suitable for security 
studies.32 Security has even been classified as an essentially contested concept, meaning that 
there can be no consensus with regards to its meaning.33 Within the realm of security studies 
and international relations, there appears to be no consensus on an exhaustive definition of 
security, notwithstanding effort made in this direction. Interestingly, this lack of conceptual 
rigour in itself demonstrates the relevance of the ontological approach of this thesis. One can 
assign this absence of conceptual definition of security to the subjective experiences, subjective 
interpretations, and subjective manifestations of the concept of security from society to society, 
which stems from the subjectivity of ideas regarding what is valuable. A lack of agreement as 
to what the ultimate referent object of security should be for example, is only an advanced 
manifestation of the subjectivity of value. 
So, how does one go about the conceptualisation of security? The answer lies in the 
deconstruction of the elements of what we observe to be the shared concept of security. 
                                                 
27 David A. Baldwin, 'The Concept Of Security' (1997) 23 Review of International Studies. 
28 Harold D Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power And Society (Taylor and Francis 2013). 
29 Paul Williams, 'Security Studies an introduction', Security Studies: An Introduction (1st edn, Routledge 2008). 
30 J. Ann Tickner, 'Re-visioning Security', International Relations Theory Today (Oxford, 1995), pp. 175-197. 
31 Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, (2nd 
edn Boulder, CO, 1991), pp 25-6. 
32 See: Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Lynne Rienner 
1998) 
33 Paul Williams, 'Security Studies an introduction', Security Studies: An Introduction (1st edn, Routledge 2008). 
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Baldwin for example, asks the following questions in his deconstruction of security: Security 
for Whom? Security for which values? How much Security? From what threats? By what means? 
At what costs? In what period? Taking Baldwin's first question into consideration, it is entirely 
accurate to propose that the concept of security is virtually meaningless if we fail to understand 
whose security we are referring to, as Williams so aptly recognises.34 So, "Whose security 
should we be talking about?"35 Literature for decades preceding and spanning the cold-war era 
proposed that priority be given to states as ultimate referent objects when security in 
international politics was discussed, and it seemed to be more important to scholars, to focus 
on how representatives of particular groups and organisations constructed their threat agendas. 
However, literature developed after the end of the cold-war (such as those emanating from the 
Copenhagen school) argue for priority to be given to human beings, as the threat agendas 
constructed by recognised representatives of states, for various reasons, were observed to not 
always accurately represent the equally legitimate threat agendas of specific minorities residing 
within the boundaries of that state.36 Literature within this period leaned towards the conviction 
that without humans as the ultimate referent objects of security, the concept of security itself 
makes little sense.37 This unsolved lack of consensus in the security debate is a foundational 
cause of considerable variance observable, when one seeks to identify central tenets of national 
security strategies of different states, with some states' national security strategies prioritising 
regime security over human life and vice-versa. This variance can be assigned to the fact that 
national security is a concept developed on the foundations of a concept of Security, a concept 
which can be understood in significantly different ways, depending on value systems that 
influence where the providers of security believe its ultimate concerns should be. As 
Christiansen et al have identified, constructivism contrasts between material and social realities, 
citing that social realities ‘exist only by human agreement’, making social realities much more 
malleable, contestable and confined to definite periods of time.38 This perspective, echoes my 
approach to the concept of security, and, as you will see, underlines the provision of national 
security from state to state, and through different periods of history.  
                                                 
34  Paul Williams, 'Security Studies an introduction', Security Studies: An Introduction (1st edn, Routledge 
2008).p.7. 
35  Paul Williams, 'Security Studies an introduction', Security Studies: An Introduction (1st edn, Routledge 
2008).p.7. 
36 See: Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Lynne Rienner 
1998) 
37 Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity, And Interests (1st edn, Cambridge University Press 1999) 
38 Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik Jorgensen and Antje Wiener, 'The Social Construction Of Europe' (2011) 6 
Journal of European Public Policy. P.530 
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2.1.4 The social construction of National Security 
Various definitions of National Security have been proposed, and some of these 
propositions are worth exploring for one to meaningfully understand how the subjectivity of 
value influences the provision of National Security. Sheenan, touches on the value-laden nature 
of security, explaining that, much like knowledge which is socially contingent, security ‘is not 
an objective or apolitical condition; it is a subjectively constructed concept’39 David Omand 
for example, proposes that National Security should be defined as "a state of trust on the part 
of the citizen that the risks to everyday life, whether from man-made threats or impersonal 
hazards, are being adequately managed [by the state] to the extent that there is confidence that 
normal life can continue."40 Omand, therefore, cites the existence of an agreement, (state of 
trust) between the citizen and the state, whereby the citizen has thrust the responsibility of the 
mitigation and alleviation of risk, onto the state. He also states that the extent to which this 
responsibility is thrust is at least to the extent that normal life, (a status-quo within that society) 
can continue. Omand implicitly proposing that security at the national level, is something that 
is to be consciously provided, whilst reiterating his conviction that Security is something that 
must be provided by the state, He stated that "Government's primary duty in respect of national 
security [is] towards the protection of the individual and the daily life of the community."41 
Therefore, we can understand that Omand's perspective on National security, is one in which 
he believes that Governments are providers of security, and as such, they should prioritise 
individual humans as the ultimate referent objects of National Security. Interestingly, David 
Omand served as the Director of the United Kingdom’s Government Communications 
Headquarters from 1996 to 1997. 
However, not all scholars seem to agree with Omand's theorising on national security. 
Sir Richard Dearlove for example, is of the opinion that a clear distinction needs to be made 
between what he calls a "register of civic anxieties" and "what really constitutes…core 
National Security concerns that could really threaten the viability of a State, as opposed to the 
quality and safety of life that it delivers to its citizens"42 Anyadike also proposes a definition of 
National Security, which is similar to Omand's aforementioned proposition. She views 
National security, as the responsibility of the state to "maintain the survival of the State through 
                                                 
39 Michael Sheenan, International Security. An Analytical Survey (Lynne Rienner, 2005) p.178 
40 David Omand, Securing The State (Hurst 2011) p.9. 
41 David Omand, Securing The State (Hurst 2011). p.11. 
42  Richard Dearlove, 'National Security and Public Anxiety: Our Changing Perceptions' National Security 
Intelligence, (1st edn, Oxford University Press 2010) 
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the use of economic, diplomacy, power projection and political power."43 There is agreement 
between Anyadike and Omand's perception of National Security with regards to the 
responsibility of the state to provide security, but Anyadike simply does not expand upon the 
social contract which Omand believes to exist between the citizen and the state. This perceptual 
subjectivity, can be assigned to the fact that Anyadike, hailing from eastern Nigeria, is perhaps 
conceptualising on a different social agreement which amounts to National security, which in 
Nigeria has been observed to prioritise the survival of the state as an entity (or Interests) as the 
ultimate referent object of its National Security Strategy, over the provision of security to 
individual citizens (People) as the referent objects. It is interesting to note that such varying 
differences in opinion can be shaped by subjective experiences of individuals who are citizens 
of different states with different value systems, attempting to characterize two different 
versions of what they consider to be the same manner of social reality. In a way, one can assign 
this variance in the definition of national security, to Kaiser’s observation that ‘scholars are 
deeply embedded in the environment in which they work and that, in turn, the somehow 
contribute to the creation of the object (in this case, social reality) they aim at exploring’44 
 Another take on the concept of national security by Julian Richards offers perhaps the 
most insightful perspective on how we should approach national security. Firstly, Richards 
recognises the nature of security as a social construct, a construct which is not static, but more 
or less fluid, depending on the dictates of society, circumstance and indeed political actors 
within that state, which together initiate, prioritise and reinforce various processes of 
securitisation according to their threat agendas. In addition to highlighting the socially 
constructed nature of security, Richards provides a brief historical analysis of National security, 
separating the evolution of the "nation" as a concept and that of "security".  Concluding that 
'"National security" is defined as a particular articulation of security priorities and concerns 
put forward by the political leaders of a state, at a given time in history….these concerns [are] 
constructed around the interests of a particular set of people, identified as the citizens of the 
state."45 Like Ziemke, he also highlights the importance of identifying and understanding the 
National Interest of a state, because it is the defence of this ultimate referent object (Ultimate 
Concerns in Ziemke's wording), that a state's actions in the face of certain perceived threats are 
                                                 
43 Nnkechi Anyadike, 'Boko Haram And National Security Challenges In Nigeria; Causes And Solutions' (2013) 
4 Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development. 
44 Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik Jorgensen and Antje Wiener, 'The Social Construction Of Europe' (2011) 6 
Journal of European Public Policy. p.531 
45 Julian Richards, a Guide to National Security (Oxford University Press 2012). p.16-17 
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determined.46 However, one can observe in Richards’ observations that he does not necessarily 
pinpoint where the ultimate referent object lies, whether it is the citizens of the state or the 
values of the State itself. Instead, he highlights a bigger picture, aiming to characterise a much 
broader concept of national security, identifying that various versions of national security exist 
in different states. In doing so, he examines the influence of internal political processes, 
bureaucratic configurations and considers the effects of the influence of time (as well as the 
differences in perspectives of analysts, constructivists, liberals etc.), as determinants of what 
the ultimate referent object for a particular state's National Security is, without necessarily 
airing a subjective opinion as to where he believes these ultimate concerns should lie. 
From the author's understanding of the assessed perspectives, in addition to a plethora 
of proposed definitions of National Security, the author proposes working definitions of 
security and national security. The provision of security should be viewed herein as- a social 
process, dependent on the existence of rational personalities which ensure the conscious 
and continual provision of stable parameters around referent objects in order to maintain 
a status quo, within the context of a society, and therefore defines National Security herein, 
as the expression of a consensus, a compilation of the expectations of citizens of a Nation, 
wherein the alleviation and mitigation of certain perceived threats to members of that 
society (Nation) and their values (referent objects), are exclusively delegated to the 
relevant institutions of the state, which are held primarily responsible for the 
identification, assessment and mitigation (or in some cases, extermination) of these 
threats. 
Securing interests, such as territory, physical wellbeing and financial stability, requires 
the investment of conscious effort, and rational decision making on the part of the state. 
Because the rational capability of any entity (including a state) is finite, rationalisation of 
phenomena requires the conscious simplification of options for choices to be made. This 
simplification process requires an entity to prioritise its options. When the process of 
prioritisation is initiated, one can then observe the deliberate preferential treatment of certain 
options by an entity, while it gradually and unconsciously deprioritises other options. When 
the process of prioritisation is superimposed on a state's finite ability to ensure the provision of 
security to objects of value, an observer can reasonably identify which objects of value are 
                                                 
46 Caroline F. Ziemke, ‘The national myth and strategic personality of Iran: a counterproliferation 
perspective’, The coming crisis: nuclear proliferation, US interests, and world order 
(MA: MIT Press 2000), 
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given priority, and the different preferential biases of states can be distilled. Therefore, 
observing a state's behaviour when it faces National Security issues pertinent to its ultimate 
survival as an entity, in comparison with observing a state's behaviour when making less critical 
decisions -such as the configuration of its national football team, enables us to observe states 
at points in time where the implications of making critical decisions, are much more severe. 
By observing state behaviour in scenarios where the implications of decisions are heightened 
in this way, it is more convenient for an observer to extract and distinguish between various 
strategic choices available to the state at points in time, when significant intellectual resources 
are dedicated to the decision making process, thereby enabling more precise observation of 
which strategic choices have been chosen, and how these choices have been made, and most 
importantly, where its ultimate concerns are. 
2.1.5 Culture, Strategy and Strategic Culture 
A casual glance at the regular activities of individuals within different social 
communities reveals striking differences.47 This is because, observable behaviour of humans 
in any given community tends to include ideas, norms, ethics and values, transmitted through 
generations thorough agents of socialisation, that are somewhat specific to the social 
community in which they are situated. These ideas, norms, ethics etc, influence the nature of 
social realities that are constructed within these societies. 48  In my view, culture is an 
encapsulation of all the social realities that exist within a defined society. However, one must 
recognise, and scrutinise authoritative definitions of concepts. Theoretically, culture has been 
defined in various ways. Below are some of the most popular authoritative definitions of culture 
have been proposed, and cited repeatedly by scholars: 49 
I use the term culture to mean an organised body of rules concerning the ways 
in which individuals in a population should communicate with one another, 
think about themselves and their environments, and behave toward one another 
and towards objects in their environments50 
Culture is a set of human-made objective and subjective elements that in the 
past have increased the probability of survival and resulted in satisfaction for 
the participants in an ecological niche, and thus became shared among those 
                                                 
47 Spradley, J. and McCurdy, D. (1975). Anthropology--the cultural perspective. New York: Wiley, p.2. 
48 Tony Bilton, Introductory Sociology, (MacMillan, 1989)p.11. 
49 This compilation was carried out by Valerie Hudson in her work on Foreign Policy Analysis, which led the 
author to investigate these propositions independently: Valerie Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis: classic and 
contemporary theory, (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers 2007) 
50 Robert LeVine, Culture, Behaviour, and Personality, (Aldine Publishing Company 1973) 
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who could communicate with each other because they had a common language 
and…lived in the same time and place51 
Culture consists [of] patterned ways of thinking, feeling and reaction, acquired 
and transmitted mainly by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of 
human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of 
culture consists of traditional (i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas and 
especially their attached values52 
Culture has fascinated humans from time immemorial and continues to do so. The study 
of culture as a concept within political science has received perhaps the greatest attention in 
comparison with other concepts. Scholars ranging from anthropology, to even strategy, such 
as Mead, Tylor, Parsons, Snyder, Snyder, and Bilton, have all delved into the concept of culture, 
utilising various theoretical lens.53 Culture has been characterised as being one of the easiest 
concepts to understand, yet one of the most difficult concepts to define theoretically.54These 
three aforementioned definitions of culture, highlight varying elements and characteristics of 
culture. However, a common denominator of all these definitions is the fact that they all try to 
define an encapsulation of social realities which are identifiable in repetitive behavior -
developed over time within the enclosure of a society. The development of symbolic 
communication, between individuals possessing the same cultural heritage, is also another 
factor of culture that they highlight. 
So, there are two sides to these definitions, firstly, the development of codified behaviour, 
from repeated behaviour, over time. Secondly, the development of symbolic meaning, and 
forms of communication that have been developed over time. With that in mind, let us take a 
look at other definitions of culture. One popular definition of culture as proposed by E B Tylor, 
views culture as: 
Culture, or civilisation, taken in its broad, ethnographic sense, is that complex 
whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and any other 
capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.55 [Tylor: 1871] 
In this context, culture is referred to as a single entity which encompasses all of 
observable human behaviour, and that this sum-total is transferrable from one human to another 
through acquisition. Tylor implies that elements of culture can only be acquired by humans 
                                                 
51 Harry Triandis, Culture and Social Behaviour, (New York: McGraw-Hill 1994) 
52 Clyde Kluckhohn, 'The Study of Culture', The Policy Sciences, (Stanford University Press 1951) 
53 See: Edward Tylor, Primitive culture, (Holt 1889) and Tony Bilton, Introductory Sociology, (MacMillan, 1989) 
and Jack Snyder, 'The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations' (www.rand.org, 
1977) 
54 Valerie Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers 2007) 
55 Edward Tylor, Primitive culture, (Holt 1889) 
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within the construct of a society. Tylor's view implies that certain innate human traits, for 
example, instinctive reactions to external stimuli, which are not acquired through learning 
within the construct of a society cannot be regarded as part of culture, and therefore reside 
outside the logical boundaries of Tylor's proposed understanding of culture.56 It must be stated 
that one must try not to confuse culture and instinct. The instinctive behaviour being any 
behaviour which is performed without being based upon prior experiences, such as a person's 
reaction to a pinch on the arm. Culture has also been defined in anthropological terms as "The 
acquired knowledge that people use to interpret experience and to generate behaviour".57 From 
this viewpoint, culture is viewed as "a set of tools" with which we utilize to understand the 
implications of certain past and present activities "to interpret experience". 58  From our 
understanding of these implications, we either curtail or modify our instinctive responses to 
stimuli by superimposing our interpretation of experience, and acting appropriately by 
"generating behaviour". The simultaneous occurrence of both interpreting experience and 
generating behaviour is a phenomenon which is necessary for actual situations, utilising 
cultural knowledge.   
Much like the constructivist distinction between material and social realities, a striking 
distinction is made between the tangible aspects of culture -such as art, law et cetera which are 
mentioned in various contemporary definitions of culture, and the intangible aspects of culture 
such as norms, myth, identity politics and so on. Therefore, cultural anthropologists as a whole, 
refer to culture exclusively as the "knowledge" that individuals use to interpret objects, events 
and actions, therefore including behaviour and excluding material tangible manifestations of 
culture.59 One of the most popular and relevant definitions of culture was proposed by Geertz 
in his 1973 anthropological work 'the Interpretation of Cultures' wherein he defined culture as:  
An historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodie[d] in symbols, a 
system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic form by a means of 
which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about 
attitudes towards life60 
Geertz as well as other prominent sociologists and anthropologists at the time 
(including Douglas and Levi-Strauss), firmly believed in the crucial role of culture in behaviour 
modification, with Geertz even suggesting ways in which patterns of meanings could lead to 
                                                 
56 Edward Tylor, Primitive culture, (Holt 1889) 
57 James Spradley and David McCurdy, Anthropology--the cultural perspective, (Wiley 1975) p.2. 
58 James Spradley and David McCurdy, Anthropology--the cultural perspective, (Wiley 1975) p.2. 
59 James Spradley and David McCurdy, Anthropology--the cultural perspective, (Wiley 1975) p.3. 
60 Clifford Geertz, The interpretation of Cultures, (Basic Books 1973)  
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unique behaviours, and provided a model of culture to supplement his proposition.61 This 
cultural knowledge serves as a set of tools useful for ‘getting along’ in life.62 To interpret the 
experiences, we encounter and simultaneously generate what we deem fit as appropriate 
behaviour in response to these experiences as they occur. The author must reiterate that the 
utility of culture (interpreting experiences and generating behaviour) occurs simultaneously, 
and are only separated in theoretical analysis, for clarity. Furthermore, the utility of culture is 
not limited to behavioural modification of individuals. Rather, it encompasses the behavioural 
modification of collectives of individuals, groups, and indeed entire societies, when they 
operate within socially constructed realities. 
Strategy, on the other hand, is commonly understood as deliberately maintaining a 
balance between ends, ways and means; the identification of objectives and the prioritisation 
of resources and methods at the disposal of the strategist, for meeting objectives.63 Thomas 
Schelling, described strategy as a series of moves initiated by an actor, aimed at influencing 
the choice of an adversarial actor, in a manner which is favourable to one's self.64 Schelling 
viewed the ultimate aim of strategy as one's manipulation of an adversary's mode of behaviour 
to the point that such an adversary is left with a simple maximisation problem, with an optimum 
solution, which is the optimum solution for one's self.65  
2.1.6 Culture and Strategy as Intervening Variables  
Considering the aforementioned perspectives on culture and strategy, one can 
reasonably anticipate that there are underlying linkages between the concept of culture and that 
of strategy. But, most importantly, one recognises that neither culture nor strategy can be 
tolerably defined without explicit reference to behaviour. In observing the functionality of 
culture and strategy, one can understand that there are quite a lot of scenarios where the 
linkages between the two phenomena become even more apparent, as both culture and strategy 
are proposed to perform the same intermediary tasks of interpreting external stimuli, and the 
modification of instinctive responses to said external stimuli. Culture and strategy can be 
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regarded as intervening variables between instinct and behaviour. Indeed, it is this relationship 
between culture and strategy that Hudson speaks of when she proposes that "what culture 
provides its members is a repertoire or palette of adaptive response from which members build 
off-the-shelf strategies of action."66 
However, two principal distinguishing factors between Culture and Strategy exist. 
Firstly, while culture is a form of interpretive mechanism which permits us to generate 
appropriate behaviour in unfolding situations, Strategy enables us to ponder upon actions in 
advance, in light of our goals and capacities.67 Secondly, unlike culture, strategy and indeed 
strategic behaviour, has an end. This means that strategy influences behaviour, in a way that is 
usually more apparent in actors with the aim of influencing anticipated events, attempting to 
guide these events in a manner that is favourable to ones' objectives at an anticipated end.68 
Whilst these distinguishing factors are relevant; it does seem that neither culture nor strategy 
can be operationalised in isolation of each other. For example, it may require cultural 
knowledge about the significance of the colors of traffic lights at intersections on the 
motorways, the intentions of other motorists, the purpose of keeping to one lane, and a variety 
of other considerations to be deemed fit to drive a car in a particular society (ideational 
variable). However, all this knowledge would not get a motorist to his/her destination without 
an understanding the physical limits of his/her automobile, range of the fuel tank in that 
automobile (material variable), and most importantly a navigation strategy to get said motorist 
from an initial location to his or her destination (strategic agency).69 The same can be said for 
states, wherein the internalised norms of warfare, the capability to engage in warfare, and the 
presence of an operating system, are all requirements for a state to engage in warfare.  
Therefore, one can reasonably conclude that cultural and strategic knowledge manifest 
simultaneously, in congruence with each other, and influencing upon each other, as they 
modify instinctive responses to stimuli. Culture and strategy both modify behaviour, in 
different contexts; culture possessing a semi-permanent influence on behaviour over an 
extended period of time, and strategy influencing behaviour with a specified end.  These 
behavioural modifications do not manifest in isolation of each other, and it is little wonder why 
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many believe that the long-term effect of cultural, behavioural modification, overlaps with 
short-term strategic plans, both in individuals and collectives. This understanding begs a new 
question. How can we identify the influence of cultural knowledge on the strategic behaviour 
of collectives such as states? 
2.1.7 The Cultural approach to Strategic Studies 
“the fog of culture has interfered with the theory and practice of strategy” - Booth70 
Perhaps owing to the overlapping nature of culture and strategy, cultural approaches to 
strategic studies have been in existence for many hundred years, in one form or the other. The 
proposition that cultural interpretations routinely influence strategy is in fact, a proposition that 
is grounded in classical strategic literature.71 Affirming this proposition are the writings of 
Thucydides72, Clausewitz73 and Sun-Tzu.74 Clausewitz consistently recognised that war and 
war-fighting strategy were a "test of moral” (ideational) as well as “physical forces." 
Clausewitz believed that the ultimate goal of strategy transcended victory on the battlefield, 
stating that the ultimate goal of strategy was the elimination of the adversaries' morale to 
continue waging war.75 Attempts to focus on cultural influences on the behaviour of entire 
societies such as states, have been driven by a need to proffer alternative explanations to the 
relatively simplified explanations proffered by the realist and neo-realist schools of thought.76 
This is not to propose that cultural approaches to strategic studies necessarily reject rationality, 
rather, it implies that a pure realist approach to strategic matters can be furnished with insight 
from cultural interpretations of strategic choice. They believe that rationality, being one of the 
most common examples of strategic judgement, is influenced by the culture within which 
rationality receives approval. Poore argues that it is insufficient to utilise any theory which 
assumes that the strategic behaviours of various states can be solely determined by immutable 
external forces such as international anarchy and the distribution of power in the international 
system, without understanding the specific social context within which such a state operates, 
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and the values which it grants priority.77 The realist and neo-realist frameworks according to 
Poore’s logic, are guilty of this; simplifying the influence of culture on collective rationality, 
discounting the accumulated knowledge and implications of the past, whilst favouring forward-
looking calculations of expected utility, which have produced limited explanations regarding 
state behaviour.78 
In focusing on material variables alone, we are robbed of a comprehensive 
understanding of how and why certain threats are prioritised over others, by the operating 
system. Perhaps the reason certain states choose to elevate the threat of terrorism to one which 
requires significant urgency, is because they consider terrorism to be far more corrosive to the 
interests of the state, in comparison to the impact of motor accidents, even though statistically, 
the impact of motor accidents evidently causes significantly higher loss of life and property 
within the state. Perhaps this biased focus on terrorism may be assigned to the fact that 
terrorism as a threat, is usually elevated, because it is orchestrated and operationalised by 
malicious agency, against the state. In contrast, the threats posed by motor accidents or natural 
causes, do not enjoy this sort of prioritisation, because of the lack of malicious intent and 
agency in these threats. Therefore, in reacting to threats such as terrorism, the state is aware of 
a much higher degree of flexibility in the strategies employed by terrorist organisations. In 
return, the strategies employed by operating systems are formulated by rational beings, outside 
the purview of low-level politics, capable of exponentially increasing the aggressiveness of the 
response to the terrorist threat. 
This is where the understanding of ideational variables, becomes more relevant. Surely, 
there must be an idea about the risks posed by terrorism, which facilitates the counterintuitive 
prioritisation of terrorism over a statistically, more dangerous threat, posed by road accidents. 
There surely is an influence of ideational considerations, which overrides statistical objectivity, 
and it should not be ignored. When we start to consider how states respond to threats which are 
orchestrated by humans, we must consider both the material capabilities of states, as well as 
the ideological considerations, which determine how these material capabilities are utilised. 
The fact that one can always identify the individuals or organisations which are required to 
coordinate the reactions of states to malicious threats makes it possible for the researcher to 
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identify state behaviour, which one can observe to understand how, why and where states react 
to malicious threats.  
Matters within the realm of strategy are infinite, and scholars have attempted to focus 
on specific strategic matters where they believe the influence of culture on strategy, is most 
apparent. Since the early 1930s, political scientists, historians and army personnel have sought 
to proffer theories that explain the various strategies employed, attitudes towards, and tolerance 
of, nation states with regards to the use of force. This specific problem which is inherently 
interdisciplinary has been present in literature spanning from military history to sociology and 
even anthropology. Notably, the most substantial contributions of a conceptual nature to this 
body of literature stemmed from political scientists studying international security. An initial 
contribution to this area of knowledge which is now generally referred to as ‘Strategic Culture', 
was suggested by Lieutenant Basil H Liddell Hart, who put forward the argument in his book 
“The British Way in Warfare” which was published in 1932, in which he claimed that a 
sanctioned British “way in warfare” existed.79 This was followed decades later by Russell 
Weigley's "The American Way of Warfare” which was published in 1973.  
2.1.8 Strategic Culture 
It was not until the 1970s however that the phrase ‘Strategic Culture' became accepted 
as an appropriate label to identify this field of inquiry. The phrase was coined by an american 
political scientist, Jack Snyder, in a report examining Soviet nuclear deterrence policy. His 
report, “The Soviet Strategic Culture; Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations" was 
principally an examination of the factors which were thought to be significant enough to 
considerably influence Soviet reactions- if the United States of America, carried out limited 
nuclear operations against the Soviet Union. Snyder defined Strategic Culture as the "sum total 
of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of 
a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation”.80 Contending 
that the uniqueness of Soviet strategic culture was crucial in shaping Soviet thought and 
behaviour regarding matters of strategy.81 Snyder further proposed that political elites seem to 
articulate a unique strategic culture with regards to security and military affairs, which in his 
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belief, was a wider manifestation of the influence of culture on strategy. He went further to 
propose that   
a set of general beliefs, attitudes, and behaviour patterns with regard to nuclear 
strategy has achieved a state of semi-permanence that places them on the level 
of cultural rather than mere policy. 82 
It is evident that Snyder thought of culture, as the presence of beliefs and attitudes, 
which facilitated the perpetual repetition of a set of behaviours. One does get the idea that he 
believed at a certain point, that the mechanical repetition of certain behaviour, was not as a 
result of policy but had moved up to the realm of ‘cultural' behaviour. Snyder thought culture 
to be a much more influential modifier of behaviour, than policy. 
So what was the context within which his research emerged? At the time of Snyder's 
research, the then United States Secretary of Defence, James Schlesinger, sought to ‘increase 
the flexibility of its strategic targeting plans' and viewed the development of ‘pre-planned 
nuclear options' as a viable supplement, which was less ambiguous in comparison to a plethora 
of options which had been previously considered. At the time, concerns of uncontrolled nuclear 
escalation between the United States and the Soviet Union were viewed as an immediate and 
urgent threat to international stability. It was also believed that the credibility of an American 
response to Soviet attacks on its territories and that of its allies would be enhanced if the US 
possessed an unambiguous plan of action which would be perceived as being below the SIOP 
(Single Integrated Operations Plan) threshold. The conceptualisation of Strategic Culture by 
Snyder was in effect necessitated by a need for the United States government to understand the 
motives and ideational foundations of Soviet strategic thought. Unable to reconcile Soviet 
decision-making styles with rational choice theory, Snyder finally concluded that the Soviet's 
unique historical experiences, political institutions, as well as its strategic situation "combined 
to produce a unique mix of strategic beliefs.83 Lantis viewed Snyder’s work on strategic culture, 
as a crucial catalyst which redirected attention to a possible nexus between political culture, 
military culture and strategic choice.84  
                                                 
82 Jack Snyder, 'The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations' (www.rand.org, 1977) 
<http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2005/R2154.pdf> accessed 15 January 2015. 
83 Lawrence Sondhaus, Strategic Culture and Ways Of War (1st edn, Routledge 2010). See also: Jack Snyder, 
'The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations' (www.rand.org, 1977) 
<http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2005/R2154.pdf> accessed 15 January 2015. 
84 Lantis J, 'Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz To Constructivism' (2006) Contract No: DTRA01-03-D-0017, 
Technical Instruction 18-06-02 Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office 
Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum <https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dtra/stratcult-claus.pdf> accessed 7 
February 2015 
Olamide Samuel - 1401236 - University of Buckingham 
 37 
Also in the 1970’s, Ken Booth began to raise similar concerns about the role of 
ethnocentrism in strategic thought.85 Booth went further to explore the ideational foundations 
of nuclear strategy and superpower relations.86 He believed that without accounting for the 
obscuring effects which culture could have on strategic thinking, analysts could arrive at grave 
misunderstandings of enemy intent and strategic position. He, therefore, called for a careful 
application of cultural relativism within the study and practice of strategy.87 Booth further 
appealed to strategists to be more aware of the manner in which their cultural contexts could 
influence their thinking.88 Professing that “an observer cannot completely eradicate his own 
cultural conditioning, and the structure of ideas and values which it passes on to him.”89 
However, one problem remained unaddressed. No one proponent of strategic culture had 
explicitly defined what cultural behaviour was. It was still, essentially, a foggy concept that 
influenced strategy. 
2.1.8.1 The Uncontrolled Development of a Theoretical Framework 
In the 1980s, the study of Strategic Culture rapidly burst out of its initial subject of 
analysis and went on to examine a plethora of non-nuclear security issues. This was in part 
attributed to concerns about misunderstandings and misrepresentations which plagued 
superpower relations, especially in matters of nuclear strategy.90 It was believed that these 
misrepresentations could have also made their ways into non-nuclear security issues and that 
they needed to be identified. Another possible reason for strategic culture's increased popularity 
was, in part, as a result of Ann Swidler's proposal of a more complex model of culture which 
encapsulated various links between culture and state behaviour.91 She proposed that the nexus 
between culture and state behaviour was mediated by cultural “strategies of action”. Although, 
she proposed a rather typical definition of culture as consisting of “symbolic vehicles of 
                                                 
84 Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Carl Von Clausewitz On War (Princeton University Press 1984) 
85 Jounghyun Choi, 'The Evolution Of Strategic Cultures Of Divided Countries: A Case Study On The Continuities 
And Changes Of Korean Strategic Culture And Strategic Relations On The Peninsula Since 1948' (PhD, 
University of Reading 2009). 
86 Ken Booth, Strategy And Ethnocentrism (1st edn, Taylor and Francis 2014). 
87 Ken Booth, Strategy And Ethnocentrism (1st edn, Taylor and Francis 2014). 
88 Lawrence Sondhaus, Strategic Culture and Ways Of War (1st edn, Routledge 2010). See also: Jack Snyder, 
'The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations' (www.rand.org, 1977) 
<http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2005/R2154.pdf> accessed 15 January 2015. 
89 Ken Booth, Strategy And Ethnocentrism (1st edn, Taylor and Francis 2014). 
90 Jounghyun Choi, 'The Evolution Of Strategic Cultures Of Divided Countries: A Case Study On The Continuities 
And Changes Of Korean Strategic Culture And Strategic Relations On The Peninsula Since 1948' (PhD, 
University of Reading 2009). 
91 Lantis J, 'Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz To Constructivism' (2006) Contract No: DTRA01-03-D-0017, 
Technical Instruction 18-06-02 Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office 
Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum <https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dtra/stratcult-claus.pdf> accessed 7 
February 2015 
Olamide Samuel - 1401236 - University of Buckingham 
 38 
meaning, including beliefs, ritual practices, art forms, and ceremonies, as well as informal 
cultural practices such as language, gossip, stories and rituals of daily life”, 92  She did, 
however, innovatively reconceptualise culture as an explanatory variable which could grant 
capability advantages to action, stating that "Action is not to be determined by one's values. 
Rather, action and values are organised to take advantage of cultural competences"93 Again, 
Swidler’s argument, served as a potential link between culture and cultural behaviour, thereby 
enabling scholars to propose different means through which cultural behaviour could influence 
strategy. 
Strategic Culture was soon categorised into three major schools of thought by Johnston, 
less than two decades after it was conceptualised. This categorisation, was an attempt by 
Johnston, to extinguish a great deal of confusion facing political scientists who found it 
problematic to wade through the concept of strategic culture. This confusion was not surprising, 
especially since half of the etymological structure of the concept remained loosely defined. 
These categories were called the "first generation", "second generation", and "third generation" 
of writers.94 Each of the generations of research on strategic culture were differentiated by 
Johnston, based on either their unique conceptual or methodological approaches to the subject 
of strategic culture.   
2.1.8.2  In Search of Synergistic Links between Culture and State Strategy 
In Johnston's opinion, the first generation of authors were primarily interested in 
describing a synergistic link between strategic culture and policy regarding weapons of mass 
destruction.95 Scholars such as David R. Jones,96 Jack Snyder, and Gray97 were identified as 
belonging to this category. These scholars viewed culture as possessing a semi-permanent 
influence on elite-proposed policy. For example, Gray was of the opinion that, as a result of 
America’s national historical experience, Americans had generated unique “modes of thought 
and action with respect to force”,98 and that his explanation of distinctive national styles would 
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provide an enduring explanation of state's behaviour concerning foreign policy.99 Booth also 
defined strategic culture as: 
a nation’s traditions, values attitudes, patterns of behaviour, habits, customs, 
achievement and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving 
problems with respect to the threat or use of force100 
This generation of scholars focused intently on why Soviets and Americans thought 
rather differently about nuclear strategy. Scholars such as David R. Jones, Jack Snyder, and 
Colin Gray contended that these variances were as a result of unique macro-environmental 
variations which were deeply rooted in subjective historical experiences, unique political 
cultures and geographical constraints.101 In the same vein, strategic culture proponents suggest 
that scholars such as Ade Adefuye, inadvertently explored the influence of strategic culture on 
sub-Saharan,  states in his 1992 work, Culture, and Foreign Policy: The Nigerian Example.102 
2.1.8.3 Strategic Culture as a Tool 
The Second Generation of scholars included individuals such as Klein,103 Klein104 and 
Luckham.105 These authors, highlighted the role of self-interest on the decision-makers’ part, 
as another crucial factor other than strategic culture, which could influence the strategic choices 
of states. Within the second generation school of thought, it was a widely accepted premise 
that leaders of strategic communities did not necessarily act in accordance with their expressed 
motives. In other words, it was observed that there was a vast difference between what leaders 
thought and said, and the deeper motives for their thoughts and actions.106 
Theoretical expansion of this premise resulted in the second generation proposing that 
one had to delink strategic culture explicitly, and observed behaviour, in order to separate 
strategic behaviour which stemmed from actual strategic culture, and strategic behaviour which 
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was a result of the influence of decision-makers seeking to achieve their self-interests.107 
According to second generation scholars, this delinkage was necessitated by observations of 
strategic behaviour in which general strategic orientation seemed to follow a proposed strategic 
culture, but actual operational strategy, on the other hand, reflected the specific interests of 
decision makers.108 Put forward initially in the mid-1980s; these scholars viewed strategic 
culture as a possible tool of political elites. These authors tended to focus more on the issue of 
instrumentality of strategic culture, and proposed that Strategic Culture was primarily relevant 
as a socialising mechanism for both decision-makers, and members of a strategic community 
– ‘a tool of political hegemony'.109  
This proposition made it possible for second generation scholars to view strategic 
culture as a means through which interest-driven political elites could establish and influence 
approaches to violence, in a manner which the state could utilise violence against its adversaries 
and still appear to be acting within the parameters of what is legitimately acceptable in that 
society.110  In theorising about leaders seeking to legitimise violence, one does wonder if the 
second generation were conceptualising on strategic culture or some form of early precursor to 
securitisation theory. It was also unanimously accepted in this school of thought, that the 
utilisation of strategic culture as a tool of political hegemony, resulted in strategic cultures 
incrementally differing from state to state, over time.   
2.1.8.4 Strategic Culture as a Falsifiable Theory  
The Third Generation of scholars according to Johnston, emphasised that for strategic 
culture to be relevant and useful, it must be a theory which is falsifiable.111 This generation of 
scholars advocated for a revision of the strategic culture concept. Pushing for a more narrowly 
defined and specific theory, which excluded behaviour and self-interest as independent 
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variables. Johnston classified himself in this generation of scholars along with Jeffrey Legro112 
and Kier113. In fact, Johnston attempted to proffer a much narrower definition of strategic 
culture. He understood strategic culture as an integrated system of ‘symbols’ which establish 
long-lasting preferences by conceptually determining the role of military force in interstate 
political affairs, which as a result granted these concepts “such an aura of factuality that the 
strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious”.114 In attempting to redefine the 
concept of strategic culture, his definition seemed to be remarkably similar to Snyder’s initial 
definition of strategic culture.115 In addition, his ‘narrow’ definition, still included loosely 
defined terms such as ‘symbols’ and ‘systems of symbols’, which in his opinion included 
“argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors”, all these terms and constructs 
which resulted in his inability to relate strategic culture, to behavioural choices.116  
2.1.9 The Unravelling of Strategic Culture  
Strategic culture as we have seen, was developed following a specific need to 
understand state strategy with regards to the use of force, from an alternative cultural 
perspective, challenging the realist assumption that the strategic behaviours of states could be 
solely determined by immutable external forces. It was as a result of the gaping dissatisfaction 
with the realist approach that there was an additional need to understand the meaning of state 
reactions to the use of force. The specific social context within which a state operates, in light 
of its unique historical experiences, was perhaps the only way in which scholars could identify 
and theorise on the non-material considerations which could reasonably influence state strategy. 
As promising as the notion of strategic culture seemed, scholars were then burdened with the 
task of developing a theory which could exhaustively explain what these non-material 
considerations were, and how these non-material considerations influenced state behaviour. In 
analysing strategic culture, the following shortcomings became apparent to the author. 
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2.1.9.1 The Problem of Infinite Independent Variables 
Although first-generation scholars of strategic culture did provide innovative insight on 
the possible nexus between culture and strategic behaviour of states, it was plagued with 
foundational problems with regards to the definition, scope of application and methodology of 
strategic culture. 117 Firstly, the first generation defined culture in extensive terms, running the 
risk of making it ‘practically meaningless'.118 The lack of a unified definition of ‘culture' by 
strategic culture proponents in this generation, meant that there was a lack of consensus on 
what this concept meant, thereby influencing researchers to view and approach culture 
differently.119  Furthermore, the definition of ‘Strategic Culture’ as a unified concept, was 
remarkably vague, and tautological at best. Johnston notes that various definitions of strategic 
culture from this generation, regarded “technology, geography, organisational culture and 
traditions, historical strategic practices, political culture, national character, political 
psychology, ideology, and even international system culture”120 as legitimate variables within 
the scope of strategic culture. This problem, also manifests itself in the inclusion of scholars 
such as Adefuye, who never explicitly expressed any ontological or methodological alignment 
with strategic culture, but was in essence, claimed by other proponents of strategic culture. The 
proponents in this generation were also guilty of oversimplifying the influence of complicated 
domestic factors on national strategy and reducing these factors to mere variables within the 
strategic culture theoretical framework. Obviously, when proponents of strategic culture failed 
to specify the theory's level of analysis, there was always the risk that variables would be 
imported from every level of analysis, and the relative importance of some these variables 
would be oversimplified. The strategic culture theoretical framework was so far-reaching that 
                                                 
117 It is interesting to note that Jeremy Black, warned against the indiscriminate application of this theory, arguing 
that the concept of strategic culture required quite a degree of flexibility to operate. This warning, however, did 
not hinder scholars from attempting to develop this concept into an increasingly sophisticated theoretical 
framework, as it gained some degree of popularity amongst political scientists who considered Strategic Culture 
as an operable alternative to Rational Choice Theory. Perhaps, because of the inability of Rational Choice Theory 
to proffer a convincing explanation for Soviet strategic thought and behaviour. The specific and narrow definition 
of ‘rationality’ employed by proponents of Rational Choice theory- which implied that an actor ‘acts as if it were 
balancing costs against benefits to arrive at action that maximizes personal advantage’-was one which excluded 
many considerations, such as the influence of the early formative experiences of a state-amongst other omissions. 
Johnston argued that these experiences, ensure that ‘different states have [developed] different predominant 
strategic preferences’. 
118  Alastair Iain Johnston, 'Thinking About Strategic Culture' (1995) 19 International Security 
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539119> accessed 19 November 2014. 
119  Jounghyun Choi, 'The Evolution Of Strategic Cultures Of Divided Countries: A Case Study On The 
Continuities And Changes Of Korean Strategic Culture And Strategic Relations On The Peninsula Since 1948' 
(PhD, University of Reading 2009). 
120  Alastair Iain Johnston, 'Thinking About Strategic Culture' (1995) 19 International Security 
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539119> accessed 19 November 2014. 
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it encapsulated almost all possible explanatory variables which could influence strategic choice, 
to the extent that there was hardly any conceptual space for a non-strategic culture explanation 
of strategic choice.121  
In attempting to explain what the relevant non-material influencers of state strategy 
were, first-generation scholars set a precedent, of enumerating various concepts from cultural 
studies, such as ideas, emotional responses, behaviour, imitation et cetera and including them 
as variables within the strategic cultural framework. The implication of this haphazard 
inclusion was that, when this theory was subjected to academic scrutiny, it was discovered that 
every variable included, had to be exhaustively defined, identified in real terms, and its 
interactions with other variables, accounted for. Whilst strategic culture scholars proposed the 
merits of strategic culture, and highlighted the intuitive genius underscoring the cultural 
approach to strategic use of force, these scholars were soon to discover the demerits of 
proposing a theoretical framework with numerous non-material variables. The strategic culture 
theoretical framework, was not intended to be superimposed on the plethora of security issues 
that subsequent proponents of the theory had applied strategic culture to, and subsequent 
generations of the strategic culture school of thought, were hardly restrained by any mechanism 
within the strategic culture theoretical framework, with regards to the scope of non-material 
independent variables that were up for consideration. 
In addition, each researcher attempted to encapsulate the strategic culture theoretical 
framework rather differently, proposing labels such as ‘political culture’, ‘security culture’, 
‘military culture’, ‘military organisational culture’, ‘ways of warfare’, ‘national style’, 
‘strategic personality’ and ‘defence culture’, to name a few.122 These numerous labels led to 
the subsequent description of strategic culture as ‘thick’ and ‘descriptive’, and as an 
“academically unfashionable subject of national character”.123 Lantis citing Klein, argued that 
only a “comparative, in-depth study of the formation, influence and process of change in the 
strategic cultures of the major powers of the modern era”124 could positively contribute to the 
study of war and peace. 125  The efficiency of Strategic Culture in aiding policymakers’ 
                                                 
121  Alastair Iain Johnston, 'Thinking About Strategic Culture' (1995) 19 International Security 
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539119> accessed 19 November 2014. 
122  Jounghyun Choi, 'The Evolution Of Strategic Cultures Of Divided Countries: A Case Study On The 
Continuities And Changes Of Korean Strategic Culture And Strategic Relations On The Peninsula Since 1948' 
(PhD, University of Reading 2009). 
123 Gregory F. Treverton and Colin S. Gray, 'The Geopolitics Of Super Power' (1988) 67 Foreign Affairs. 
124 Yitzhak Klein, 'A Theory Of Strategic Culture' (1991) 10 Comparative Strategy. 
125 Lantis J, 'Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz To Constructivism' (2006) Contract No: DTRA01-03-D-0017, 
Technical Instruction 18-06-02 Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office 
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understanding of the perceptions of different actors in international relations, and its 
consequent ability to eventually reduce ambiguity and misinformation with regards to strategic 
choice, are also considerations which make the case for the introduction of the NSSP theory. 
In addition, the perpetual disagreement on the importance of culture in strategy, and the failing 
final attempts made by third generation scholars to somehow eliminate, or at best minimise the 
influence of Culture in an attempt to produce a falsifiable theory out of strategic culture, 
remains perhaps, the most enduring hindrance of strategic culture.  
With such an observation by Kelin, the factors which should be considered in 
generating an NSSP theory becomes increasingly evident. The NSSP theory needs to be 
capable to perform in-depth investigations into the formation, processes of change and 
personality of national security strategy, against modern threats such as malicious non-state 
actors. Understandably, it is quite difficult to theorise on ideational milieus which influence 
state strategy, utilising only material variables. This is perhaps why strategic culture scholars 
imported numerous ideational variables as an avenue through which a state's ways of strategy 
could be understood. However, the NSSP theory approaches this issue from a unique standpoint, 
by focusing on state behaviour. Observable state behaviour, is a result of material as well as 
ideational milieus, which enables us to understand the operationalisation state strategy as a 
result of its material limits, and ideational limits. Arguably, the physical capabilities of states 
are easier to identify in comparison to ideational limits. However, the author proposes that 
ideational milieus can be identified by identifying the purpose of state behaviour, by analysing 
its end. Asking about whom or what the state is protecting from threats, as well as how the state 
eliminates threats and where the state identifies threats, enables scholars to distil the general 
purpose of state behaviour in instances where it can be identified. These observations are 
proposed to be adequately addressed by the NSSP theory, as shall be shown in the next chapter. 
2.1.9.2  The Ambiguous Dependent Variable 
Much like the first generation of strategic culture, the author observed a great deal of 
confusion with regards to second generation theorising about the nature of strategic culture. It 
remains unclear whether strategic culture was to be seen as a dependent variable, or as a tool. 
In referring to strategic culture as a tool utilised to create political hegemony within a strategic 
community, the second generation failed to propose a refined definition of strategic culture, 
before introducing additional variables or categorising strategic culture as a tool. The second 
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generation also struggled to identify if, in reality, there were certain decision makers who were 
capable of objectively utilising strategic culture as a tool to serve their varying self-interests. 
Johnston cited recent research on organisational culture at the time, published by Hollander,126 
wherein it was proposed that “elites too are socialised in the strategic culture they produce and 
thus can be constrained by the symbolic myths which their predecessors created”. 127  The 
proposition that strategic culture could be utilised as a tool to enhance political hegemony, 
whilst also acting as an agent of socialisation, was at best confusing. This is because there are 
not many strategic communities tight-knit enough to possess a unique strategic culture, where 
top-level decision makers can be immune to the socialising effects of strategic culture. Unless 
of course, if proponents assume that top-level decision makers either are not subjected to the 
same socialisation process at some formative point in their membership of a strategic 
community, or on the other hand, that these top-level decision makers are capable of relieving 
themselves of all relics of the socialisation process when they achieve a high-level status, to 
the point that they can rationally and objectively manipulate the very strategic cultures they too 
have been  socialised in, without the constraining effects of the strategic culture in question. 
Both of these assumptions seem far-fetched, and it remains unclear whether we should expect 
the strategic culture to influence the behaviour of the political elites, or if these elites enjoy a 
level of immunity from their strategic culture, especially since these elites can be largely 
constrained by the symbolic myths which their predecessors have created. Second generation 
literature also remains wholly unclear about a fundamental argument within strategic culture; 
if cross-national differences in strategy are expected to exist as a result of strategic culture.128 
As we have seen in the Second-generation school of thought, the attempts at 
reinvigorating the strategic culture idea were overshadowed by an inadequate conceptualisation 
of strategic culture as a dependent variable. The second-generation school of thought, by 
implication, exposed the lack of rigidity within the strategic culture theoretical framework. By 
proposing that strategic culture could be conceptualised as a tool of utility to elite decision 
makers, these scholars exposed another problem which the inclusion of infinite independent 
variables in the theoretical framework had caused.  Successfully proposing that strategic culture 
could be viewed as anything other than the encapsulating construct proposed by first-
                                                 
126 Edwin P. Hollander, 'leadership and Power', Handbook of Social Psychology, (New York: Addison-Wesley, 
1985)  
127  Alastair Iain Johnston, 'Thinking About Strategic Culture' (1995) 19 International Security 
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539119> accessed 19 November 2014. 
128 Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, 'Comparative Strategic Cultures 
Literature Review (Part 1)' (Center for Contemporary Conflict 2006). 
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generation scholars, meant that scholars were also free to debate on the nature and functions of 
strategic culture as a dependent variable. Some viewed strategic culture as a context, others 
viewed strategic culture as a variable, others viewed strategic culture as an outcome -of 
millennia of repetitive action by decision-making elites. As a result, strategic culture was 
rendered vulnerable and perceived as a free-for-all theory. Besides, methodology applicable to 
strategic culture was only limited by the imaginations of scholars interested in the concept, who 
approached the subject (as explained in the next paragraph), utilising a cocktail of proposed 
independent variables, and loosely constructed dependent variables to creatively approach 
various subject matters of their specific interests without restraint. The NSSP theory inherently 
addresses both the problems of infinite independent variables and ambiguous dependent 
variables, by virtue of its nature as a carefully constructed explanatory typology, with defined 
independent and dependent variables.  
2.1.9.3 Strategic Culture as Anyone’s Game 
The author has taken the liberty to identify and label the fourth school of thought within 
strategic culture as the "Conciliatory School of thought". This school of thought encompasses 
all scholars who seek to utilise the concept of strategic culture in various security-related fields, 
drawing upon previously conceptualised notions of strategic culture within the three 
generations of scholars. These scholars in applying strategic culture to their specific areas of 
research interest, attempt to criticise the theoretical framework of strategic culture, while also 
simultaneously applying modified concepts of strategic culture to said particular line of inquiry. 
The constant denominator in this school of thought is that scholars approach strategic culture 
with biased predilections for a particular generation's school of thought, which usually, is most 
aligned with their subjective ontological inclinations, and as a result, these scholars promulgate 
their ideas based on these predilections. Scholars such as Basrur and Morgan fall under this 
category. Basrur laments the "lack of theoretical rigour in demonstrating the linkage between 
identified cultural traits and actual behaviour"129 proposing that a limited definition of strategic 
culture needs to be conceptualised to be efficient in the present age. In his publication, he 
identifies strategic culture as having three elements. The Structural, Ideational and 
Praxiological elements. According to Basrur, the ideational element of strategic culture 
includes a country's "basic assumptions and beliefs". In other words, its perception of the 
international environment, as well as its "operational level" doctrine. The praxiological element 
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of strategic culture "consists of the repetitive patterns of action over time"130  (Reiterating 
Snyder's original concept of strategic Culture), and the structural element of strategic culture 
are understood in a 3-tier "structural frame" which measures a country's level of "tolerance for 
ambiguity", its "reactions towards arms limitation regimes", and its "level of restraint in times 
of crisis". Thus, Basrur initiated the notion that strategic culture could be viewed as a dynamic 
and intermediate factor which influences the actions and reactions of a state in response to 
internal and external stimuli. Basrur is quite interesting because he analyses as non-western 
subject of strategic culture. Another conciliatory scholar, Forrest Morgan, argued that strategic 
culture merely conditions the behaviour of decision-makers in a state, rather than determining 
behaviour. Morgan viewed strategic culture as an "intermediate structure" which influenced a 
state's reaction to internal and external stimuli and served as something similar to an 
interpretory mechanism.131  
The strategic culture narrative resembles a chaotic landscape consisting of countless 
opinions, divergence and disagreement from a host of contributing scholars. The strategic 
culture field still remains in a poorly defined, hyper debated landscape, where inclusive 
variables (each in their own right, complicated terms) are grossly oversimplified.132 Revised 
versions of the strategic culture theoretical framework are routinely proposed; each attempt, a 
more sophisticated way of reconceptualising strategic culture.  
From this chaotic landscape, however, generations of scholarship have emerged, each 
with their respective merits and demerits, all serving to proffer greater understanding of the 
underlying nexus between culture and the state's strategic behaviour. However, analysis of the 
strategic culture discourse exposes immense room for refinement of the strategic culture 
theoretical framework, and the need for a standard definition of strategic culture is ever more 
apparent. Lantis identifies the need to interrogate the universality of strategic culture, amongst 
a plethora of problems plaguing this theoretical framework, 133  moreover, it is a wise 
proposition that careful deconstruction of the strategic culture theoretical framework could 
assist policymakers and academics alike, to establish more accurate and specific theoretical 
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frameworks which could be utilised to eliminate the uncertainty and ambiguity which persists 
within the realm of state strategy. The proposed NSSP framework, emerges from a careful 
deconstruction of the strategic culture theoretical framework, taking into account the strengths 
and weaknesses of the different generations of the strategic culture framework. The NSSP 
theoretical framework is also unique, because of its constructivist approach to the subject. By 
aiming to identify the impact of repetitive behaviour and norms, on the construction of the 
Nigerian National Security Strategic Personality, it follows the overarching contributions made 
by constructivist approaches which ‘include the impact of norms and ideas on the construction 
of identities and behaviour’134 
2.1.10 Origins of the National Security Strategic Personality Typology 
Caroline Ziemke first proposed the concept of Strategic Personality Types in her work 
titled ‘Strategic Personality and the Effectiveness of Nuclear Deterrence’. She too proposed 
that the strategic personality type of a state could be identified by focusing on the state's 
ultimate concerns. These ultimate concerns are referred to as "the set of material, moral, or 
ideological factors that have emerged over the state's history as the keys to its long-term 
survival, cohesion, and sense of national well-being."135 She went further to highlight the 
constantly evolving nature of a state's ultimate concerns, and additionally stated that states' 
perceptions of the effects of events (external stimuli), their identification of threats and 
vulnerabilities in addition to their scale of preference for their strategic options, were all 
characteristic of their habitual perspective and decision-making styles.136 Ziemke went further 
to develop a strategic personality methodology, which sought to compartmentalise (in theory), 
the various types of strategic personalities which exist. Originally adopting typologies from 
personal psychology, her methodology focused on how states have been observed to behave in 
the pursuance of their Ultimate Concerns. As a result, she proposed that three aspects of state 
behaviour are of utmost relevance in her Strategic Personality methodology, with each aspect 
resembling human psychological traits. These are:  
 A State's Orientation to the 'Outside World' (analysing whether a state seeks the 
pursuance of its Ultimate Concerns in an "introverted" or "extroverted" manner). 
                                                 
134 Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik Jorgensen and Antje Wiener, 'The Social Construction Of Europe' (2011) 6 
Journal of European Public Policy. p.532 
135 Caroline F. Ziemke, Philippe Loustaunau, and Amy Alrich, Strategic Personality and the Effectiveness of 
nuclear Deterrence, D-2537 (Alexandria, V A: Institute for Defense Analyses, November 2000). 
136 Caroline F. Ziemke, Philippe Loustaunau, and Amy Alrich, Strategic Personality and the Effectiveness of 
nuclear Deterrence, D-2537 (Alexandria, V A: Institute for Defense Analyses, November 2000). 
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 A State's prioritisation preference (i.e. the kinds of information which attracts the 
attention of the state, and in which it invests the most resources into), "sensing or 
intuitive" and finally,  
 How the state analyses the information it attends to, defines its interests and decides to 
act. "thinking or feeling"137  
This typology, essentially categorised states' unique personalities, according to the 
observed behaviours individual states exhibit, in relation to the observer's identification of a 
state's ultimate concerns. She utilised this means of observation, to facilitate comparison and 
analysis of state personality. For clarification, a tabularised explanation of Ziemke's Strategic 
Personality typology shows that each state's strategic personality is made up of three qualities 
identified in each tier of her categorisation. This meant, that a state's strategic personality could 
be 'Extroverted, Intuitive and Feeling' or 'Introverted, Intuitive and Feeling' for example, but 
could not be 'Extroverted, Introverted and Feeling', as the extroverted and introverted 
characteristics of state behaviour, fall under the same category of external orientation. 
Therefore, she believed that a state could not possess the qualities of being extroverted and 
introverted, at the same time. The table shown below explains. 
Country Type A Type B 
External Orientation Introverted Extroverted 
Attention Preference Sensing Intuitive 
Strategic Behavior Thinking Feeling 
 
The Strategic Personality typology developed by Ziemke, was not particularly useful 
in understanding and grouping the behaviour of a wide range of states which she had placed 
under observation, although she was able to only loosely identify Strategic Personality Types 
of twenty states. For example, Ziemke proposes that the United States' strategic personality is 
Extroverted, Intuitive and Feeling, while China, for example, is Introverted, Sensing and 
Feeling, in contrast. 138  Whilst these characteristics appear to be remarkably accurate, the 
behavioural criteria with which Ziemke categorised these states in her methodology, do not 
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appear to be consistent. It must be said that Ziemke, by virtue of her typology, was ultimately 
promulgating the long-standing beliefs of a distinct group of strategic culture proponents such 
as Jack Snyder, Ken Booth, Colin Gray and Gerald Segal who charismatically propose that 
different nations conceptualize about, and act upon strategic matters in different ways, based 
on their unique strategic cultures and habitual decision-making styles.   
So, whilst the author deems it fit to utilise Ziemke's typology with regards to the incisive 
potential of the configuration of some of her independent variables, the author believes that 
there is an overwhelming need for the revision, adaptation and development of Ziemke's 
typology. This is because, the dependent variables of the typology, are much too broad to be 
utilised as a reasonable perspective with which scholars can reliably understand and anticipate 
the strategic preferences of states. For example, while she accurately identifies the existence of 
Extroverted and Introverted states, utilising cumulative information about states’ past 
behaviour with regards to the scope of operational theatres within which these states actively 
consider as being within the domain of their national interests (ultimate concerns), elements 
such as the state’s attention preference, categorised as Sensing or intuitive, come across as 
rather ambiguous, as these elements are so broad, that it leaves substantial room for 
interpretational bias, and various researchers utilising this theoretical framework can quickly 
come to different conclusions when applying this theoretical framework to the same case study. 
In addition, considering that this craving to understand state's strategic personalities is 
especially inspired by a much more specific need to understand state strategy within the context 
of self-preservation against actors directly seeking to compromise the perceived longevity of 
states in question, the author believes that it was an erroneous decision on Ziemke's part, to not 
specify which strategic behaviours her typology recorded, and which behaviours were outside 
the scope of her investigation. 
2.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF NSSP IN WIDER ACADEMIC LITERATURE 
Within this chapter, the author argued that different versions of national security exist, 
based on the information gathered about national security strategy. The subjectivity of value 
within distinct human societies was observed to influence the prioritised referent objects of 
security within these societies. It was also argued that a constructivist ontology was the most 
appropriate to accommodate the complexities of characterising such a broad range of possible 
national security types, and distinct social realities which enable such variance. The author 
surveyed the ability of the strategic culture and strategic personality theoretical frameworks to 
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characterise these varying types of national security and discovered that both theories were 
unable to characterise them, in isolation. Purely rationalist accounts of national and 
international security, have also struggled to explain the ‘subjective security demands’ of 
states, where scholars such as Jervis, struggled to grasp variances to the security dilemma in 
his 1978 publication.139 The identified inability of the aforementioned theories, necessitated 
the development of a proposed theoretical framework, which could (in theory) adequately 
merge the descriptive and interpretive qualities of both theoretical frameworks. The author's 
focus on observable state behaviour as the starting point for such a hybrid theoretical 
framework led to the development of the National Security Strategic Personality theoretical 
framework, which shall be introduced in the subsequent chapter. 
In this thesis, the author aims to propose a new theoretical framework, reconfiguring the 
individual elements of the strategic personality typology, and introducing two new elements 
which make up the National Security Strategic Personality theoretical framework, namely 
Inflationary Containment, and Compression. This reconfiguration, is especially mindful of the 
fact that the National Security Strategic Personality theory, focuses much more specifically on 
state strategic behaviour aimed at coercing malicious non-state actors, in comparison to the 
strategic personality typology in which Ziemke searches for an overall strategic personality of 
a state, based on its ‘ultimate concerns'. It is the author's belief, that the NSSP framework 
provides a constructive route to understanding the marked similarities and differences in states' 
strategic personalities with regards to coercion, while it either sidesteps or modifies the major 
flaws inherent in the strategic culture theoretical framework, and strategic personality typology. 
  
                                                 
139 See: Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma” (1978) 30 World Politics, pp. 167-214 
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3 CHAPTER THREE: INTRODUCING THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIC 
PERSONALITY THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK (NSSP) 
This chapter proposes the NSSP theory as an explanatory typological theory, tracking 
how the NSSP theory was developed to address the shortcomings of existing theoretical 
frameworks namely; Strategic Culture, and National Strategic Personality. It proposes a 
coherent analytical tool, aimed at identifying and categorising the various national security 
types. The NSSP theory, as an explanatory typology should enhance research into the 
identification of various national security types. Explanatory typologies enable researchers to 
specify configurations of variables in a manner in which the researcher can capture 
configurative causation.1 This thesis separates the three principal elements of National Security 
Strategic Personality, which are useful in capturing the configuration of national security 
strategy over a specific period of time. These proposed variables are; Orientation, Inflationary 
Containment and Compression, which are treated as independent variables which cause the 
characteristics of a state’s NSSP. These elements are explained in detail, with specific attention 
given to their origins, nature, relevance to understanding the NSSP, and their causation of the 
character of the NSSP of a state, in this chapter.  The author then goes forward to expand on 
the characterisation of the resultant dependent variable, as well as proposing standardised 
questions which will be utilised for case-study analysis, and cross-case study analysis. In 
seeking to introduce this new theory of National Security Strategic Personality, it is crucial to 
elaborate on the Objectives and the Elements of the theory. It is of equal importance to the 
author that the Elements and Sub-Elements of this theory be explicitly defined.  
3.1 OBJECTIVES OF THE THEORY 
An unambiguous explanation of the aims of the National Security Strategic Personality 
theory is necessary, to avoid a repetition of the mistakes which plagued strategic culture from 
the very beginning. As we have seen, proponents of strategic culture, were not too clear on the 
scope of application of their theoretical framework, and this led to the misapplication of the 
theory. Therefore, expanding on the aims and functions of this theory enables scholars to 
concretely understand what this theory seeks to investigate, how it seeks to investigate, and 
why. It is the author's hope that this clarification would enable accurate criticism of the validity 
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of the theory whenever it is applied to new, relevant case studies. Setting rigid boundaries to 
the scope of this theory ensures that the author can minimise the misapplication of this theory. 
The proposed dependent variable of National Security Strategic Personality theory, is 
characterised as a strategic personality which guides a state's strategic conduct with regards to 
how it operationalises its national security policy. It is proposed to vary from state to state, and 
can also vary within a state, through successive periods of time. This strategic personality 
constantly influences the manner in which states attempt to exterminate various malicious 
threats to the referent objects of its national security. The NSSP theoretical framework, 
therefore, aims to exhaustively understand the characteristic differences in how different states' 
security operationalise their national security policies towards malicious non-state actors. The 
NSSP theory should also be capable of enabling scholars to make in-depth observations of state 
behaviour and permit them to identify the contextual justifications which states attach to their 
actions. By analysing summaries of the state's resultant behaviour when confronted with threats 
to their referent objects from malicious non-state actors, this approach should expose the 
habitual, as well as variant strategic behaviours of states, which are cumulated to describe its 
National Security Strategic Personality. This information should shed light on the underlying 
strategic guidelines and ideational milieus that influence and limit the strategic behaviour of 
States within the context of National Security provision. 
3.2 FUNCTIONS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIC PERSONALITY THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In developing a theory which could be subject to empirical testing, it is important to 
accurately conceptualize the dimensions and ramifications of events in a clear, concise manner. 
Analogues which enable us to represent real-world events on a theoretical platform must be 
proposed. Within the fields of Comparative Foreign Policy, these analogues are usually called 
foreign policy "events", and in the 1970s the analysis of identified events resulted in conceptual 
breakthroughs for political science as a whole.2 In focusing on behaviour as something which 
could be dissected, aggregated and measured within the NSSP theoretical framework, the 
researcher hopes to essentially conceptualise about National Security Personalities as an 
aggregate of "who does what to whom, how”.3  Therefore, the conceptualisation of sub-
elements within the NSSP thesis enables us to utilise an adequate level of abstraction, so that 
                                                 
2 See; WEIS (World Event/Interaction Survey), or CREON (comparative Research on the Events of Nations) these 
were well funded projects wherein the collection and aggregation of events data was the primary focus of the 
projects. 
3 Valerie Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers 2007) 
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we may understand the "who" and "whom". In the same vein, events could be collated, but they 
must be adequately conceptualised and governed by the general rules of interaction which have 
been observed in the real world, so that we may understand the "what" and "how".  
The working definition of national security within this research, views it as “the 
expression of a consensus, a compilation of the expectations of citizens of a Nation, wherein 
the alleviation and mitigation of certain perceived threats to members of that society (Nation) 
and their values (referent objects), are exclusively delegated to the relevant institutions of the 
state, which are held primarily responsible for the identification, assessment and mitigation 
(or in some cases, extermination) of these threats”. In understanding how national security 
works, a constructivist ontology, advocates for a better understanding of the social 
process which typifies national security provision. Focusing on the working definition of 
national security, the author extracts the sub-elements of the NSSP framework, which enables 
us to reconstruct the process of national security provision. The sub-elements of the NSSP 
theory, are merely a representation of real-world occurrences as analogues. The first sub-
element, are the Referent Objects, referring to the citizens of a nation, and their collective 
expectations or values. The second sub-element we can deduct from the definition is the 
presence of the State institutions charged with the mitigation of threats. The third sub-element 
we can see in the working definition, comprise of those threats to the referent objects, which 
the NSSP framework primarily considers to be the Malicious Non-State Actors. The fourth 
element is State behaviour, which comprises of the identification, assessment, mitigation and 
extermination of threats. Therefore, a simple reconstruction of the process of National Security 
provision, involves the State, exerting State behaviour, against MNSAs to secure Referent 
Objects.  
3.3 THE SUB-ELEMENTS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIC PERSONALITY THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
The Sub-Elements are the fundamental Actors and Factors which are the building blocks 
of this theory. These Sub-Elements are: (a) The State, (who) (b) Malicious Non-State Actors, (whom) 
(c) Observable State Strategic Behaviour, (what) and (d) Prioritised Referent Object(s) (how). 
These fundamental pieces are the Sub-Elements of this theory which, when combined to 
interact with each other in various ways, create the Elements of this theory.  
Olamide Samuel - 1401236 - University of Buckingham 
 55 
3.3.1 The State (Active, Exertive) 
Etymological origins of the state, comes from 'lo Stato', in the Italian language. This 
term was originally coined by Machiavelli to explain a social order which rules over society or 
singular political entity.4 Weber depicts the state as "a permanent specialised organisation of 
men armed with rules and means of coercion for maintaining order over a population in a 
defined territory over which this organisation exercises power".5 The State within the National 
Security Strategic Personality theoretical framework is a categorised as a Sub-Element. The 
State is viewed as the only initiator of another sub-element -Observable State Behaviour. To 
enable practical operationalisation of the NSSP theoretical framework, the author has decided 
to black-box the State. This means that within the NSSP theoretical framework, the State is 
viewed as a Unitary, Rational Actor, for the following reasons: 
3.3.1.1 Mutual dependency of Agency and Structure 
The decision to view the state a metaphysical abstraction might come across as one 
which should be utilised by realist scholars.6 But, viewing the state as a unitary, rational actor 
within the NSSP theoretical framework, stems from constructivist insight regarding the 
mutual dependency of agency and structure within the state. To illustrate, we routinely say 
that the United States captured Osama Bin-Laden; not Obama, who was acting within the 
powers granted to him as the President of the United States, to authorise the capture. We do 
not reference the unnamed individual who physically captured Osama, as he or she was only 
acting under orders which dictated their designated role in Osama's capture, and in the capacity 
of the office of the state which they occupied. Instead, we refer to the United States as a whole. 
To elucidate further, individuals such as those mentioned prior, carry out actions with far-
reaching consequences, because of the socially constructed reality which grants them their 
respective powers and responsibilities. Notions of authority, office, rank and societal status, 
which underpin the ability and legitimacy of agency (in this case Obama), are all socially 
constructed realities, which have little or no meaning without the fabric of society, and its 
socially constructed realities. Therefore, behaviour of state actors depends on the existence of 
rational human actors, who, utilising the institutional structures of the state, carry out actions 
                                                 
4 Sheriff Folarin and Faith Oviasogie, Insurgency And National Security Challenges In Nigeria: Looking Back, 
Looking Ahead <http://eprints.covenantuniversity.edu.ng/3243/1/Folarin%20and%20Faith%206.pdf> accessed 
23 October 2017. 
5 Martin Shaw, War and Genocide: Organised Killing in Modern Society. (Wiley Blackwell 2003)  
6 It should be noted at this point, that a tendency to combine a realist position with an intersubjective ontology, is 
not entirely misplaced, and is in fact, quite common among social constructivists. See: Wendt 1992, Jepperson et 
al. 1996. 
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on behalf of the state. A constructivist considers this mutual dependence of agency and 
structure, as inseparable determinants of State behaviour as an outcome. State behaviour cannot 
be exerted exclusively by institutional structures without the influence of individual agents, 
and vice-versa. Instead, a focus on the state as a unitary actor, enables us to encapsulate, as a 
whole, the distinct identities shaped by ideational, as well as material circumstances. 7 
Therefore, it is less ambiguous, to view the state as a unitary actor within the NSSP framework. 
3.3.1.2 Variance of Institutional Functions 
Black-boxing the state, also enables us to view the state at an adequate level of 
abstraction where we can conceptualise about the agency of the state as an aggregation of the 
interaction of its institutions. It also helps an observer to avoid another problem -The variance 
of institutional functions within different states. The specification of functions of the internal 
institutions of States vary from state to state. For example, not every state utilises the same 
institution as its primary utilizer of force. The functions and capabilities of a police force in 
State A could vary significantly from that of State B, which may use its army to carry out the 
same functions as the police force of State A. Therefore, the decision to view the state as a 
unitary rational actor, means that Observable State Behaviour such as the use of physical force, 
which could be carried out by its police force, army, paramilitary institutions etc., are regarded 
as actions of the State as a whole. Therefore, viewing these institutions as part and parcel of 
the state eliminates the variance of institutional functions observable between different states. 
By simplifying the state to be viewed as a unitary actor, the author is potentially making it 
easier to link the State and Observable State Behaviour as sub-elements, as we shall see in the 
case-studies covering Nigeria. The actions of these institutions (and their representatives) are 
regarded as the actions of the state and categorised as Observable State Behaviour. 
3.3.1.3 Adjectival Misconceptions 
Black-boxing the state, also avoids erroneous expectations of state behaviour, based on 
preconceived ideas of how individual states should behave. Not all democratic states are true 
democracies, in the same vein, not all monarchies are autocracies. There is a great deal of 
complexity involved in identifying and categorizing states as having specific adjectival 
qualities, according to the institutional configurations which they utilize. "arguably materially 
dissimilar states can act similarly, and materially similar states can act dissimilarly"8 These 
                                                 
7 Timothy Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, International Relations Theories (3rd edn, Oxford University 
Press 2013). 
8 Valerie Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers 2007) 
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complexities stem from the fact that many states theoretically recognised as belonging to a 
category of states based on their institutional configurations, do not behave in accordance to 
what we expect of states of similar internal configurations. For example, a state could be 
internally configured to have a democratically elected President, an independent judicial 
system, and legislative bodies which are proportionally representative of the political 
inclinations of the citizenry, (all of which are characteristic features of a democratic state) but 
in reality, such a state could be governed by a President who has grossly interfered with the 
suffrage process to ensure the longevity of his/her term in office, a judicial system which has 
been crippled by corruption, and legislative bodies which are unable to implement legislation 
for various reasons. Such a state by virtue of its functions cannot truly be referred to as a 
democracy and may operate in a manner which is akin to a totalitarian State (as is the case in 
Nigeria which is observed in this thesis). 9 Observations of such a state as a democratic state 
could result in erroneous conclusions, because these observations would be primarily 
influenced by expectations of behaviour based on the state's institutional configuration, and is 
utterly unrealistic. In the same vein, it is arguable that additional adjectives, such as ‘post-
colony’ or ‘quasi-states’, should bear little meaning in terms of the application of the NSSP 
theory, as I shall explain. Ascribing adjectival connotations of this kind as an additional 
description of a state’s sovereignty, does enable one to distinguish between the functional 
nature of the state in first and third-world contexts. However, one cannot but engage with 
conceptualisations of sovereignty as espoused in the wittgensteinian language game, which 
deviates from positivist empiricism, that proposes sovereignty as a constant fact. As a result, 
placing emphasis on the post-colony, or quasi-state, enables us to gainfully highlight the inter-
subjective nature of sovereignty within these types of states (such as Nigeria), and enhances a 
more constructivist insight into the nature and function of the state in question.10 But, as 
scholars, we must be mindful of the context within which we theorise. Christiansen et al, 
highlight that ‘the respective political culture and the participants of a debate bear on the way 
theories, or for that matter research programmes, are shaped’ 11 accordingly, the author 
believes that it is the western narrative of state sovereignty, that perpetuates the continued need 
for a distinction in the description of post-colonies and quasi states, and actual states. As a 
                                                 
9 It is interesting to note that North Korea for example, is officially known as the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea. 
10 See: Tanja E. Aalberts, 'The Sovereignty Game States Play: (Quasi-)States In The International Order' (2004) 
17 International Journal for the Semiotics of Law Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique. 
11 Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik Jorgensen and Antje Wiener, 'The Social Construction Of Europe' (2011) 6 
Journal of European Public Policy. p. 535 
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researcher from the third-world, one of the principal objectives driving the author towards 
formulating a theory of national security, which is immune to adjectival misconceptions, is to 
enable the scholarly characterisation of national security provision of both first and third-world 
states, in a manner which enables one to compare national security strategic personality across 
such conceptual divides, so as not to perpetuate the notion that some states are more deserving 
of sovereign status than others. Also, considerable variance exists between the institutional 
functions of post-colonies such as the United States of America, and the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, and as one could imagine, it would be quite problematic to continually define the 
United States in terms of its history as a post-colony, in contrast to other states with similar 
history. Ultimately, it is arguable that every state could be defined in a plethora of terms, based 
on the uniqueness of its internal institutional compositions and functions, and one might 
reasonably suggest that the lowest divisional unit, within the NSSP theoretical framework, is 
the state itself. The merits of viewing every state as a unitary rational actor, in contrast, means 
that every state can be equally observed merely as the initiators of Observable State Behaviour 
within this theoretical framework, as opposed to the creation of multiple theoretical 
frameworks which independently critique national security strategy of first and third-world 
states. Therefore, characteristic differences amongst states national security strategic 
personalities are only viewed in terms of the degree of variance in Observable State Behaviour, 
and not on the degree of variance of the internal institutional configurations of states. This 
perspective still comprehensively identifies the subjective differences in the provision of 
national security, as a socially constructed reality.  Therefore, a state only needs to meet the 
following criteria to be suitable for observation within the NSSP theoretical framework; a state 
must be a sovereign, recognised, nation state, with an existing government, and defined 
territory. Adjectival categorisations such as ‘democratic state', ‘monarchy', ‘totalitarian state', 
‘post-colony’ etc., bear little consequence within the NSSP theoretical framework, potentially 
enabling the theory’s application on a larger number of states in the future. 
3.3.2 Prioritised Referent Object(s) (Passive, Reactionary) 
Referent Objects refer to what a state considers valuable enough to warrant the 
prioritised, conscious and continuous provision of security, from threats posed by Malicious 
Non-State Actors. As we have seen in aforementioned perspectives on national security (in the 
Second Chapter of this Thesis), referent objects are categorised as such, based on the observed 
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state behaviour, aimed at protecting them.12  There are two categories of referent objects; 
referent objects are either people or interests, depending on the priorities of the state. Referent 
objects as people refers to a civilian population which the state isolates from interaction with 
Malicious Non-State Actors. In viewing people as the primary beneficiaries of security 
provision, a state's behaviour must reflect an orientation of security provision around 
individuals, "in line with internationally recognised standards of human rights and 
governance."13  
However, people are not always the prioritised referent object of states' national 
security strategy.  Interests other than people can also be identified as the prioritised referent 
objects of states. These interests are the tangible and intangible values, which a state can be 
observed to prioritise. These interests include; Tangible Values (e.g. territory, oil, and mineral 
resources), and Intangible Values (e.g. regime security, state sovereignty, and protected 
ideology).  The prioritised referent objects are identified as such, based on the observable 
behaviours of states, regardless of the state's narrative as to what its prioritised referent objects 
are. This is because, in reality, the state's proclamation of its referent objects is not always 
aligned with its actions during inflationary containment, when state behaviour exposes what 
the referent objects are in reality. As mentioned earlier in second chapter of this thesis, this 
contradiction was identified by second generation scholars of the strategic culture school of 
thought, where it was a widely accepted premise that the leaders of strategic communities and 
states, did not necessarily act per their expressed motives.14 It was in this school of thought, 
that the identification of observable differences between what leaders expressed as their 
motives for action, and the possible motives for their eventual actions was initiated.15  
The separation between people and interests as referent objects has been created 
because of the author's observations, that when interests are prioritised as referent objects, 
people are no longer the primary beneficiaries of the continuous, conscious provision of 
security by the state. The security of people becomes deprioritised as long as the provision of 
security is diverted to interests. This distinction, touches on a prominent debate within the 
emerging field of critical human security studies, as highlighted by Newman. Within critical 
                                                 
12 Inflationary Containment refers to the Strategic means with which a State seeks to isolate Malicious Non-State 
Actors from Referent Objects of the State. It would be expanded on in the remainder of this chapter.  
13  Newman E, ‘Critical Human Security Studies’ (2010) 36 Review of International Studies 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210509990519> accessed 28 June 2016 
14 See: “Strategic Culture as a Tool” within this thesis. 
15 Defence Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, 'Comparative Strategic Cultures 
Literature Review (Part 1)' (Center for Contemporary Conflict 2006). 
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human security studies, Newman points out that, ‘international security traditionally defined 
– territorial integrity – does not correlate with human security, and an over-emphasis upon 
state security can be to the detriment of human welfare needs.’16 The NSSP theory takes 
cognisance of this proposition, albeit elementarily, in the separation of people and interests as 
referent objects of national security provision. Although the NSSP framework only categorises 
a state as either people-centric or interest centric, a graphical representation of the hierarchy of 
referent objects is shown below, to serve as a guide to researchers further interested in 
identifying more specific interests of states: 
 
Figure 1. The Hierarchy of Referent Objects. 
How this prioritisation process can be observed, will be explained in detail, when the 
independent variables of the NSSP theory are introduced later in this chapter. 
3.3.3 Malicious Non-State Actors (Active, Transfer) 
Various threats to national security exist. These threats range from threats stemming 
from natural causes, such as earthquakes, flooding, epidemics and famine, to threats stemming 
from a states’ inability to immediately control circumstance, such as uncontrolled inflation, 
undocumented immigration, high motor accident rates etc. However, there are also threats to 
national security which exist, as a result of the deliberate actions of organisations, with 
perceived malicious aims. The intents of these threats are socially constructed, based on 
perceptions governed by social realities such as interests, friendship, enmity or rivalry.17 What 
the author has observed in preliminary surveys of the constitution of malicious threats, is that 
these threats are typified by organisations, which include organisations such as terrorist groups, 
                                                 
16 Edward Newman, 'Critical Human Security Studies' (2010) 36 Review of International Studies. p.79 
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organised criminal networks, secessionist movements, armed militias and other organisations 
which are perceived by the state to be at odds with its national interests. By extension however, 
organisations which might not necessarily consider themselves to be malicious, could in fact, 
be designated as such by the state. Therefore, one must be aware of the qualifying nature of the 
term MNSA, as it is merely nomenclature to identify actors which the state deems malicious. 
What sets malicious threats apart from natural threats to national security, is the existence of 
rationality at the helm of malicious threats. While, states need to have an outlined plan of action 
to respond to threats stemming from natural causes, the primary difference between malicious 
threats and natural threats is that, malicious threats are capable of intelligent manoeuvring, and 
resilience to state strategy. Malicious threats are not only capable of responding intelligently 
to state strategic behaviour, but they are also capable of understanding and interpreting state 
strategy as a form of communication, in ways that natural threats cannot. To reiterate, the term 
Malicious Non-State actors refer to organisations or individuals, whose existence, objectives 
and actions, are perceived as proximally threatening to the referent objects of a state. The 
perception of a malicious non-state actor as a threat is determined by the existence of a state 
that perceives the non-state actor as a threat to its interests. A malicious non-state actor, 
therefore, is only characterised as such, after it has been identified and categorised as a threat 
to a state's interests. 
It may seem far-fetched to theoretically group terrorist organisations, organised 
criminal networks, secessionist movements, and armed militias together as the same category 
of threats. The reality is, these threats have far more characteristics in common than in contrast. 
These non-state actors have been observed by various scholars to utilise similar means of 
operation, communication, organisational structure, evasion and even transportation 
channels.18 These actors have also been observed to interact with referent objects of states in 
the same way, and in some cases, it is increasingly difficult to distinguish a terrorist 
organisation from an organised crime ring as they have been observed to synergise resources 
and means.19 What typically differentiates these malicious non-state actors from each other, 
are their different organisational aims and objectives. These malicious non-state actors, all pose 
proximal threats to the referent objects of the states that identify them as threats, and the 
interests they threaten require conscious, continuous security provision by the state. 
                                                 
18 Thomas M. Sanderson, 'Transnational Terror And Organized Crime: Blurring The Lines' (2004) 24 SAIS 
Review. 
19 Thomas M. Sanderson, 'Transnational Terror And Organized Crime: Blurring The Lines' (2004) 24 SAIS 
Review. 
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Malicious non-state actors, as sub-elements of the NSSP theoretical framework, are 
viewed as actors, the ‘whom'. They react directly to another sub-element –observable state 
behaviour. Malicious non-state actors are proposed to have one function within the NSSP 
theoretical framework, which is to persistently attempt to interact with, and overcome the sub-
element –prioritised referent objects. Therefore, malicious non-state actors within this 
theoretical construct, interact with two sub-elements directly. Observable state behaviour and 
prioritised referent objects. 
3.3.3.1 Interaction between Malicious Non-State Actors and Referent Objects 
As explained earlier, what differentiates Malicious Non-State Actors as threats within 
the NSSP theoretical framework, are their objectives. This is to imply that the primary 
difference between a terrorist group and an organised criminal gang, for example, can be found 
in their primary objectives; the former's primary objective usually premeditatedly utilises 
violence against targeted referent objects as a communicative means through which it can 
compel a political or ideological change, and the latter's objective usually being to amass profit 
from the illegal production, distribution, or resettlement of items or people whilst exploiting 
referent objects as suppliers or markets for their trade. These interactions include the utilisation 
of violence to interact with human referent objects through shooting, capturing, terrorising and 
bombing human referent objects, or destroying, capturing and occupying Interest Referent 
Objects. Because of the overwhelming similarities in their means of organisation, 
communication and sustenance, the nature of their interaction with Referent Objects is usually 
similar. Therefore, the author articulates all these instances of MNSAs utilising violence 
against Referent Objects, as instances of interaction between MNSAs and Referent Objects. 
Requirements of Malicious Non-State Actors’ to Pursue Aims 
Malicious Non-State Actors need to preserve access to the resources which they 
continually require to exist as a functioning entity. Without these interests, their reasons for 
continued existence is jeopardised. Malicious Non-State Actors, require Core and Peripheral 
Interests, to ensure their continued existence. The Core interests are Objectives and Personnel, 
while the peripheral interests are Mobility, Communication, and Supplies to enable the 
feasibility of their continued existence. 
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Figure 2. Malicious Non-State Actors 
Core Interests 
The proposed core interests of an MNSA, includes the material means, as well as the 
ideational reasons for their existence. The author proposes that without one of the core interests, 
an MNSA would either lack the intent, or the capability to continue its existence as a threat. 
These are; 
Objectives refer to the ideational motivations and goals which bring all the other vital 
resources together within the construct of the malicious non-state actor. These objectives could 
be the quest to amass profit through illegal means, or the promulgation and enforcement of an 
extremist or nationalist ideology among other things. These objectives, are the goals and 
motivations which guide the conduct of the malicious non-state actors and are constructed by 
the leaders of MNSAs. Ultimately, these objectives are operationalised and sustained by the 
actions of Personnel.   
Personnel refers to all human elements who subscribe to the Malicious Non-State 
Actor's objectives, spanning from individuals serving as operational and figurative leaders, to 
individuals serving as foot soldiers or providing peripheral functions such as drivers, guards 
and scouts. The Malicious Non-State Actor's requirement of possessing Personnel is perhaps 
the most important material requirement for its continued existence. The possession of 
Personnel is a necessary precondition for the MNSA to intelligently manoeuvre in ways that 
other threats do not. The MNSA's ability to identify its objectives, as well its ability to 
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access to existing and new personnel, who are willing and able to coordinate the MNSA's 
resources to achieve its objectives. 
Peripheral Interests 
The proposed peripheral interests of an MNSA refer to the interests which are required 
for its Personnel to achieve its Objectives. It is possible, that without one or more of these 
peripheral interests an MNSA can continue to exist, with intent and capability. However, if all 
the peripheral interests are eliminated by a state, the MNSA loses most of its capability. These 
peripheral interests are: Mobility, Communication and Supplies 
 Mobility refers to all means through which Personnel can physically transport 
themselves and other vital resources, for organisation, interaction with referent 
objects, or evasion from the State. The elimination of mobility means that the 
rational element of the MNSA is physically incapable of interacting with any other 
sub-elements in the NSSP theoretical framework. 
 Communication in the same vein, refers to all means through which Personnel can 
transfer Information, for organisation, interaction with referent objects or evasion 
from the State. The elimination of MNSA communication means that the 
individuals who make up the MNSA are incapable of sending or receiving 
information which is vital to the coordination of the physical and ideological assets 
that would enable the MNSA to achieve its aims and objectives. Therefore, the 
elimination of mobility and communication would render the MNSA incapable of 
maintaining its organisational form and interacting with Referent Objects. This 
would eventually lead to the compression of the Malicious Non-State Actor. 
 Supplies refer to all tangible assets which the MNSA requires to achieve their aims 
and objectives. Supplies refer to raw materials and finished goods, which the 
MNSAs consistently require to pursue their objectives. Supplies include 
ammunition, food supplies, access to healthcare, finances and source materials (e.g. 
opium for the production of drugs, or C4 for the production of bombs to incite 
terror). Eliminating the possibility of MNSA access to supplies limits MNSA scope 
of operations to a minimum, and eventually incapacitates MNSAs from achieving 
their aims of interacting with the referent objects of a state. 
When states embark on eliminating MNSAs, they utilise various strategies, each with 
varying degrees of severity. Sometimes states move to directly eliminate all members of an 
MNSA by ordering a military campaign against them, other times we witness a softer approach 
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where states destabilise an MNSA by seizing its supplies. In some scenarios we observe states 
utilising an even softer approach of negotiation, in an attempt to weaken the objectives of an 
MNSA. The fragmentation of composite elements of MNSAs within the NSSP theoretical 
framework enables an observer to adequately characterise the severity of states' actions, which 
are aimed at eliminating the MNSA, as shall be explained subsequently. 
3.3.4 Observable State Strategic Behaviour (Passive, Exertive) 
To identify factors is not to trace their influence. To understand processes that 
affect external behaviour is not to explain how and why they are operative 
under certain circumstances and not under others. To recognize that foreign 
policy is shaped by internal as well as external factors is not to comprehend 
how the two intermix or to indicate the conditions under which one 
predominates over the other…Foreign policy analysis lacks comprehensive 
systems of testable generalisations20.  
Truthfully, the relative importance of a plethora of variables in influencing state 
behaviour can only be guessed (especially if some of these variables are intangible), and the 
influence of these variables cannot be easily measured. Therefore, an applicable methodology 
must seek to identify the point of theoretical intersection between material and ideational 
variables. The researcher believes that state behaviour itself lies at this intersection. Opinions 
concerning the possible reasons for state behaviour, such as the ones proposed by the realist 
and cultural schools cannot be studied in aggregate. However, state behaviour can. “behaviour 
as disparate as a war, a treaty, and a state visit [can] be compared and aggregated in a 
theoretically meaningful fashion”21 In asking the how, why and where, questions that should 
be asked in every instance of observable state behaviour, we can document a reliable body of 
information that should enable us to understand the underlying patterns of state behaviour, and 
only then should we propose 'foundational elements'. 
Instead of drawing conclusions regarding an individual’s probable motivations 
and purposes, his environmental knowledge, and his intellectual processes 
linking purposes and knowledge, on the basis of assumptions as to the way 
people are likely on the average to behave in a given social context, the 
cognitive [behaviorist], be he narrative historian or systematic social scientist, 
undertakes to find out as precisely as possible how specific persons actually did 
perceive and respond in particular contingencies22 
                                                 
20 James Rosenau, 'Pre-theories and theories of Foreign Policy', in Approaches in Comparative and International 
Politics,(Northwestern University Press 1966) 
21 Valerie Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers 2007) 
22  Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs with Special Reference to 
International Politics (Princeton University Press 1965) 
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Observable State Behaviour within the NSSP theoretical framework refers to the 
deliberate strategic application of a state's resources to protect its referent objects. It is also the 
application of the state's resources to influence or control the politico-strategic choices of 
malicious non-state actors. The deliberate and purposive use of state power to influence another 
actor's strategic choices is a process which has been studied by various scholars such as 
Freedman23, Schelling24, Wijk, Byman and Waxman25 analysing Strategic Coercion. Whilst 
these scholars amongst others have been successful in identifying elements of strategic 
coercion, theorizing on its manifestation in various contexts,26 and even its utilisation against 
non-state actors and terrorist organisations,27 none of the proponents of this school have been 
able to explore the explanatory potential of dissecting and collating instances of strategic 
coercion as an element within other fields of scholarly inquiry such as strategic culture and 
strategic personality. The author recognises this unexplored explanatory potential of strategic 
coercion as an element within the NSSP theoretical framework, resulting in the inclusion of 
strategic coercion within this sub-element of the NSSP theory. By documenting a state's 
habitual preference for utilising strategy against a specific kind of threat, the author can identify 
the milieu which limits a state's habitual strategic preference; its strategic personality.  
Observable State Behaviour is the nexus that enables observers to relate state behaviour 
to political purpose.28It encompasses the coercive means with which a state chooses to reduce 
or exterminate interaction between malicious non-state actors and referent objects. It is perhaps 
the most vital sub-element within the NSSP theoretical framework because it serves as a means 
through which we can exhaustively understand the character of the national security strategic 
personality of a state in various ways. Firstly, the location where one can identify observable 
state behaviour enacted against malicious non-state actors serves a vital indicator of the 
physical scope of operations within which a state considers itself as a legitimate actor, aiming 
to ensure the protection of its referent objects. It also serves as an indicator of the type of 
                                                 
23 Lawrence Freedman 'Strategic Coercion', Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases, (Oxford University press, 
1998)  
24 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence, (Cambridge University Press 1960) 
25 See: Daniel Byman, and Matthew Waxman. The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the 
Limits of Military Might, (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 108-111; and  Rob de Wijk, The Art of Military 
Coercion: Why the West’s Military Superiority Scarcely Matters, (Mets and Schilt 2005) 
26 David Johnson, Karl Mueller and William Taft V, Conventional Coercion Across the Spectrum of Conventional 
Operations: The Utility of U.S Military Forces in the Emerging Security Environment, (CA: RAND 2002) 
27  Michael Andrew Berger, 'How Resisting Democracies Can Defeat Substate Terrorism: Formulating A 
Theoretical Framework For Strategic Coercion Against Nationalistic Substate Terrorist Organisations' (PhD, 
University of St Andrews 2010). 
28 Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy, (Oxford University Press 1999) 
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malicious non-state actors which a state considers as a primary threat to its referent objects. 
Secondly, observable state behaviour enables us to analyse how a state chooses to interfere 
with the interaction between malicious non-state actors and its prioritised referent objects. By 
analysing how a state chooses to interfere with the interaction between malicious non-state 
actors, an observer can easily identify what strategic options a state deems practical, legitimate, 
applicable and proportional to protect its referent objects. Observing the strategic options 
operationalised by the state also exposes the state's perception of the severity of the threat posed 
by the malicious non-state actor, to referent objects. Furthermore, instances where one can 
observe state behaviour aimed at primarily separating malicious non-state actors from possible 
referent objects, enables an observer to identify what referent objects the state prioritises 
specifically.   
Within the NSSP theoretical framework, malicious non-state actors are proposed to be 
perennially expanding entities, whose primary function is to interact with the referent objects 
of the state. Observable state behaviour aimed at inflationary containment is concerned with 
preventing these malicious non-state actors from achieving their objectives which require 
interaction with referent objects. For a state to interfere with the interaction between malicious 
non-state actors and referent objects, the state must engage in strategic activities of denial and 
isolation, primarily aimed at limiting and extinguishing the malicious non-state actor's capacity 
for successful interaction with referent objects by either target hardening, or damage mitigation. 
Observable state behaviour with regards to compression refers to the strategic means with 
which a state seeks to extinguish the very existence of malicious non-state actors and 
demonstrate the futility of the malicious non-state actor's continued existence as such. 29 
Therefore, within the NSSP theoretical framework, Observable State Behaviour aimed at 
compression, is concerned with preventing these malicious non-state actors from maintaining 
their organisational form, and the elimination of the motives and capabilities which enable their 
continued existence.  
Finally, documenting sufficient instances of observable state behaviour aimed at 
securing referent objects and exterminating malicious non-state actors, provides us with 
sufficient data with which we can identify instances of repetition, habitual behaviour, the range 
of strategic options which a state considers, instances of variance from observed norms, as well 
                                                 
29  Michael Andrew Berger, 'How Resisting Democracies Can Defeat Substate Terrorism: Formulating A 
Theoretical Framework For Strategic Coercion Against Nationalistic Substate Terrorist Organisations' (PhD, 
University of St Andrews 2010). 
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as instances of innovation and incremental or sudden change in state behaviour. Data 
obtainable from meticulously documenting observable state behaviour against malicious non-
state actors is sufficient for a researcher to characterize the national security strategic 
personality of a state, over the period of documentation, and serves as the most reasonable basis 
on which the anticipation of future state behaviour should be attempted. 
3.4 ELEMENTS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIC PERSONALITY FRAMEWORK 
3.4.1 Inflationary Containment 
Inflationary Containment as an element of the National Security Strategic Personality 
theoretical framework refers to the strategic means with which a state seeks to isolate malicious 
non-state actors from referent objects of the state. Inflationary containment is concerned with 
preventing these malicious non-state actors from achieving their objectives which require 
interaction with referent objects. For a state to interfere with the interaction between malicious 
non-state actors and referent objects, the state must engage in strategic activities of denial and 
isolation, primarily aimed at limiting and extinguishing the malicious non-state actor's capacity 
for successful interaction with referent objects by Target Hardening (Preventative Strategy) or 
Damage Mitigation.30 
 Target Hardening (Preventative Strategy). Target hardening refers to strategic 
actions taken by a state to increase the resilience of its referent objects within the 
range of malicious non-state actors’ inflation. In hardening targets, the state aims to 
convince malicious non-state actors that their attempts at interacting with specific 
referent objects may be too costly to be considered beneficial, by actually raising 
the costs of attempting to interact with said referent objects. Target hardening 
includes the fortification of territories and assets of importance to the state, 
increasing security provision to civilian populations within reach of the malicious 
non-state actor, and increasing surveillance and security provision to transportation 
channels and hubs, amongst other things. Therefore, target hardening interferes 
with the malicious non-state actor’s cost-benefit estimation of interacting with any 
referent objects within its range, by raising the costs of attempting to interact with 
these referent objects. 
                                                 
30 See: Clarke and Mayhew, 'The British Gas Suicide Story and its Criminological Implications', Crime and Justice 
Vol.10 (University of Chicago press 1988) Pp79-116. 
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 Damage Mitigation. Damage mitigation refers to strategic actions taken by a state, 
to limit, reduce or reverse ongoing interaction between malicious non-state actors 
and referent objects. Damage mitigation is the implementation of target hardening 
strategies on referent objects which are already subject to interaction with malicious 
non-state actors. Therefore, damage mitigation includes the reclamation of 
territories and assets of importance to the state from the malicious non-state actor, 
the identification and separation of members of malicious non-state actors from 
protected civilian populations, and the increased presence of security provision and 
surveillance to compromised transportation channels and hubs. Therefore, damage 
mitigation limits, reduces, or reverses any ongoing interactions between malicious 
non-state actors and referent objects, by increasing the resilience of these referent 
objects in a manner which incapacitates or dissuades the malicious non-state actors' 
continued interaction with referent objects. 
As a configuration of sub-Elements, Inflationary Containment comprises the state exerting 
Observable State Behaviour to separate Malicious Non-State Actors from Referent Objects. 
3.4.2 Compression 
Compression refers to the strategic means with which a state seeks to extinguish the 
very existence of malicious non-state actors and demonstrate the futility of the malicious non-
state actor's continued existence as such.31 Compression is concerned with preventing these 
malicious non-state actors from maintaining their organisational form, and the elimination of 
the motives and capabilities which enable their continued existence. For a state to compress 
malicious non-state actors, the state must also engage in strategic activities of denial and 
isolation, primarily aimed at limiting and extinguishing the malicious non-state actor’s capacity 
for organisation and operation by dismantling its core and peripheral interests. 
3.4.3 Orientation 
The location where one can identify observable state behaviour enacted against 
malicious non-state actors, by a state, serves as a vital indicator of the physical scope of 
operations within which a state considers itself as a legitimate actor, aiming to ensure the 
protection of its referent objects. This element was adapted from Ziemke’s typology. Therefore, 
orientation refers to the physical location within which a state has been observed to 
                                                 
31  Michael Andrew Berger, 'How Resisting Democracies Can Defeat Substate Terrorism: Formulating A 
Theoretical Framework For Strategic Coercion Against Nationalistic Substate Terrorist Organisations' (PhD, 
University of St Andrews 2010). 
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operationalize inflationary containment and compression against malicious non-state actors 
habitually. States are usually considered to be extroverted or introverted, depending on where 
observable state behaviour has been observed. The determining factor in categorizing a state 
as extroverted or introverted, lies in whether a state habitually engages with malicious non-
state actors within or outside its territorial jurisdiction. A state is considered introverted, when 
most or all of the case studies regarding the state under observation, shows that the state only 
identifies and tackles malicious non-state actors that operate within and along its territorial 
borders, and proceeds to protect referent objects within its borders. A state is considered as 
extroverted, when most or all of the case studies regarding the state under observation, reveals 
that the state continually identifies and tackles malicious non-state actors operating 
significantly outside its territorial borders, and proceeds to protect its referent objects outside 
of its borders. As a configuration of sub-elements, orientation comprises of the state, 
observable state behaviour, malicious non-state actors and prioritised referent objects. 
Orientation, Inflationary Containment and Compression are treated as Independent 
Variables which make up a National Security Strategic Personality, which in this thesis is 
identified as a Dependent variable. National security policies are outcomes which depend 
largely on the configuration of the national security strategic personality. National security 
strategic personality is treated as a semi-permanent entity, which morphs and changes gradually 
over time but occasionally morphs relatively quickly, to accommodate unusually intensified 
threats to national security, such as violent extremist terrorism or a rapidly intensifying 
secessionist movement for example. As an analytical tool for scholarly understanding, national 
security strategic personality serves to characterise a state's interaction with its perceived 
malicious threats to national security. 
3.5 ELEMENTS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIC PERSONALITY THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
AS INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
In attempting to identify the ideational limits of state strategic behaviour, the independent 
variables selected within the NSSP theoretical framework, are variables which are made up of 
a stable configuration of the four aforementioned sub-elements, which revolve around state 
behaviour.  
Olamide Samuel - 1401236 - University of Buckingham 
 71 
3.5.1 Orientation as an Independent Variable 
Orientation as an independent variable determines whether the national security 
strategic personality dependent variable can be characterised as introverted or extroverted, 
depending on where state behaviour enacted against malicious non-state actors has been 
consistently observed. The physical scope of operations within which a state operationalises 
inflationary containment and compression can extend well beyond the territorial borders of 
said state, as long as the state can express that it has referent objects at risk of interacting with 
malicious non-state actors.   
The definitive factor in determining the nature of a state's orientation is where one can 
identify inflationary containment and compression. Whether it is within the state's territorial 
borders or outside of it. Therefore, the national security strategic personality of a state is 
considered introverted, when most or all of the case studies regarding the state under 
observation, shows that the state only identifies and tackles malicious non-state actors that 
operate within and along its territorial borders, and proceeds to protect referent objects within 
the immediate reach of MNSAs. The NSSP of a State is considered as extroverted, when most 
or all of the case studies regarding the state under observation, reveals that the state constantly 
identifies and tackles malicious non-state actors operating significantly outside its territorial 
borders, and proceeds to protect its referent objects outside of these borders. 




State Territory Neighbouring 
State 
Sub-Region Other Continent 
Date of 
Occurrence 
    
 
3.5.2 Inflationary Containment as an Independent Variable 
Inflationary Containment enacted against malicious non-state actors by a state, serves 
a key indicator of the referent objects which a state considers as its priorities. This is because, 
when a state initiates strategic action against malicious non-state actors aimed at ensuring the 
protection of its referent objects, the state inadvertently coerces malicious non-state actors to 
steer clear of its most important referent objects first, before initiating compression to 
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incapacitate malicious non-state actors altogether. Therefore, inflationary containment as an 
independent variable of the national security strategic personality theoretical framework 
characterizes which referent objects the national security strategic personality of a state 
habitually prioritises.  
Inflationary containment as an independent variable, determines whether the national 
security strategic personality dependent variable can be characterised as people-centric or 
interest centric, depending on which referent objects have been consistently observed to be the 
prioritised when analysing state behaviour enacted against malicious non-state actors within 
the state's scope of operations. The identification of prioritised referent objects is a deductive 
process, following the hierarchy of referent objects. This means, if inflationary containment 
enacted against MNSAs is observed to prioritise people as its referent objects, the state engages 
in actively protecting its citizens to the minimal extent that they can enjoy the freedom from 
premature and preventable death.32 One can deduce that interests and all its sub-categories are, 
for example, not considered as prioritised referent objects. In the same vein, if inflationary 
containment enacted against MNSAs is observed to prioritise territory as its referent object, 
for example, then one can deduce that interests, not people, are considered as the prioritised 
referent objects of the state. So, how do we separate which Referent Objects have been 
prioritised from those which have not? 
As mentioned previously, there are two ways which a state can implement inflationary 
containment. These are; target hardening and damage mitigation. Target hardening refers to 
strategic actions taken by a state to increase the resilience of its referent objects within the 
range of malicious non-state actors’ inflation. In hardening targets, the state aims to convince 
malicious non-state actors that their attempts at interacting with specific referent objects may 
be too costly to be considered beneficial, by raising the costs of attempting to interact with said 
referent objects.  
3.5.2.1 People as Referent Objects 
When referent objects are people, target hardening that can be observed includes 
increased security provision to civilian populations within reach of the malicious non-state 
actor, negating the threatening influence of the MNSA, “to the extent that there is confidence 
                                                 
32Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, 'A Conceptual Framework For Human 
Security' (CRISE Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford 2003) 
<http://www3.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/crisewps/workingpaper2.pdf> accessed 23 October 2017. 
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that normal life can continue."33 Target hardening people as referent objects also includes 
increased surveillance and security provision to civilian transportation channels and hubs and 
an increased presence of security forces amongst civilian populations, for the purpose of 
alleviating threats to civilians so that normal life can continue. Therefore, target hardening 
people as referent objects interferes with the malicious non-state actor's cost-benefit estimation 
of interacting with any people within its range, by raising the costs of attempting to interact 
with these people to the extent that interaction34 is unfeasible. Essentially, target hardening, 
when people are the primary referent objects of a state, is configured in such a way that people 
are the vital core of a state's inflationary containment activities.35 
Damage mitigation can be observed as strategic actions taken by a state, to immediately 
limit, reduce or reverse ongoing interaction between malicious non-state actors and people. 
Damage mitigation is the implementation of target hardening strategies, on people who are 
already subject to interaction with malicious non-state actors. Therefore, damage mitigation 
includes the identification and separation of members of malicious non-state actors from 
protected civilian populations, the swift response of emergency services to people who have 
been subjected to interaction with MNSAs, and the increased presence of security provision 
and surveillance to compromised civilian transportation channels and hubs. Therefore, damage 
mitigation limits reduces or reverses any ongoing interactions between malicious non-state 
actors and people, by increasing the resilience of these people to the influence of MNSAs in a 
manner which incapacitates or dissuades the malicious non-state actors' continued interaction 
with people within range. 
3.5.2.2 Interests as Referent Objects 
When referent objects are interests, target hardening that can be observed includes 
strategic actions taken by a state to increase the resilience of its interests within the range of 
malicious non-state actors' inflation. Target hardening includes the fortification of territories 
and assets of importance to the state or increased the promulgation of state rhetoric which 
counteracts the ideological rhetoric promulgated by the MNSA. Security provision to civilian 
populations within reach of the malicious non-state actor is not usually present, or at least 
                                                 
33 David Omand, Securing the State, (Columbia University Press 2010), p.9. 
34 Interactions as described earlier, include the MNSAs utilisation of violence to interact with Human Referent 
Objects through shooting, capturing, terrorizing and bombing them. In the case of Interest Referent Objects, 
interaction involves destroying, capturing and occupying them. 
35 Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, 'A Conceptual Framework For Human 
Security' (CRISE Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford 2003) 
<http://www3.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/crisewps/workingpaper2.pdf> accessed 23 October 2017. 
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considered as a priority of secondary importance. Target hardening interests interferes with the 
malicious non-state actor’s cost-benefit estimation of interacting with any interests within its 
range, by raising the costs of attempting to interact with these interests. Damage mitigation can 
be observed as strategic actions taken by a state, to limit, reduce or reverse ongoing interaction 
between malicious non-state actors and its interests. Damage mitigation is the implementation 
of target hardening strategies, on interests which are already subject to interaction with 
malicious non-state actors. Therefore, damage mitigation includes the reclamation of territories 
and assets of importance to the state from the malicious non-state actor, and the increased 
presence of security provision and surveillance to compromised assets and territories.   
Therefore, the National Security Strategic Personality of a State is considered People-
Centric, when most or all of the case studies regarding the state under observation, shows that 
the state prioritises and protects humans subjected to threats stemming from interactions with 
malicious non-state actors, before the protection of interests is considered. Conversely, the 
NSSP of a state is considered as interest centric, when most or all of the case studies regarding 
the state under observation, shows that the state prioritises and protects interests subjected to 
threats stemming from interactions with Malicious Non-State Actors, before the protection of 
People is considered. 




Centred On   
 
3.5.3 Compression as an Independent Variable 
Within the NSSP theoretical framework, compression is concerned with how a state 
prevents malicious non-state actors from maintaining their continued access to vital interests. 
In cutting off an MNSA from its vital interests, the state essentially incapacitates the MNSA. 
Compression as an independent variable, characterizes the NSSP dependent variable based on 
the nature of the strategic means with which a state seeks to end continued access to their vital 
interests, eventually demonstrating the futility of the malicious non-state actor’s continued 
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existence as such.36 Therefore, the nature of a state’s application of compression of MNSAs 
characterizes the NSSP dependent variable as either constraining, coercive or compelling. An 
NSSP is determined as either constraining, coercive or compelling, depending on the severity 
of the strategic means which the state employs to neutralize MNSA access to its vital interests. 
Therefore, strategic means are characterised on a spectrum of compressive severity, with brute 
physical force, and compelling communication, on opposite ends of the spectrum. 
3.5.3.1 The Spectrum of Compressive Severity 
As was explained earlier, an MNSA has core and peripheral interests, which it requires 
to continue existing. The core interests are its objectives and personnel. Without one of these 
core interests, an MNSA would either lack the intent or the capability to exist. The peripheral 
interests include those interests which enable the core interests to exist. Communication, 
mobility and supply, are required for MNSA personnel to pursue their objectives. Without 
some of these peripheral interests, an MNSA would still exist, though would be greatly 
incapacitated. The constraining and compelling communication extremities on the spectrum of 
compressive severity, focus on the core interests of the MNSA; with the constraining extremity 
focusing on personnel and the compelling extremity focusing on objectives respectively. In this 
configuration, one can distinguish compression strategy, as focused on the ideational or 
physical dimensions of the MNSA. Coercive severity is located in the middle ground of the 
spectrum, as it focuses on state strategy that seeks to target the peripheral interests of the MNSA, 
such as communication, mobility and supply. The components of the spectrum of compressive 
severity are explained in detail below: 
3.5.3.1.1 Constraining Severity 
  On this end of the spectrum, state behaviour is comprised of Strategic means, with 
which the State aims to eliminate Personnel of an MNSA, physically, without any room for 
symbolic communication of any sort between the MNSA and the State. It is usually 
characterised by the utilisation of Brute Physical Force by the state, to eliminate Personnel of 
an MNSA physically. This severity of strategy leaves no room for any alternative options for 
the MNSA. For example, a Military action such as bombing is a definitive physical action taken 
by a state to instantaneously and physically eliminate the Personnel and other associated 
peripheral interests of an MNSA. There is no room for compelling communication of any sort 
                                                 
36  Michael Andrew Berger, 'How Resisting Democracies Can Defeat Substate Terrorism: Formulating A 
Theoretical Framework For Strategic Coercion Against Nationalistic Substate Terrorist Organisations' (PhD, 
University of St Andrews 2010). 
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between the MNSA and the state after a bomb has been dropped and personnel killed, there is 
no room for the MNSA even to consider surrendering to the State. Therefore, a State bombing 
MNSA personnel has utilised strategic means, which falls on the Constraining extremity of the 
spectrum. The deployment of a state's Armed Forces to shoot and kill all MNSA personnel on 
sight also falls on the same extremity of the Spectrum. All instances where strategic means 
utilised by a state to compress an MNSA are characterised by the physical extermination of the 
Personnel of an MNSA are documented as Constraining. 
3.5.3.1.2 Coercive Severity 
Strategic means on this portion of the spectrum, are characterised by the State, targeting 
the Peripheral interests of the MNSA (Communication, Mobility and Supply), to incapacitate 
an MNSA. This portion of the spectrum is characterised by the state, capturing and detaining 
MNSA personnel, in order to restrict their communication and mobility. Coercive severity 
could also be characterised by the restriction of MNSA supply, through the interception of their 
weapons, seizure of assets etc. This portion of the spectrum of compressive severity includes 
all strategies employed by the State, which fall short of physically eliminating (killing) MNSA 
personnel. 
3.5.3.1.3 Compelling Communication 
Strategic means on the Compelling Communication end of the spectrum is comprised 
of the means, with which the State aims to eliminate the Objectives of an MNSA. It is 
characterised by diplomatic communication, between the MNSA and the State. Compelling 
Communication strategies implemented by the state, are expected to compress the ideology of 
the MNSA. For example, Negotiations between the State and the MNSA, is on the Compelling 
Communication end of the spectrum, as is the threat of military action, and the promulgation 
of counter-narratives by the state. By convincing personnel to end their ideological ties with an 
MNSA, the state aims to incapacitate an MNSA's intent (objectives). 
The Spectrum of Compressive Severity therefore, is a guide with which we can identify 
and characterise the strategic means utilised by a State, to Compress an MNSA. By aggregating 
and characterising the Strategic means utilised by States within observed case studies, we can 
characterise the NSSP dependent variable. If instances of Brute Physical Force during 
Compression are observed to outnumber those of Compelling Communication significantly, 
one can conclude that the NSSP dependent variable is Constraining. Likewise, if instances of 
Compelling Communication during Compression are observed to outnumber those of Brute 
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Physical Force significantly, one can conclude that the NSSP dependent variable is Compelling. 
When instances, where Strategic means appear to be a combination of Brute Physical Force 
and Compelling Communication, the characteristics of the instances of Compression within 
the case study, would be collated, and the strategies with higher frequency would characterise 
the NSSP dependent variable. 
 
Figure 3. The Spectrum of Compressive Severity. 
 
Figure 4. The spectrum of Compressive Severity (Adapted to include some examples of strategic means). 
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3.6 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIC PERSONALITY AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The National Security Strategic Personality Theory postulates the following. That every 
State possesses a National Security Strategic Personality, and that the NSSP of every State has 
unique characteristics, which guides State actions against its perceived malicious threats. 
Furthermore, these unique characteristics can be identified by observing different dimensions 
of State behaviour against malicious threats to its Referent Objects. Three Key elements are 
required to understand the characteristics of the NSSP of a State exhaustively. They are 
Orientation, Inflationary Containment and Compression. The function of each element is of 
equal importance, as each element plays a unique role in contributing to understanding a 
specific dimension of State behaviour. The Characteristics of the National Security Strategic 
Personality of a state can be identified by utilising these key elements to observe their relevant 
dimensions of State behaviour against MNSAs. 
Accordingly, the assertions of the National Security Strategic Personality Theoretical 
Framework can be broken down into the following hypotheses: 
o Every state possesses a unique National Security Strategic Personality which guides 
state actions against its perceived Malicious threats to its Referent Objects 
o The unique National Security Strategic Personalities of States can be identified and 
adequately characterised by utilising the three Elements of the National Security 
Strategic Personality Theoretical Framework 
 Recalling Elman’s proposition, an explanatory typology is a kind of typological theory which 
makes predictions based on combinations of different values of the theory’s variables. In 
accordance, the National Security Strategic Personality is a theory which can be categorised as 
such. Since the proposed NSSP theory is an explanatory typology, then the author should be 
able to place collected data into relevant cells for empirical validation, in order to determine 
whether data collected is consistent with the proposed hypotheses above. This thesis separates 
and values the Orientation, Inflationary Containment and Compression variables of the 
National Security Strategic Personality, in order to capture the configuration of Nigerian 
national security strategy over a specific period of time. NSSP as a Dependent Variable 
possesses the valued characteristics, of Orientation, Inflationary Containment and 
Compression. This means that the National Security Strategic Personality as a Dependent 
Variable, can be an Extroverted, People-Centric and Constraining NSSP for example.  
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Typological theories and case study analysis are very compatible methodologically, as 
such a combination enables a researcher to identify not only types of phenomena, but also links 
between successive types.37 This is because, while the typological nature of the NSSP theory 
should enable a researcher to identify the NSSP of the Nigerian state at any given time, the 
implementation of case study analysis enables the researcher to comparatively analyse and 
distinguish between NSSPs of Nigeria, tracking its continuity or change over time. 
To empirically test the validity of the National Security Strategic Personality theory, an 
observer must employ a structured and focused investigation into case studies, to enable an 
observer to identify the National Security Strategic Personality of a state, for the duration of 
the case study period. In addition to the case study method of analysis, the observer can employ 
cross-case study comparison, to compare the NSSP of a State with other States, or even identify 
if and how the NSSP of a State has changed over a period of time. Using Nigerian state 
behaviour against MNSAs, the aforementioned hypotheses would be subject to empirical 
validation, by focusing on the Nigerian State against Tribal MNSAs (1960-1967), as well as 
against Secessionist MNSAs (1967-1970), and against Terrorist MNSAs (2009-2014). In the 
course of the investigations, three independent variables be examined in order for the 
researcher to characterise the NSSP dependent variable. 
The author in applying the measurement scales of the independent variables to 
investigate a case study, will be guided by the following standardised questions and tasks which 
would enhance a structured, systematic and focused investigation. These are: 
A. Identify the State and its Proposed MNSAs 
B. Where can one observe the presence of Inflationary Containment and Compression 
by the State? 
C. What Referent Objects within reach of the MNSA have been observed to be granted 
priority by the State? 
D. What Strategic Means have repeatedly been utilised by the State to eliminate the 
vital interests of the MNSA? 
E. What are the characteristics of the National Security Strategic Personality of the 
State? 
 
                                                 
37 Alexander L George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies And Theory Development In The Social Sciences (MIT 
Press 2005). 
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Table 4. Dependent Variable Measurement: National Security Strategic Personality 
Orientation Inflationary Containment Compression 
Introverted  People-Centric  Constraining  
Extroverted  Interest-Centric  Compelling  
 
Therefore, if the NSSP theory is valid, one should reasonably expect collected data to 
correspond with the proposed hypotheses, and insightful information should be derivable from 
the empirical validation process.38 The author stresses that the characteristics of an NSSP as a 
dependent variable does not aim to place the NSSPs of different states on hierarchic scales, 
claiming one country is better than another. Instead, it aims to accurately identify the 
characteristics of the NSSP of a state, in a manner which enables a researcher to understand 
and anticipate future state behaviour against MNSAs, in a more reliable manner than existing 
theories. 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter introduced the NSSP theory as an explanatory typological theory, and 
subsequently tracked the author’s considerations that guided the development of the NSSP 
theory. It proposed an explanatory typology aimed at enhancing research into the identification 
of various national security types. This chapter then introduced the proposed variables of the 
National Security Strategic Personality theory, which should become useful in capturing the 
configuration of Nigerian national security strategy over selected case study periods. The 
author then proceeded to expand on the characterisation of the resultant dependent variable, 
and well as proposed standardised questions and tasks which will be utilised for Case-Study 
analysis, and Cross-Case study analysis in the next chapter.  
 
  
                                                 
38 Elman C, ‘Explanatory Typologies in Qualitative Studies of International Politics’ (2005) 59 International 
Organisation. 293-326 
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4 CHAPTER FOUR: EMPIRICAL VALIDATION OF THE NSSP THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
In the preceding Chapter, the author elaborated on the key objectives and elements which 
make up the proposed NSSP theoretical framework. The author then proceeded to provide an 
operational breakdown of the process of identifying a National Security Strategic Personality, 
by utilising these elements. The measurement scales of the independent variables and the 
dependent variable, were also introduced, as well as an expansion on the characterisation of 
the resultant dependent variable. In order to carry out an empirical validation of the NSSP 
theoretical framework, standardised questions for Case-Study analysis, and Cross-Case study 
analysis, were also introduced. 
In seeking to carry out this empirical validation exercise, the author began by testing the 
validity of the NSSP framework, through case study analysis. The case studies that were carried 
out in subsequent chapters, broadly encompassed periods of Nigerian government, spanning 
from 1960, through 2014. More specifically, the case study periods were compartmentalised 
into various within case episodes in the following manner: 
1. 1960-1967, described as the Formation Period. This case study was selected 
because it covers Nigeria’s independence, up until the beginning of the Nigerian 
Civil War. This case study identified Nigeria's political origins, considerations and 
ultimate concerns within that period. The author sought to include this period, as it 
was during this time, that one could identify specific developments and trends that 
would eventually influence the origins of Nigerian National Security Strategic 
Personality. It is also from this period of formation that one could begin to identify 
a broad set of characteristics and organisational objectives that have been socially 
constructed as proximal threats to Nigerian National Security. 
2. 1967-1970 described as the Secession Period: This period of analysis was selected 
because it covered a crucial part of Nigeria’s history -the Nigerian Civil war, as 
well as the personalities and their considerations that imminently resulted in the 
eruption of the War. This period of analysis was essential, more so, because it 
illustrated the experimental beginnings of the Inflationary Containment, (i.e. the 
interests of Nigeria's National Security Agenda) and Compression, (i.e. the modus 
operandi of Nigerian National Security) aspects of Nigerian NSSP. 
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3. 1970-1999: This period of analysis, was selected so as to enable the researcher to 
understand if the NSSP of the Formation and Secession periods had lasting effect 
on Nigerian NSSP. It covered the subsequent fall out of the Nigerian Civil war, 
Nigeria's attempts at unification, but most importantly, it explored the various 
exchanges of power between Nigeria's military and civilian elite. During this 
period, the exponential increase of violent and non-violent power tussles between 
civilians and the Nigerian military laid the foundations of its current civil-military 
relations configuration. 
4. 2009-2014 described as the Explosion Period: This period of analysis, investigated 
the re-emergence of multiple MNSAs, and an intensification of their interactions 
with Referent objects, taking into consideration the precedents laid out by the 
Nigerian State in the Formation and Secession periods of analysis. During this 
period of investigation, all elements of Nigerian NSSP were observed critically, to 
determine if their operationalisation was indeed in line with the previous NNSP 
trends as identified, or if perhaps, if there was visible change. 
All four periods of case study analysis are intimately interlinked, but, the demarcation of 
the case study periods into the periods as mentioned earlier, enabled the researcher to suitably 
carry out informed, systematic and empirical inquiry into the existence and nature of Nigerian 
National Security Strategic Personality. It is essential for one to vividly understand the nature, 
material and ideational contexts within which the Nigerian state was immersed, as it is with 
such contextual familiarity that the strategic actions of the Nigerian government may be 
accurately understood in light of its ultimate concerns. 
4.1 A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO NIGERIA 
In order to fully appreciate the complexities that are associated with understanding Nigeria 
as a whole, one needs to understand its origins as an entity. In the 1870s, the trade of oil palm 
was the main export product of the Niger Delta region; an area which was previously referred 
to as the Slave Coast. The lucrative trade in oil palm was commonplace in this region of 
Western Africa, and competition was rife within European markets, vying for preferential 
access to the oil palm trade. The Second Industrial Revolution in Britain had necessitated a 
massive demand for the Oil Palm produce, to power industrial machines. Hence, the Niger 
region was one of paramount importance to British interests. 1879 saw the emergence of the 
United African Company, and by 1884, the United African Company was the most influential 
Olamide Samuel - 1401236 - University of Buckingham 
 83 
company in the region. The UAC possessed about 25-35 trading posts along the Lower Niger 
River, and this company was controlled by a British knight namely, Sir George Taubman 
Goldie.1 His company’s near monopoly on the Oil Palm market, granted the British leverage 
against German and French interests in the region, subsequently legitimizing British claims 
over the lower Niger region at the famed 1884 Berlin conference. British interests and those of 
the UAC were eventually consolidated and incorporated into the British sphere of influence, 
against other European interests in proximal regions. Therefore, in 1886, the company was 
granted a Royal Charter, and soon authorised to ‘administer’ the Niger Delta, and all lands 
around the banks of the Niger and Benue rivers.2 The company was renamed as the Royal Niger 
Company. On the 29th of January 1895, the company's headquarters were attacked by some 
local kings, and their armies, with about 60 Europeans (mostly British) taken as hostages and 
about 40 of them killed as a result of failed negotiations between the African kings and the 
British. In February 1895, the British Royal Navy attacked locals inhabiting the Niger region, 
in what is referred to as the Brass Oil War today.3 The aftermath of this war turned public 
opinion within Britain against the Royal Niger Company, and it subsequently sold its holdings 
to the British Government for £865,000.00. This transaction effectively represented the sale of 
Nigeria to Britain in 1899. Two years later, Nigeria became a British protectorate and part of 
the British Empire on January 1st, 1901. 
4.1.1 The Imposition of Unity 
Indeed, the name “Nigeria” was merely a combination of the words ‘Niger’ -referring to 
the river Niger in West-Africa, and ‘Area’. This name was coined by a British journalist, Flora 
Shaw, who was the mistress of Nigeria’s administrator –who at the time was Governor 
Frederick Lugard. Nigeria was merely an encapsulation of British colonies around the Niger 
River; a country created by the United Kingdom, which encapsulated different peoples under 
a singular administrative umbrella for the primary purpose of resource exploitation. The formal 
amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates of Nigeria in 1914 was an 
administrative decision on the part of the British, primarily influenced by the proximity of the 
protectorates which were thought to be more efficiently administrable as a singular colony of 
                                                 
1 Martin Meredith, The Fate of Africa (Public Affairs 2011) 
2 Nwanze C, ‘History Class: who sold Nigeria to the British for £865k in 1899?’ (Africa is a Country, 2014) 
<http://africasacountry.com/2014/04/historyclass-who-sold-nigeria-to-the-british-for-865k-in-1899/> accessed 7 
August 2017 
3  Yusuf O, ‘Retro Series: How Nigeria Was Sold for £865,000 to Britain (Photos)’ (Naij.com, 2017) 
<https://www.naij.com/amp/901602-retro-series-nigeria-sold-865000-britain-photos.html> accessed 7 August 
2017 
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the British Empire. In practice, however, Nigeria remained divided by administrative lines into 
the Northern and Southern Provinces, with the addition of the Lagos Colony. 
Of the hundreds of ethnic groups within Nigeria, there were three identifiable dominant 
ethnic groups which at the time, comprised of about 70 percent of the Nigerian population in 
total. These three tribes were the Yoruba, Hausa and Igbo tribes respectively.  Due to the stark 
differences in the nature of the well-established political systems of these dominant tribes, it 
made sense that the British colonial administrators further divided the amalgamated territory 
of Nigeria into three parts namely; The Northern Region which encapsulated the Hausa peoples, 
the Eastern Region, which encapsulated the Igbo peoples and the Western Region, which 
encapsulated the Yoruba peoples. It must be noted, however, that these three regions were also 
populated by hundreds of minority tribes which made up on average about 30 percent of the 
population at the time. 
This artificial creation of the Nigerian state was achieved without the direct consent of 
Nigerian citizens, but somewhat indirectly through local chiefs and kings.4 As Siollun noted, 
‘over 250 ethnic groups were arbitrarily herded together into an unwieldy and non-consensual 
union by the UK’. 5  Nonetheless, in the mid-1950s, there was general agitation for self-
governance across Africa, and this was reflected by the reclassification of Nigeria as an 
autonomous federation of Nigeria in 1954. It was eventually decided in late 1958 that Nigeria 
would be granted full independent status by 1960. One must be unambiguous in articulating 
the origins of Nigeria. It is not justifiable to view Nigeria as a country necessarily created by 
the consensual will of its inhabitants, or the fulfilment of a shared identity, but as merely a 
financial transaction between the British Government, and the Royal Niger Company in the 
early 1900s.   
4.1.2 The Foundations of Elitism in Nigeria 
Arguably, the push for self-governance championed by Nigeria's ‘founding fathers' in the 
1950s, could be viewed in a different light. Members of Nigeria's legislative council in 1947 
emerged as delegates of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons in London. They 
were: Jaja Wachucku, an Igbo Lawyer, Funminlayo Ransome-Kuti, a female Yoruba activist, 
and Prince Adedoyin, a Yoruba monarch, among others. Excerpts of Jaja Wachuku's address 
in London stated that: 
                                                 
4 Max Siollun, Oil, Politics and Violence, (Algora Pub 2009) p.11 
5 Ibid. p.12 
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We have come to the United Kingdom, as delegates of the National Council of 
Nigeria and the Cameroons, chosen by our people, in order to demand for a 
more democratic constitution, to modify our [inaudible] laws affecting our 
lands, minerals and chiefs and to request the British government to grant us 
more political responsibility, to enable us to take an active part, in the 
management of our affairs within the framework of the British Empire- 
[Adedoyin]6 
These representatives promulgated the impression that their push for more inclusive 
governance, was legitimised by the Nigerian people as a whole. However, the noticeable 
absence of a democratic political system in Nigeria at the time would have made it unfeasible, 
even nearly impossible for such legitimacy to have been granted to these individuals in the first 
place. These were the foundations of an elitist political system in Nigeria, which would 
eventually shape its NSSP. Another relevant consideration, is the realisation that even if such 
legitimacy was indeed granted to these representatives, it was much more likely that such 
unified representation was necessitated by a yearning for independence from British rule, rather 
than by a unified National identity forged by Nigeria's inhabitants, which would be necessary 
to bond them together in the future. Indeed, analysing Prince Adedoyin's speech, wherein he 
was quoted as specifying the extent to which he and his co-delegates hoped to manage their 
affairs ‘within the framework of the British Empire' was revealing of the origins of the unified 
front, in that, it was temporary and necessary only for the alleviation of Nigerians from direct 
British rule, whilst maintaining a unified Nigeria within the British Empire. The utility of this 
Unity would subsequently be challenged at various periods throughout Nigeria's history. 
So, by the 1950s it was increasingly clear to British colonial masters that Africans were 
becoming more aware of the inequalities that existed against them in their homelands. However, 
there was an absence of an emerging unified identity capable of birthing a Nation. Perhaps the 
only identifiable drivers of a Pan-African identify were to be seen amongst the children of the 
African elite, especially amongst those that were studying in foreign institutions in London and 
Europe as a whole. These offspring of the elite were driven by the realisation of the existence 
of racism and the frequent racist treatment they received in diaspora, and not necessarily by the 
identification of any such common political and social ideologies of a unified people. The 
emergence of conferences such as the Manchester Pan African Conference of 1945 and 
subsequent conferences, are a testament to the unification of Africans in diaspora against 
                                                 
6 ‘The N.C.N.C. Delegation to London of 1947 in Searchworks’ (Searchworks.stanford.edu, 2017) 
<https://searchworks.stanford.edu/view/4002886> accessed 7 August 2017 
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racism and subjugation, but not one of true Pan-Africanism. The main resolution of the 1954 
conference for example, was that: 
We shall complain, appeal and arraign. We will make the world listen to the 
facts of our condition. We will fight in every way we can for freedom, democracy 
and social betterment –Main Resolution of the 5th pan-African Congress7 
Judging by the personalities who were present at the Congress such as; Kwame Nkrumah 
of Ghana, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Hastings Banda of Malawi, Peter Abrahams of South 
Africa, Jaja Nwachuku and Obafemi Awolowo of Nigeria amongst others, it is evident that 
their joint resolve did not result in the creation of a Pan-African state, but rather, the existing 
territorial borders drawn up by the colonial masters of the time, were preserved. One can induce 
that, were Obafemi Awolowo and Jaja Nwachuku from different colonial territories, their 
respective (hypothetical) territories would have ended up being separate sovereign entities, and 
not the Federation of Nigeria. Notwithstanding, The Federation of Nigeria was granted full 
independence on the First of October, 1960, by an act of the British parliament. 
4.1.3 Nigeria’s Role and Identity in the World 
Nigeria in the 1960s was a vibrant, newly independent nation, having gained its 
independence from the United Kingdom in 1960. With about 60 million citizens at the time, 
consisting of over 250 distinct ethnic groups, Nigeria boasted of the most educated workforce 
in the African continent.8 Nigeria was immediately saddled with the responsibility of fulfilling 
African expectations of becoming the world’s first African superpower, or as one BBC 
broadcaster narrated: “Many expect it to become the foremost negro state of the continent.”9 
These expectations largely influenced the strategic outlook of the Nigerian state, and routinely 
served as justification for the administrative unity of Nigeria at the time. Excerpts from the 
Contact Magazine in London, on 10 October 1958, duly represented Nigeria as the embodiment 
of these hopes for a new African superpower: 
A Gigantic new independent African State whose influence on the development 
of the rest of the continent must be incalculable is taking shape at the Nigerian 
Constitutional Conference here.10 
                                                 
7 1947 T, ‘The N.C.N.C. Delegation to London of 1947 in Searchworks’ (Searchworks.stanford.edu, 2017) 
<https://searchworks.stanford.edu/view/4002886> accessed 7 August 2017 
8 Max Siollun, Oil, Politics and Violence (Algora Pub 2009) p. 11 
9  Pathe, ‘Queen in Nigeria’ (Britishpathe.com, 2017) <https://www.britishpathe.com/video/queen-in-nigeria> 
accessed 7 August 2017 
10 Collin Legum, ‘Huge New African State is Taking Shape at Nigeria Talks’ Contact Magazine (1958) 
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The newly independent Nigerian government was structurally configured as a 
parliamentary government, as provided for in the 1960 Nigerian constitution. In this regard, its 
domestic politics attempted to reproduce a Westminster style parliamentary democracy. 11 
Although the Queen of England was still Nigeria’s constitutional monarch, essential functions 
including those of foreign relations, Defence and Fiscal Policy were vested in the Nigerian 
parliament.12 Influential Nigerian political leaders at the time were; Chief Obafemi Awolowo, 
a Yoruba, and the leader of the Official Opposition, Sir Tafawa Balewa, a Hausa and the first 
elected Prime Minister, Sir Ahmadu Bello, a Hausa and the Premier of the Northern Region, 
and Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Igbo and the first Governor General and President. Three main 
political parties were in existence at the time. These were namely; the National Council of 
Nigerian Citizens, which was headed by Dr Azikiwe, and controlled the Eastern Region, The 
Northern People's Congress, which was led by Sir. Bello and commanded the Northern Region 
in addition to being the Ruling party at the time, and the Action Group, which was headed by 
Chief Awolowo, controlled the Western region and was the official opposition party. Evidently, 
these parties failed to represent refined debate about political ideologies. Instead, tribal interests 
of the three aforementioned majority ethnic groups, the Yorubas, Hausas and Igbos were 
vividly represented.13 Although this political configuration would be sure to elicit negative 
scrutiny by an observer in hindsight, it does highlight the relevance of the author’s 
aforementioned argument, with regards to the lack of political and ideational harmony that are 
believed to be necessary preconditions for the creation of a nation.  
To a social constructivist, in Nigeria's case, the relegation of ideational harmony in favour 
of tribal politics does highlight the ideational context within which politics in Nigeria operated 
at the time. Externally, Nigeria was viewed as a singular political entity, the newest and most 
promising African Superpower and a progressive economic state. Internally, however, 
Nigerians considered the country to be a much looser political association of indigenous nations, 
within a very workable political and economic union, merely retaining the boundaries of its 
past colonial administrators. Regional and tribal identity were viewed as much more relevant 
identifiers of political status and determinants of the nature of each individual's political 
participation. Indeed, this rhetoric was espoused by the man who would eventually become its 
first Prime Minister, Sir Balewa, stating: 
                                                 
11 Max Siollun, Oil, Politics and Violence (Algora Pub 2009) p. 11 
12 Martin Meredith, The Fate of Africa (Public Affairs 2011) 
13 Max Siollun, Oil, Politics and Violence (Algora Pub 2009) p. 11 
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Nigeria is not a Nation; it is a mere geographic expression. There are no 
‘Nigerians’ in the same sense as there are English or Welsh or French. The 
word ‘Nigeria’ is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live 
within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not –Sir Tafawa Balewa14 
 Externally, hopes were high that Nigeria would be well on the way to achieving a stable, 
unified and productive nation. The ultimate concern that seemed to gather significant narrative 
in international media was that of ‘Unity in Diversity.' To the insiders in Nigerian government, 
however, unity was practically useless if they did not immediately benefit from their perceived 
proximity to the centre of political power, which they had recently struggled to obtain from the 
British. The struggle to maintain a unified government, therefore, was not as important to the 
Nigerian state, as the even distribution of the dividends of independence to the constitutive 
regions that made up Nigeria.   
No doubt, we in Nigeria are very anxious of fostering a good relationship with 
all the countries in Africa and we hope that after October 1960, we shall go all 
out in order to make friends of our African neighbours. We are really interested 
in the other African states, but not in the sense of having a federated African 
state, but a union of African States, because we feel, though the thing might 
come about sometime in the future, it is most important for our countries in 
Africa especially those in west Africa, to do their utmost to develop the 
resources in their individual countries- Sir Tafawa Balewa 195915 
Taking a look at the political rhetoric promulgated by the then Prime Minister, Sir 
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, he aimed to set the stage for a politically extroverted Nigerian state, 
cautious of the reality that such extroversion would not necessarily be pursued in the immediate 
future, but would only succeed after significant efforts had been exerted by Nigeria, as well as 
other African states to develop their countries. Therefore, Nigeria’s proposed strategic outlook, 
was for it to eventually become regionally Extroverted, pending such a time that the conditions 
would have been suitable for such strategic outlook to be attained.  
4.2 CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided as a brief history of Nigeria as the subject of analysis. It also 
introduced the case study periods which shall be observed in the subsequent chapters. The next 
chapter will initiate an in-depth empirical validation exercise of the NSSP theory, and this 
would be carried out by utilising the case-study methods of analysis. The next chapter would 
                                                 
14 Obafemi Awolowo, Path to Nigerian Freedom (Faber 1967) 
15  Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Mr. Prime Minister: A Selection of Speeches Made by Alhaji the Right 
Honourable Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, K.B.E., M.P., Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria (Nigerian National Press Ltd 1964) 
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focus on investigating the interactions between the Nigerian state, and its declared or otherwise 
implied Malicious Non-State Actors, to ultimately identify and characterise the National 
Security Strategic Personality of the Nigerian State from 1960 to 1967.  
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5 CHAPTER FIVE: A GUIDE TO IMPLEMENTING THE NSSP THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK - THE FORMATION CASE-STUDY 
Having postulated the National Security Strategic Personality theory and its constitutive 
elements, as well as a brief history of Nigeria as the subject of analysis, this chapter initiated 
an in-depth empirical validation exercise of the NSSP theory. This was carried out by utilising 
the case-study methods of analysis, investigating the interactions between the Nigerian state, 
and its declared or otherwise implied Malicious Non-State Actors, to ultimately identify and 
characterise the National Security Strategic Personality of the Nigerian State. 
5.1 THE FIRST WITHIN CASE EPISODE 1960 – 1967 (FORMATION) 
This first case study, is unique in comparison with subsequent case studies, as it is a case 
study period that analyses Nigeria's formative years as an independent state. The NSSP theory, 
would be applied with emphasis placed on the following considerations; Firstly, the author 
takes care to identify the proposed ultimate concerns of newly independent Nigeria, as this 
furnishes an observer with extensive insight regarding the strategic outlook of Nigeria's NSSP 
and, in a way, enables us to understand the underlying justifications for Nigeria's strategic 
means, aimed at achieving its strategic goals. The author also takes care in delineating the sub-
elements of the NSSP theoretical framework, (The State, Prioritised Referent Objects, 
Malicious Non-State Actors and Observable State Behaviour), as well as the Elements of the 
NSSP framework (Orientation, Inflationary Containment and Compression). The author 
believes, that by explaining how the various sub-elements of the NSSP framework have been 
extracted from the case study, and how they can be used to identify the Elements of the NSSP 
theory the reader would be furnished with step-by-step insight into the application process of 
superimposing the NSSP theoretical framework on case-studies. The author then proceeds to 
analyse the elements of the NSSP theory as the independent variables of the NSSP framework; 
as it enables an observer to accurately determine the nature of the NSSP as a dependent variable 
of the case study period. 
The Formation (1960-1967) Period of Nigeria's NSSP has been chosen for this 
proprietary application of the NSSP theory because, this period serves to characterise the 
specific developments and general trends that would ultimately influence subsequent discourse 
and operationalisation of Nigerian NSSP, thus enabling us to understand the genesis of its 
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Orientation. It is also from this period of formation that one can begin to identify a broad set 
of characteristics of MNSAs that would be socially constructed as proximal threats to Nigerian 
National Security. So, the first step that needs to be taken when applying the NSSP theoretical 
framework to analyse the proposed 1960-1967 case-study period is to identify the Sub-
Elements as suggested in the NSSP theoretical framework. 
5.2 ASSESSMENT QUESTION 1 - DELINEATING BETWEEN THE STATE AND ITS PROPOSED MNSAS 
5.2.1 The State  
The Nigerian State was structurally configured as a parliamentary government, as 
provided for in the 1960 Nigerian constitution. There were three major political parties headed 
by influential Nigerian political leaders at the time. These were namely, the National Council 
of Nigerian Citizens, which was headed by Dr Azikiwe, and controlled the Eastern Region, 
The Northern People's Congress, which was headed by Sir Bello and controlled the Northern 
Region, and the Action Group, which was headed by Chief Awolowo, controlled the Western 
region.1The federal legislative house in Nigeria was made up of 312 seats. The three political 
parties in existence that constituted this parliament were the Northern People's Congress (NPC) 
with 134 seats, The National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) with 89 seats, and the 
Action Group (AG) with 73 seats. As represented graphically below, the NPC captured a 
significantly higher proportion of seats than the remaining parties. 
                                                 
1 Max Siollun, Oil, Politics and Violence (Algora Pub 2009) p. 11 
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Figure 5. Seats in the Nigerian Parliament October 1960 
The configuration of the Nigerian parliament seemed to overwhelmingly favour the NPC 
party of the North, which was by far more significant geographically and by population, in 
comparison to the remaining two parties.2 Therefore, the very first majority government post-
independence was a strategic alliance of the Northern NPC and the Eastern NCNC, with the 
official opposition party being the Western AG. As a result, no significant parliamentary 
decision could be made without the full involvement of the NPC. This meant that, by 
implication, the entirety of Nigeria, was governed by Northern tribal interests. One can 
reasonably deduce, that due to the tribal nature of parliamentary politics in Nigeria, any future 
development of the country would be hinged on the level-headedness and cooperation of the 
influential individuals within the three major parties. This cooperation was expected to 
transcend ethnic lines, and instead, focus on the simultaneous development of all regions of 
Nigeria. Indeed, this cooperation of the political elite would also have to transcend differences 
accentuated by religion, mutual suspicion and hostility for political stability to be achieved.3 
But, the unambiguous nature of tribalism in Nigeria at the time, with one of the political party's 
motto, even being: "one north, one people", meant that ethnic conflict and rivalry was an 
impending eventuality that could only be delayed, but not averted altogether.4  In an uncovered 
memo written by Robert Komer of the United States National Security Council Staff, Komer 
                                                 
2 Martin Meredith, The Fate of Africa (Public Affairs 2011) 
3 Max Siollun, Oil, Politics and Violence (Algora Pub 2009) p.12 
4 Ibid pp. 34 
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expressed his concerns about Northern dominance in the Nigerian Federal Government. He 
highlighted the ebbing resentment of northerners by their southern counterparts owing to the 
North's dominance in central government.5  
Delineating the real core of the Nigerian State requires the identification of the 
conglomerate of institutions that act as part and parcel of the State. Recalling Max Weber's 
definition of the State, wherein the State is defined as the specialised organisation of men armed 
with the rules and means of coercion to maintain order over a population, in an assigned 
territory, the NPC appears synonymous with the Nigerian State.6 The NPC was the ruling party, 
and within its ranks, the first Prime Minister, Sir Balewa, was selected. Sir Balewa, being the 
Prime Minister was viewed by citizens and foreigners as being its legitimate leader. More 
importantly, Sir Balewa wielded the sole authority over the institutions that served as the 
primary utilizers of coercive force. The Nigerian Army, headed by Major-General Welby-
Everard, the Nigerian Navy, headed by Commodore Joseph Wey, and the Nigerian Police 
Force, headed by Louis Edet, were all constitutionally bound to obey his orders if he 
commanded them (at least in theory). So, therefore, any instances of Inflationary Containment 
and Compression would only occur, in line with the strategic goals of the NPC party to which 
he belonged, and on Sir. Balewa's explicit command. Opposition and Minority leaders, though 
being part of the government, did not enjoy the same authority which Sir. Balewa possessed, 
and even though the actions of these peripheral leaders would, in one way or another, influence 
Sir. Balewa's actions, they cannot be construed as being representative of the State, in the same 
way which Balewa can. 
5.2.2 Malicious Non-State Actors 
Taking into account the leadership structure of the Nigerian State, in which the NPC 
wielded absolute power, it was only a matter of time before pre-colonial tribal tensions and 
sentiments resurfaced in newly independent Nigeria. Nigeria was a newly independent nation 
which, for the first time since 1914, was responsible for its own survival as a unified entity. It 
is understandable that any actors which were viewed as a direct threat to Nigeria’s unity, would 
attract the attention of the Nigerian state.  
The first instances of such tribal tensions would emerge in the Middle-Belt zones of the 
Northern Region in August of 1960. When members of the Tiv tribe and the Yoruba tribe of 
                                                 
5 '35. Paper Prepared By The NSC Interdepartmental Group For Africa, Washington, February 10, 1969' (2001-
2009.state.gov, 2009) <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e5/54835.htm> accessed 14 May 2017. 
6 Martin Shaw, War and Genocide: Organised Killing in Modern Society, (Polity Press 2003) 
Olamide Samuel - 1401236 - University of Buckingham 
 94 
the Western Region, were simultaneously engaged in popular uprisings against the NPC-led 
government. These revolutions were characterised by the Nigerian State as threats to the fragile 
unity and stability of the State.7 While civilians belonging to the Tiv tribe, engaged in riots and 
protests against what they viewed as an inconsiderate and repressive government, widespread 
incidents of civil unrest were also documented in the Western Region. The underlying 
grievances which led to civil unrest in both regions were attributed to the nature of governance, 
which was characterised as unrepresentative of the people, and repressive, as espoused by Mr. 
Tarka who was the leader of the United Middle Belt Congress. 
In the Middle-Belt zones of the Northern region, the members of the Tiv tribe and their 
supporters primarily questioned the credibility of the NPC government, and by extension, the 
legitimacy of the so-called Native Authority, which directly oversaw their affairs. An 
overwhelming majority of Tivmen supported a political party called the United Middle Belt 
Congress UMBC; a political party that has hardly been mentioned in general narratives of 
Nigerian history, probably because of its lack of representation in the Federal Parliament.8 In 
the Western Region, the development of tensions between two influential individuals within 
the western AG party namely; Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Chief Ladoke Akintola, were 
increasingly evident. These tensions were the initial catalysts that could potentially destabilise 
the fragile political arrangement of the day.9 The development of tensions between the AG 
party leader, and his deputy were based on the objectives of their party in the National 
parliament. While party leader Awolowo preferred maintaining the AG party as an active 
opposition, deputy party leader Akintola was in favour of strategically allying with the NPC 
led government, to form a ruling coalition. This rift escalated to the point of splitting the AG 
party into two factions, with either faction supporting the Leader and Deputy respectively. We 
must be reminded that Sir Bello, the NPC leader himself was still unconvinced of a Nigerian 
identity, stating in one interview, that he would prefer to be addressed as the Sultan of Sokoto 
than the President of Nigeria.10 This highlights the fact that, although Sir Bello harboured the 
same anti-Nigerian sentiments as his counterparts in the West and Middle-Belt zones, his 
                                                 
7 '35. Paper Prepared By The NSC Interdepartmental Group For Africa, Washington, February 10, 1969' (2001-
2009.state.gov, 2009) <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e5/54835.htm> accessed 14 May 2017. 
8 Audu Bem, ‘Tiv (Nigeria) Riots of 1960: The Principle of Minimum Force and Counter Insurgency’ (Nigerian 
Defence Academy 2008) 
9 Martin Meredith, The Fate of Africa (Public Affairs 2011) 
10 Muhammed Adamu, 'Pondering On The Life Of Sir Ahmadu Bello' (Blueprint - For Truth and Justice, 2017) 
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proximity to legitimate power meant that he was able to control the narrative that identified 
threats to national values.  
The utilisation of political violence by the AG in the Western Region, and the UMBC in 
the Middle-Belt zones pitted them against the Nigerian State, and unwittingly increased the 
powers of the Northern region, which controlled the apparatus of the Nigerian State. The AG 
and UMBC parties, were viewed by NPC leaders as acting against the interests of the Nigerian 
State and were essentially dealt with, as MNSAs. As their Western and Middle-Belt 
counterparts appeared to be divided, Northern leaders such as Sir Bello, for the time being, 
were relieved, as they had feared that "a sudden grouping of the eastern and western 
parties…might take power and endanger…the north" which would be ‘utterly disastrous.'11 
The development of civil unrest, served as justification for the NPC government to clamp down 
on manifestations of instability which were purportedly against Nigeria's national interests. It 
was, therefore, convenient for those in control of the Nigerian State apparatus, to identify 
specific individuals and groups as Malicious threats to Nigerian values of national unity and 
peaceful development. So, in applying the NSSP theoretical framework on this case study, 
these individuals and groups that were seen as the instigators of political violence, and 
subsequently clamped down upon by the State, would be represented as the Malicious Non-
State Actors.   
With the delineation of the Nigerian State from potential MNSAs, it is now possible to 
introduce the first Independent Variable of the NSSP theoretical framework, by postulating the 
Second Assessment Question, which enables us to characterise the Orientation of the NSSP. 
As mentioned in the Third Chapter, the Orientation of an NSSP is determined by the location 
where one can identify Observable State Behaviour enacted against Malicious Non-State 
Actors, by the Nigerian State. It serves a key indicator of the physical scope of operations 
within which the Nigerian State considered itself as a legitimate actor, aiming to ensure the 
protection of its Referent Objects. Therefore, in identifying the nature of Nigeria's Orientation 
in this case study, one has to recognise the Physical Location within which the State has been 
observed to operationalise Inflationary Containment and Compression against Malicious Non-
State Actors habitually. The Nigerian State would then be considered to be Extroverted or 
Introverted, depending on where Observable State Behaviour has been observed in the case-
study. 
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5.3 ASSESSMENT QUESTION 2 ORIENTATION: WHERE CAN ONE OBSERVE THE PRESENCE OF 
INFLATIONARY CONTAINMENT AND COMPRESSION BY THE STATE? 
Middle Belt Zone, Northern region 1960-1963 
Riots and widespread civil unrest began in the Yandev village in the Middle-Belt zones 
of the Northern Region in 1960. Violent clashes between members of the Tiv tribe and 
Government forces were as a result of popular discontent with the NPC leadership in the 
Middle-Belt zones.12 Government narrative, cast the blame on the UMBC party and its political 
ties with the AG party in the Western region. The Nigerian government singled out one UMBC 
politician, Mr Tarka, claiming that he was going against the national interests, in his 
campaigning for the creation of the Middle Belt Region to be carved out of the Northern 
region.13 The Nigerian State was quick to allege that Mr Tarka's campaign was not in the 
national interests, but rather a part of conspiracies by ‘external forces' to destabilise the unity 
of the Nigerian State. One publication in the newspapers of the day, aggressively reiterated the 
government's allegations:  
some selfish politicians in the area (Middle Belt Zone) who hope to achieve their 
pet ambition…it has been the vowed desire of the disgruntled politicians that by 
so doing, they will make an inroad into the North and cause a setback to the 
present peaceful and steady march towards political solidarity and economic 
emancipation of the Northern Regional Government14 
Mr. Tarka, was quick to respond to the government’s allegations, stating that he and his 
tribesmen had exhausted all legitimate avenues towards the creation of a Middle Belt 
government that represented his tribesmen at the federal level. Tarka compared the NPC’s 
governance of his people, to the colonial system of indirect rule. Tarka proposed that violence 
was perhaps the only other option left to him and his tribesmen, but also claimed that the 
nonresponsive nature of the Nigerian State, had necessitated the violence. “The high-
handedness of the local authority, the clan and kindred heads, arbitrary police raids, mass 
arrests and imprisonment of the innocent by the police, the NP, and in particular, the Ahmadu 
Bello Youth Brigade for framed offences…”15 were given as reasons why the Tivmen had 
turned towards violence in order to achieve their emancipation from NPC rule. The Nigerian 
Government responded by deploying a limited number of Military officers to assist the 
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Nigerian police force in quelling the violence, and subsequently withdrew the Military officers.  
On further investigation of Mr. Tarka’s claims, one would be inclined to agree with his position, 
as he did have some legitimate concerns. Firstly, in the build up towards the first parliamentary 
elections in 1959, it was reported that the UMBC had won an overwhelming majority of Tiv 
votes in the region. Adding up to about 85% of the popular vote. However, their votes had little 
effect on the nature of government which they were subjected to. As the NPC had won a 
majority of the votes in the Northern Region as a whole, 85% of Tiv votes were infinitesimal 
in comparison to the NPC mandate. The NPC subsequently decided to instead, appoint their 
favourite local chiefs from the Tiv tribe to administer the TIV people, circumventing the 
popular mandate which the UMBC received. 16  This was how the ‘Native Authority' was 
fabricated. Needless to say, the Tiv tribesmen who supported the UMBC were cut out from the 
political process altogether through this political arrangement by the NPC. The repressive 
nature of the NPC figureheads in the Middle Belt Region, was conspicuous, to say the least. 
The victimisation and arbitrary arrest of UMBC supporters was a common occurrence, as was 
the frequent occurrence of arbitrary taxation, arrest and detention of even passive supporters of 
the UMBC party. Without legitimate avenues for Tivmen to voice out their concerns, it was 
only a matter of time before violent, aggressive means were utilised for the emancipation of 
the Tiv from NPC dominance.17  
In September of 1960, UMBC supporters ambushed an NPC delegation headed for a 
meeting in Wukari, a town in the Middle Belt zone. 18 In a bid to intimidate NPC supporters in 
Tivland, UMBC supporters forced the NPC delegation to retreat to their town of origin. 
However, a second attempt at ambushing the NPC delegation, ended in bloodshed, as police 
escorts opened fire on the Tivmen and killed one of their members. This killing sparked 
widespread violence in the area. Any villages, businesses or individuals that were perceived as 
supporting the NPC government were subject to intimidation and violence from the UMBC. 
Entire villages were razed to the ground by UMBC supporters, and government infrastructure 
in the area were set alight in retaliation to the killing of one of the UMBC supporters. It is 
documented that the arsonists from the UMBC frequently shouted ‘Tarka' (The Name of their 
leader) and ‘Awo' (short for Awolowo, the name of the AG leader at the time), as battle cries 
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17 Victor Elaigwu, The Military and the Management of Civil Crises In Nigeria, 1960-1993 (Nigerian defence 
Academy Press 2003) 
18 Audu Bem, ‘Tiv (Nigeria) Riots of 1960: The Principle of Minimum Force and Counter Insurgency’ (Nigerian 
Defence Academy 2008) 
Olamide Samuel - 1401236 - University of Buckingham 
 98 
before embarking on their chaotic assignments.19 As civil unrest would continue to render 
many areas of the Middle Belt zone ungovernable by the Nigerian State, the UMBC supporters 
seemed to be making their point known, that they were supported by a popular mandate. A 
publication by the Government at the time showed that the UMBC supporters were effective 
at crippling the administration within the Middle Belt Zones.20  The Nigerian State's immediate 
reaction to the civil unrest in the Middle Belt Zones was to send in anti-riot squads to quell the 
riots which were widespread and increasingly destructive. The Nigerian police estimated that 
about 5000 people were arrested for their participation in the violence, and about 3,880 were 
convicted of various crimes related to the riots.21 The Nigerian Government also ordered the 
arrest and detention of UMBC leader, Mr Tarka. Following the arrests and detention of rioters, 
the Nigerian State sought to address the underlying political grievances of the Tivmen. This 
second phase of the response was characterised by the facilitating of dialogue between the 
Government and the UMBC party, which resulted in the dissolution of the unpopular Native 
Authority.22  With the apparent willingness of the Nigerian State to engage in negotiations with 
the Tivmen and UMBC, political and legal reforms which were a result of the dialogue between 
the Nigerian Government and the UMBC were effective, and Mr Tarka was released from 
detention. Civil unrest seemed to be reduced to acceptable minimums. However, the instigation 
of the "Fletcher Commission" to assess the damages caused by the riots and compensation of 
riot victims, sparked outrage for the following reasons. The Fletcher commission estimated that 
about £500,000.00 infrastructure and goods had been damaged by Tivmen. The Northern 
Premier, Sir. Bello, then directed that these costs should be borne by every adult male taxpayer 
in the Middle Belt Zone.23 The resurgence of violence was imminent when it was discovered 
that the special levy to be paid within the Middle Belt Zone, exempted virtually all pro-NPC 
vicinities, and only applied to pro-UMBC settlements. This biased application of the special 
levies unearthed recently buried grievances, and by 1964, riots would re-emerge.24  
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Western region 1960-1963 
In the Western Region, the Nigerian government was facing similar challenges with the 
Yoruba tribe. As was mentioned earlier, tensions between two influential individuals within 
the western AG party namely; Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Chief Ladoke Akintola, were 
becoming increasingly violent.25 The party leader Awolowo was bent on maintaining the AG 
party as an effective opposition to NPC dominance, whereas his deputy, Akintola was in favour 
of an alliance with the NPC led government, to form a ruling coalition. This rift escalated to 
the point of splitting the AG party into two factions, with either faction supporting the Leader 
and Deputy respectively. In the Western house of Parliament, violence quickly escalated after 
parliament met in May of 1962 to debate a motion of no confidence in Akintola.26 Akintola 
supporters who would eventually become members of the NNDP party started a riot in the 
chambers of parliament.27 It was recorded that chairs were flung by members of the house, the 
speaker’s mace was converted into a weapon by one of the speakers, and tables were broken 
as violence ensued within the house. Riot police were deployed in the western region, and it is 
reported that canisters of teargas were thrown in the Parliament chambers. The meeting was 
subsequently adjourned as proceedings could not continue in such a violent manner. 
Subsequent attempts to reconvene the house of parliament resulted in similar outbreaks of 
violence and thus granted the western region its lasting reputation as a region prone to political 
violence.28  
Internal Division cripples Nigeria’s Proposed Orientation 
This plunge into violent intra-party politics, against the backdrop of tribal inter-party 
politics, was not in line with Balewa's proposed strategic plans of positioning Nigeria as an 
extroverted and dominant state in the sub-region. Instead, Nigeria was beginning to implode 
following the breakdown of law and order within the western Nigerian house of parliament. It 
was becoming increasingly evident that the manifestation of pre-colonial tribal sentiments, was 
perhaps the most dangerous phenomenon with the capability of wreaking havoc on the delicate 
and newly established political order in Nigeria. Any individuals among the political elite, 
which were identified as willing and able to utilize and weaponize tribal sentiments for personal 
political gain, were viewed as potential MNSAs proximal to the interests of the state. 29 
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Following the eruption of riots in the western region, as initiated in the western parliament, a 
western Senator, Chief O. A. Fagbenro-Beyioku appealed to the Prime Minister to intervene. 
Thus, what could be argued to be one of the very first manifestation of Inflationary 
Containment in Nigerian history was operationalised.  
Judging by the actions of the Prime Minister, in which he promptly imposed martial law 
via a state of emergency declaration, manifestation of Inflationary Containment was arguably 
targeted at members of the Western parliament, but specifically at the AG party. The Prime 
Minister then proceeded to install Dr. Moses Majekodunmi as the interim Administrator of the 
Western region.30 Many Nigerians viewed the prompt declaration of martial law in the western 
region as premature. Also, it was hardly a secret that Dr. Majekodunmi had close personal ties 
with the Prime Minister (as his personal physician and friend) which influenced the 
appointment of the Western Administrator. Dr. Majekodunmi's first act, was to place several 
Western leaders under house-arrest and to launch an investigation into Chief Awolowo. A 
special commission led by Justice G. B. Coker, uncovered that Chief Awolowo had syphoned 
public funds for the enrichment of his party. It was also uncovered, that Awolowo may have 
been part of a plan to unconstitutionally overthrow the Federal Government.31 Awolowo and 
others including Anthony Enahoro and Lateef Jakande were eventually convicted and 
imprisoned for treason. These men vehemently denied these allegations at the time, but decades 
later it was revealed by one of the accused, that such plans actually existed. Samuel Ikoku, 
speaking at a workshop on Nigerian history, actually confessed to being part of the plot: 
we were fed up with the way the Nigerian System, the Nigerian state and the 
Nigerian government were operating, we were deeply committed to a change of 
government and we saw that waiting for elections would not produce any 
solution to the problem. This is what we did. We started preparations for it and 
the preparations had gone very far and I believe we would have pulled it off. 
But unfortunately for us our leader was so kind to the Nigerian police that he 
had a police informant among his planners and so the police knew every move 
we were making. And so it was easy to trip us up. Well, after the act, people 
have been saying, there was no coup because we went to court, there was no 
plan to overthrow the government. Naturally, if you catch me over a coup plot 
and take me to court, I have to enter a plea of not guilty, I did not do it. This is 
normal…Our leader even became the number two citizen in the country. I felt it 
was time to tell the country the truth so that our history would be correct. So, 
all I am saying is that, yes there was an attempt to overthrow the government. 
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Yes, I took part in the attempt. Yes, it failed, thanks to people like M.D. Yusuf 
and Co. –Samuel Ikoku32 
Elitist Tribalism as the bane of National Unity 
The conviction of Awolowo among other southern politicians for treason, established 
the fact that it was conceivable for some, to plan to overthrow the constitutional government 
through physical force. These chain of events, in hindsight, appear to be the proprietary 
template under which subsequent attempts at overthrowing the Nigerian government would 
follow.  
Following the federal clampdown on Western politicians that saw most of the 
politicians behind bars, there was a conspicuous vacuum in the political sphere of the western 
region. Arguably, public confidence in the political and judicial system was also significantly 
weakened by Awolowo’s pleas of innocence. The deep and mutual mistrust harboured by 
different tribes against their counterparts, was beginning to emerge, and it seemed as though 
the Federal Government’s intervention in the western region had been the catalyst for these 
happenings.  
A new democratically created region emerged in early 1963; The mid-Western region. 
This region was carved out of the Western region, and although it served positively to highlight 
a new phase of political inclusion of minor tribes, it essentially weakened the western region's 
position as an effective opposition to the northern-eastern alliance. 1963 also saw the creation 
of a new western-based political party, the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP). This 
political party was led by the AG's former deputy leader, Chief Akintola, and although the 
party was widely unpopular, this party led the Western region, supposedly because of support 
from senior NPC leaders Bello and Balewa. 
Middle Belt Zone, Northern Region 1964-1966 
In the Middle Belt Zones, violence had re-emerged following the unsolved grievances 
of the 1960 riots. The Nigerian Government had increased its Police presence in the Middle 
Belt Zone as a result of the bitter lessons it had learnt from the 1960s riots. However, the 
Nigerian Government's increment of police forces in the Middle Belt Zone did not envisage 
the resurgence of violence that would greatly supersede that which occurred in 1960. It must 
be noted that since the dissolution of the Native Authority in 1960, no elections were held in 
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the Middle Belt Zone to elect any representatives from the zone into parliament. This 
essentially meant that the UMBC party, and the Tiv people by extension, were effectively 
ostracised from the government. With the Majority of Tivmen denied adequate representation, 
they once again turned to brutal violence against any entity which they believed were in support 
of the NPC led government.33 There was also the presence of the brutal Native Authority Police, 
an element of the Native Authority which was strategically preserved by the Nigerian 
Government. Reportedly, the Native Authority police engaged in repressive and abusive 
activity which could not be carried out by the conventional Police Force.34 The brutality of the 
Native Authority Police led the UMBC to call out for either a dissolution of the Native 
Authority Police or at the very least, a merger between the Native Authority police and the 
Nigerian Police Force, for increased supervision and accountability 35 . The Nigerian 
government responded to Mr Tarka's demands, by reorganizing the Tiv Native Authority Police, 
under the administrative control of the Nigeria Police Force.36 This reorganisation however, 
had no strategic value in quelling UMBC grievances which stemmed from their lack of formal 
representation in government. Numerous riots broke out in the Middle Belt Zones in February 
1964, in which several Police officers were murdered as a reprisal to the murder of a Tiv 
traditional ruler and clan head, earlier that year.37   
The Nigerian Police Force in the Middle Belt Zone appeared to be ill-equipped and 
understaffed to handle the unfolding crises. Reinforcements from the Northern city of Kaduna 
were routinely sent to assist in crises management. Tivmen were increasingly organised in their 
mobilisation of personnel, organisation of attacks, and solicitation of popular sympathy and 
support. A significant portion of the Tiv rioters were recently decommissioned military 
servicemen who served in the Second World War, fighting on behalf of the British Empire.38 
The experience of these ex-servicemen, in addition to overwhelming popular support from 
members of the Tiv tribe, emboldened the rioters to carry out direct attacks on the police. The 
increasing intensity of the attacks on the Nigerian police, most likely necessitated a brutal 
military suppression of riots by the Nigerian government. On the 18th of November 1964, an 
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entire Battalion of the Nigerian Army, as well as the Reece Squadron of the Nigerian Army, 
was mobilised for a counter insurgency operation against the Tiv uprising. 39  The Army 
battalion was explicitly ordered by the Prime Minister, Sir Balewa to neutralize the Tiv uprising 
by any means necessary. The Army battalion and Reece Squadron were never recalled up until 
the outbreak of the Nigerian Civil War in 1967.  
Nigeria 1964-1966 
These political happenings highlighted the relegated role of popular legitimacy in 
Nigeria. The declaration of emergency rule in the western region, the leadership of the western 
region by a grossly unpopular party, 40  the NNDP, coupled with the installation of Dr 
Majekodunmi in 1962, the leadership of the Middle Belt Zones by an unpopular native 
Authority, the deployment of the Nigerian army to crush dissent, and the ostracizing of all 
opposition parties, set the stage for the happenings in the 1964 elections. However, these 
political happenings are much more significant, when their effects are superimposed on the 
remainder of Nigerian history. Firstly, it was clear that the opinion of the common man in 
Nigeria was of little consequence in political proceedings. The wishes of the political elite 
overshadowed any of the concerns of the common man, and this arguably exacerbated the 
perception of the common man's distance from and subjugation to the government. Secondly, 
the power of political rhetoric such as those espoused by Awolowo over his conviction and 
incarceration, by far outweighed the popular legitimacy granted to courts of law. Until Ikoku's 
admission about their involvement in the coup plot decades later, Awolowo's political rhetoric 
proclaiming his innocence was viewed as truth, and the courts of law were viewed with deep 
suspicion by many.41 Thirdly, the swift imposition of martial law, and numerous house arrests 
by the Federal Government appeared authoritarian and further reminded the people, of the 
Federal Government's authoritative tendencies in its application of Inflationary Containment. 
5.4 RESEARCH FINDINGS: ASSESSMENT OF ORIENTATION 
Although the Prime Minister had called for an extroverted orientation in principle, this 
was never achieved. Instead, Nigeria had become so engulfed in domestic political issues, that 
in practice, its orientation had been “Introverted". All instances of Inflationary Containment 
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and Compression against possible MNSAs by the Nigerian state occurred within the territorial 
boundaries of Nigeria during the period of formation. It was also clear that, even though no 
self-proclaimed MNSA was active within Nigeria's borders, the determining factor of MNSA 
classification was at the discretion of those within the upper echelons of the Federal 
Government. All individuals within the Nigerian political elite were guilty of promulgating 
tribalist sentiments. However, the difference between those that were socially construed as 
threats to Nigerian unity and those that were not was the possession of political power, backed 
up by the State. The Nigerian government was capable of identifying its political rivals and 
labelling them as threats to National unity. The Nigerian government also effectively detected 
even loosely organised political dissidents and dismantled them through incarceration, house 
arrests and installation of replacements. 
Owing to increasing political instability within Nigeria, there were no recorded 
instances of Inflationary Containment and Compression outside of Nigerian territory, during 
the formation period. Therefore, utilising Orientation as an independent variable within the 
NSSP theoretical framework, Nigeria was essentially an Introverted State. Below, is a 
measurement scale of Nigeria's orientation during the formation period. This measurement 
scale is the first representation of an element of Nigerian NSSP. Within this measurement scale, 
recorded events are tabularised, according to their location. Events represented in this 
measurement scale occurred within Nigerian territory, and are input in the ‘State Territory’ 
column. Notable instances wherein the Nigerian government operationalised Inflationary 
Containment, and Compression are as follows42: 
Table 5. Independent Variable Measurement: Orientation 
Introverted Extroverted 








                                                 
42 To compile the data within the assessment tables, I consulted archival material obtained from the National 
Library, Abuja, and the Libraries of the Nigerian Defence Academy, Zaria, National Defence College, Abuja, as 
well as documents obtained from British Library Archives. Documents (in the form of newspaper and magazine 
cuttings as well as audio and video messages) were invaluable. A large chunk of data were obtained from 
interviews, books, journals and official reports. These were collated, analysed and presented in the mentioned 
tables and figures. 
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1961 UMBC leader, Mr Tarka is 
arbitrarily Arrested and 
Detained 
   
1961 Military Deployment against 
UMBC supporters 
   
1962 Attachment of Armed 
Personnel to Government 




1962 Chief Awolowo and Others 
Imprisoned for Treason 
   
1962 Members of the Western 
Parliament Placed Under 
House Arrest 
   
1962 Martial law is Imposed in the 
Western Region 
   
1962 Chief Awolowo and Others 
Accused and Convicted on 
Treason Charges 
   
1964 Military Deployment against 
UMBC supporters 
   
1964 Arrest and Detention of Tiv 
Rioters 
   
1964 Fortification of Residential 
Dwellings of Government 
Officials 
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1964 Brutal Military Suppression 
of Tiv Riots 
   
  
 
5.5 ASSESSMENT QUESTION 3 (INFLATIONARY CONTAINMENT): WHAT REFERENT OBJECTS 
WITHIN REACH OF THE MNSA HAVE BEEN OBSERVED TO BE GRANTED PRIORITY BY THE STATE? 
In seeking to identify the Prioritised Referent Objects of Nigeria's NNSP within the 
NSSP theoretical framework, a deductive process wherein the hierarchy of Referent Objects is 
introduced as a guide to identifying Prioritised Referent Objects, is encouraged. Referent 
Objects within this case study refer to what the Nigerian government considered valuable 
enough to warrant the prioritised, conscious and continuous provision of Security, from threats 
posed by perceived Malicious Non-State Actors. As has been established in the course of the 
first assessment question, the Nigerian government considered the political instability in the 
Western Region and Middle Belt Zone as a source of concern. Also, the Nigerian government 
took decisive steps in identifying key influential individuals within the AG and the UMBC 
parties as responsible for the perpetuation of political violence. Therefore, the superimposition 
of the hierarchy of referent objects serves as an aid in deciphering what exactly the Nigerian 
government had interests in protecting, above other considerations. 
As at 1964, when the National elections were to be held, the situation in Nigeria had 
deteriorated significantly. Endemic corruption among the political elite was conspicuous and 
had become clear that politicians were diverting national funds for personal enrichment. 
The ostentatious lifestyle of prominent ministers such as Chief Festus Okotie-
Eboh raised eyebrows…Ministers were accused of taking ‘kickbacks’ for large 
government contracts. As many civil servants lacked experience and training in 
governmental, constitutional and parliamentary practice and affairs, they could 
easily be manipulated…in ministers’ corrupt practices –Max Siollun43 
Smith, a former British Colonial officer also expressed his views about the finance 
minister at the time: 
Okotie-Eboh was a gross squalid crook who dragged Nigeria down to his own 
level…He had dragged Nigeria into the sewer, but because of his corruption, 
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Nigeria has no sewers. The money to pay for them is still in Swiss banks –Harold 
Smith44 
It could be argued that most constituents saw little benefits of civil participation in 
Nigeria's democracy, as political violence had become a regular occurrence. Uniform provision 
of security to Nigerian citizens seemed to be absent. Instead, records show that on occasion, 
members of the pro-government NPC party were afforded preferential treatment by the 
Nigerian State.45 
The scale of Okotie-Eboh's corruption was hardly unique to him, as corruption amongst 
most government officials was rife and evident. The elections, therefore, were held against this 
backdrop of corruption and civil unrest.46 In parliament the AG was significantly weakened 
entering the elections as a result of the Awolowo scandal, and the UMBC had no official 
constituency to contest for. The existing coalition between the Northern People's Congress and 
the NCNC was unravelling due to tribal tensions and instances of violence. However, the 
NCNC had strengthened its position as it now controlled large swathes of the Mid-western 
region formerly belonging to the AG. New coalitions were emerging, such as the NNDP under 
Akintola, aligning with the NPC to form what they called the Nigerian National Alliance 
(NNA). The weakened AG party, on the other hand, had allied itself with the encroaching 
NCNC to form the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). This consolidation of parties 
meant that entering the elections, there were two main parties pitted against each other; the 
NNA protecting Northern interests with supportive elements from the Western region, and the 
UPGA promoting Southern interests against Northern domination. The Northern Premier in an 
Interview with the BBC, just before the 1964 elections stated that: 
Well this is not a very serious matter, it is a matter that happens in every 
country, you get odd controversies taking place here and there. I think all the 
leaders at once see that the unity of the country is maintained. Therefore, you 
get the tail of every parties trying to drag the parties here or there – Sir Ahmadu 
Bello47 
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Considering the fact that hundreds of civilians caught up in political clashes had already 
lost their lives to the undeterred ambitions of the political elite, Sir Ahmadu Bello's utterances 
were insensitive to the plights of the Nigerian people at best. One can arguably perceive his 
deeply rooted elitist ontology. His views were not unique, however, as the actions of the 
political elite within the government were manifestations of similar views. It was becoming 
increasingly clear that Nigerian NSSP was hardly people-centric, in actions or in rhetoric. 
As the two political alliances prepared for the general elections, Northern interests were 
to propagate their time in power; Southern interests were to taste power finally. The eventual 
fate of Awolowo and his colleagues still in prison from 1962 echoed the conviction that, it was 
dangerous to remain as the government's official opposition. The timely incarceration of Mr 
Tarka of the UMBC, suspiciously close to regional elections in 1961 suggested that the 
aforementioned conviction was true. The stakes of the election were higher because, to those 
on the opposition, it was a make or break affair. "The supremacy that could be enjoyed by a 
victorious party in government"48 dictated the desperation of opposition politicians. As a result, 
election malpractices were rampant, with the inclusion of ballot box stuffing, election rigging, 
voter intimidation, and physical blockades of election polling stations. The electoral processes 
were dictated by the scale of physical abuse, intimidation, tribal rhetoric and xenophobia, rather 
than by policy or refined ideology. 
African politics, in which tribes, religions and economics all play a part, are 
involved in the situation. The northern premier is at odds with the eastern 
premier in whose regions large oil deposits have been discovered. In the heat 
of the election campaign, there have been threats of secession by the east; 
threats of violence “that would make Congo look like child’s play49 
The UPGA even resolved to boycott the elections altogether, levelling allegations 
against the northern region, claiming that they had devised plans to rig the elections. Fighting 
ensued in the Western region with approximately 2000 people losing their lives in the violence 
incentivised by the political elite.50  
The deployment of the Army to police elections was just one of their numerous 
mobilisation tasks since Nigeria gained independence. Amidst the violence between civilians 
at the grassroots level, military deployment ordered around securing ballot boxes, was 
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suggestive of the Nigerian government's increasingly Interest Centric nature. Many Army 
officers witnessed the gross electoral misconduct and were called by many Nigerians to 
intervene.51 At the central level of government, President Azikiwe and Prime Minister Balewa 
were competing for Army and Police loyalty in the case of any eventualities. In one of the 
several instances of their tussle, President Azikiwe reminded the heads of the Navy, Army and 
Police forces ‘of their loyalty' to him as the Commander in Chief of the Armed forces. It was 
widely believed that President Azikiwe, sought to utilize the armed forces as leverage in the 
eventuality of a political stalemate. In response, the Prime Minister Balewa ordered a highly 
controversial show of force. Balewa ordered the Nigerian Army to embark on a tour of the 
country. The reasons for his order being to "give the people an opportunity to see their army" 
and "show the people of Lagos that the army is ready in case of trouble."52 Sir. Balewa also 
ordered the deployment of the Army to the Middle Belt Zone in the Northern Region to "take 
immediate steps to ensure a return to normal life" in the crisis-torn Tiv division.53 It is widely 
believed that the utilisation of such intimidation by the most powerful men in the country for 
the sake of elections, against the advice of people like Sir Vahe Bairamian (who urged for the 
political neutrality of the armed forces), essentially set the country on the path towards military 
rule, and eventually, civil war.54  
5.6 RESEARCH FINDINGS: ASSESSMENT OF INFLATIONARY CONTAINMENT 
In assessing the nature of Inflationary Containment, the identification of Target 
Hardening strategies as well as Damage Mitigation strategies on Referent Objects should 
enable us to identify where the state’s Inflationary Containment is centred upon. As explained 
in the third chapter of this thesis, target hardening refers to strategic actions taken by a State to 
increase the resilience of its Referent Objects within the range of Malicious Non-State Actors’ 
inflation, and in this case study, MNSA’s inflation refers to organisations blamed for inciting 
tribalist political violence. In hardening targets, the Nigeria State aimed to convince its 
perceived Malicious Non-State Actors that their attempts at interacting with specific Referent 
Objects would be too costly to be considered beneficial, by raising the costs of attempting to 
interact with said Referent Objects. For example, the deployment of soldiers to police election, 
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suggests that any MNSA attempting to interact with ballot boxes would be met with lethal 
force.  
Implementation of The Hierarchy of Referent Objects within the NSSP framework 
It should be recalled that there are two proposed categories of Referent Objects; 
Referent Objects are either People or Interests, depending on the prioritisation by the State 
during Inflationary Containment. Within the framework of the National Security Strategic 
Personality Thesis, Prioritised Referent Objects are identified as such, based on the Observed 
State Behaviour, aimed at preventing or terminating Malicious Non-State Actors’ interaction 
with a specific group of people or interests. Therefore, identifying processes of inflationary 
containment where they may exist, enables an observer to understand the State’s Prioritised 
Referent Objects, amongst other Referent Objects.55  
When identifying Referent Objects as People, one should normally be able to identify a 
civilian population which the State strives to isolate from interaction with Malicious Non-State 
Actors. But, as suggested earlier, safeguarding the Nigerian People did not seem to be the focus 
of the Nigerian State’s National Security Strategic Personality. Instead, Interests other than 
People could arguably be identified as the Prioritised Referent Objects of States. These interests 
are the tangible and intangible Values, which Nigerian NSSP could be Observed to Prioritise. 
Inclusive of Tangible Values like:  
 Territory – The swift imposition of Martial law in the Western region  
 Assets -The Fortification of Private Residences of Government Officials,  
and Intangible Values, such as: 
 Regime Security – The arbitrary Incarceration of Opposition leaders at strategic times 
around elections or important votes in parliament  
 State Sovereignty – The military suppression of politically active indigenous Tiv 
tribesmen 
 Political Ideology – the criminalisation and ostracizing of political organisations which 
were vehemently opposed to a National Union wherein the perpetual Northern 
dominance of the Nigerian State apparatus existed.  
Again, the separation between People and Interests as Referent Objects has been created 
because of the author's observations, that a trade-off occurs when Interests are prioritised as 
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Referent Objects, as People automatically become deprioritised, and the continuous, conscious 
provision of security to People is jeopardised as long as the provision of security is diverted to 
Interests. 
If Nigeria’s Referent Objects were People, Target Hardening that would have been 
observed would include increased security provision and counter-rhetoric aimed at capturing 
the hearts of civilian populations within reach of the Malicious Non-State Actors. In this way, 
the Nigerian state would have been able to negate the threatening influence of the MNSA, “to 
the extent that there is confidence that normal life can continue."56 Target hardening People 
would have also included increased surveillance and security provision to civilian 
transportation channels and hubs, and increased presence of security forces amongst civilian 
populations to quell violence. Damage mitigation would have also been observed to be 
implemented by the State, to immediately limit, reduce or reverse ongoing interaction between 
Malicious Non-State Actors and People. However, it was observed that target hardening and 
damage mitigation efforts by the Nigerian government were hardly centred on the civilian 
population within the reach of MNSAs. For example, when the Prime Minister decided to 
declare a State of Emergency and subsequent martial law in the Western Region, this was a 
manifestation of Inflationary containment by the state. However, that only supporters of Chief 
Awolowo that were convicted and incarcerated, showed that an uneven application of State 
strategy was underway, suggesting that the martial law strategy was interest-centric in nature. 
It was Awolowo and his supporters, who wanted to maintain their official opposition stance 
against the government, as well as Tarka and his supporters who wanted to secure some degree 
of political autonomy for their zone, that were subjected to Nigerian Inflationary Containment. 
This biased application of state strategy could be viewed as the first indication of an interest 
centric Inflationary Containment strategy.  
The eventual installation of Dr Moses Majekodunmi as the interim Administrator of the 
Western region was unconstitutional, and one could argue that it served as confirmation of 
many Nigerians’ suspicions that the government was acting in favour of preserving its 
longevity in power, or at the very least, enforcing a national unity without regards to minority 
opinion.57 Dr Majekodunmi’s first act of placing several western leaders under house-arrest 
(all of whom were Awolowo supporters and not Akintola supporters), and the commencement 
of investigations into Chief Awolowo and his supporters, suggested that Dr Majekodunmi was 
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acting under specific orders to prosecute the state’s perceived enemy. The special commission 
led by Justice G. B. Coker, which uncovered that Chief Awolowo had siphoned public funds 
for the enrichment of his party, would undoubtedly have also uncovered the misappropriation 
of public funds by a majority of other public office holders, other than AG politicians such as 
the infamous Okotie-Eboh. However, only Awolowo of the AG (and his supporters) were 
indicted.58 One could also argue that, had Tarka held an official position in the Middle Belt, it 
would have been very likely that he would have been indicted for misappropriation of public 
funds in a manner very similar to Awolowo's indictment. This seemingly targeted, biased 
campaign by the State, at least ensured that Awolowo and his elite supporters were efficiently 
isolated the civilian population, but more importantly, that Awolowo and his supporters were 
distanced from tools of political autonomy. That State-sponsored perpetuators of violence did 
not face the same fate, from an observer's standpoint, indicated that this isolation of the AG 
from civilians was deliberate, and largely interest centric. Referent Objects that were protected 
included the fortification of residential dwellings of the elite and assets of importance to the 
state, such as the targeted military deployment to secure ballot boxes and polling stations, 
without any specific orders to protect civilians subjected to political violence. 59  Security 
provision to civilian populations within reach of the Malicious Non-State Actor was not usually 
present, suggestive of people being considered as a priority of secondary importance. Target 
hardening interests such as ballot boxes and polling stations did in fact interfere with the 
Malicious Non-State Actor's cost-benefit estimation of seizing such assets within its range, but 
simultaneously, civilians were denied the right to access these ballot boxes to cast their vote. 
As it has been established that Nigeria's Referent Objects were Interests, efforts can 
then be made by an observer to identify what these interests were. Target Hardening that was 
observed by the Nigerian State included strategic actions taken by a state to increase the 
resilience of its ideals such as National Unity, and its longevity in power; both of which were 
threatened by the political uprisings spurred by its designated Malicious Non-State Actors' 
inflation. The deployment of the Army to police elections, at specific polling stations where 
the AG was popular, pointed to State interests in the electoral processes of these areas. However, 
that military deployment amidst the violence between civilians at the grassroots level in the 
West and Middle Belt was not to quell such violence that did not directly affect the well-being 
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of the ballot boxes, one can reasonably deduce that the fate of these civilians was of little 
consequence. Interests of the State, therefore, had much to do with the results of electoral 
processes in these areas, rather than the physical well-being of the civilians inhabiting these 
areas. The pleas of civilians, urging those Army officers that witnessed the gross electoral 
misconduct, represented the dire situation many civilians found themselves in. 
In light of the information gathered from the Formation case study, the measurement 
scale, which characterizes the nature of Inflationary Containment within Nigeria’s NSSP is 
represented in tabular form. This measurement scale is the representation of the Inflationary 
Containment element of Nigerian NSSP. Within this measurement scale, recorded events are 
tabularised, according to the interests they were centred upon. Events represented in this 
measurement scale which are suggestive of interest-centric inflationary containment, are input 
in the ‘Interests’ column. Likewise events suggestive of people-centric inflationary 
containment are input in the ‘People’ column, as follows:  




  Chief Awolowo and Others, 
estranged from the political process 
(Accused and Convicted on Treason 
Charges 1962) 
  Attachment of Armed Personnel to 
Government official’s convoys and 
residences 
  UMBC leader, Mr. Tarka is 
arbitrarily Arrested and Detained 
1961 
  Martial law is Imposed in the 
Western Region 1962 
  Biased Arrest and Detention of Tiv 
rioters 1960 
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  Military Deployment against UMBC 
supporters 1964 
  Military Deployment against UMBC 
supporters 1961 
  Fortification of Residential 
Dwellings of Government Officials 
  Chief Awolowo and Others 
Imprisoned for Treason 1962 
  Members of the Western Parliament 
Placed Under House Arrest 1962 
  Violent suppression of Tiv Rioters 
1964 
In applying the measurement scale for Inflationary Containment, Nigerian NSSP during 
the Formation case study is inclined towards the protection of Interests. As a result, NSSP 
during this case study period would be characterised as Interest Centric.  
5.7 ASSESSMENT QUESTION 4 (COMPRESSION): WHAT STRATEGIC MEANS HAVE BEEN 
OBSERVED TO BE REPEATEDLY UTILISED BY THE STATE TO ELIMINATE THE VITAL INTERESTS OF 
THE MNSA? 
In postulating this assessment question, an observer aims to identify the strategic means 
with which the Nigerian state sought to extinguish the existence of its designated Malicious 
Non-State Actors. It must be recalled at this point, that the compression of an MNSA is best 
achieved through the separation, isolation or elimination of the vital interests of an MNSA. 
These vital interests are the Core and Peripheral interests of an MNSA that, in a functional 
model, ensures the continued existence of an MNSA as such. As mentioned earlier in the third 
chapter, the proposed Core interests of an MNSA under the NSSP model are; Objectives and 
Personnel, whilst the peripheral interests of an MNSA are; Mobility, Communication and 
Supplies. Eliminating the Core interests of an MNSA, is a strategic move which offers 
definitive results in the compression of an MNSA. However, the elimination of peripheral 
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MNSA interests, serves to limit the capability and willingness of an MNSA to continue its 
existence.  
This postulated assessment question when asked within the context of the Formation 
case study, focuses on the strategic means which were operationalised against eliminating the 
organisational form, ideological motives and operational capability of Nigeria’s designated 
MNSAs. The strategic means of interest to an observer applying the MSSP theoretical 
framework, are those which are perceived to have been geared directly towards the 
incapacitation or elimination of vital interests of the MNSA. The strategic means, are what an 
observer should characterize as manifestations of Compression.  In addition, characterizing the 
nature of Compression geared towards an NSSP, means that an observer would be engaged in 
characterizing the compressive severity of strategy against the vital interests of an MNSA. 
This procedure is an essential first step towards enabling an observer to determine whether the 
NSSP dependent variable is either; Constraining, (meaning that case studies observed expose 
a continued reliance by the State on brute military force to physically eliminate MNSA 
personnel) Coercive, (meaning that case studies highlight a reliance of the state on eliminating 
MNSA peripheral interests; communication, mobility and supply) or Compelling, (meaning 
that case studies observed expose a continued reliance on strategy aimed at eliminating MNSA 
Objectives, through the utilisation of compelling communication). This characterisation of 
severity is guided by the spectrum of compressive severity as proposed in the third chapter of 
this work.  
Constraining NSSPs are typically characterised by the identification of reliance on 
strategic means during the case study period, wherein one can deduce that the state aims to 
eliminate personnel of an MNSA, physically, without any room for symbolic communication 
of any sort, between the MNSA and the state. This means, Constraining NSSPs utilise strategies 
are definitive, and leave no room for any alternative options for the MNSA. For example, the 
deployment of an entire battalion of Nigeria's Armed Forces to ‘crush' the Tiv riots in 1964, 
falls on this extremity of the Spectrum, as it symbolised the end of direct dialogue between the 
Nigerian government and the Tiv.  
On the other hand, strategic means on the Compelling end of the spectrum is 
characterised by a softer approach, wherein the state aims to eliminate the core ideology of an 
MNSA, such as its objectives or grievances. This severity of strategy, at least leaves MNSAs 
with reasonable room for symbolic communication with the state. Such strategies implemented 
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by the state, are focused on picking apart the grievances of an MNSA, or delegitimising such 
an MNSA’s ideological aims, eventually leaving it without reasons to continue its existence as 
such. An example for illustrative purposes would be the negotiations which occurred between 
the Nigerian government and the Tiv tribesmen in 1961. These negotiations were on the 
Compelling Communication end of the Spectrum, and they left significant options for the 
Tivmen to consider. Such a strategy, if effectively utilised could be productive in eliminating 
other vital interests of MNSAs such as Personnel and Communications, in the event that MNSA 
personnel are convinced that their strategic interests are not at odds with those of the State, and 
hostilities cease. 
Using the Spectrum of Compressive Severity as a guide, we can identify and 
characterize the strategic means utilised by the Nigerian state, to compress the UMBC and AG 
MNSAs. By combing through occurrences, the researcher can effectively aggregate and 
characterize the severity of the strategic means utilised by the Nigerian State within the 
Formation case study. If instances of brute physical force during compression are observed to 
significantly outnumber those of compelling communication, one can suggest that the NSSP 
dependent variable is Constraining. Likewise, if instances of Compelling Communication 
during Compression are observed to significantly outnumber those of Brute Physical Force, 
one can conclude that the NSSP dependent variable is Compelling.  
5.8 RESEARCH FINDINGS: ASSESSMENT OF COMPRESSION 
January –August 1960 Middle Belt Zone, Northern region 
The Nigerian State employed the strategy of counter-narrating the UMBC, in order to 
quell the violent confrontations between UMBC supporters and government officials in 
Yandev, Middle Belt zones. 60  It cast blame on the UMBC party and its political ties with the 
AG party in the Western region, ultimately holding them responsible for any unfortunate 
occurrences in the Middle-Belt Zones. The Nigerian State’s counter-narrative was aimed at 
discrediting the legitimacy of the UMBC objectives and criminalising its leadership's interests. 
In particular, the leadership of the UMBC party under Mr Tarka, was accused of being at odds 
with Nigeria's national interests. It was argued that Mr Tarka, in his campaigning for the 
creation of the Middle Belt Region to be carved out of the Northern region,61 was, in fact, part 
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of conspiracies by external forces utilising Mr Tarka's ambitions to destabilize the unity of the 
Nigerian State. In this instance, one could readily decipher that the Nigerian State sought to 
utilize the power of counter-narratives to immediately consider the objectives of the UMBC 
party to be at odds with the national interests and wellbeing of the State. This strategy also 
sought to incapacitate Mr. Tarka’s influence over Nigerian citizens, thereby attempting to 
reduce the possibility of the UMBCs Objectives, gathering popular support. Overall, this 
instance of compression by the Nigerian State against the UMBCMNSA was characterised by 
negotiations aimed at reducing the potency and credibility of UMBC objectives. These methods 
of compression, therefore, are assessed to be Compelling. 
The Nigerian State was perhaps unprepared for a rebuttal by Mr. Tarka, who was 
prompt in responding to the Nigerian State's compression strategy. As Mr. Tarka stated that he 
and his tribesmen had exhausted all legitimate avenues towards the creation of a Middle Belt 
government which would represent his tribesmen at the federal level, Tarka neutralised the 
influence of the Nigerian State's compression strategy of counter-narratives –at least in part. 
Tarka had been successful in legitimizing his stance, as well as that of the UMBC party to the 
local population within the Tiv occupied Middle Belt Zone. In doing so, he was increasing his 
chances of recruiting additional personnel who would subscribe to UMBC objectives. He was 
also successful in strategically allying with the AG party in the Western region. This was seen 
as a consolidation of similar organisations, with similar objectives. In addition to minimizing 
the influence of the Nigerian State's counter-narrative, he was successful in highlighting the 
flaws of the negotiations between the UMBC and the Nigerian State. The flaws of the 
negotiation process were made apparent by the fact that, the UMBC party were still ousted 
from legitimate avenues to participate in the political leadership of the Middle Belt Zone.  
Tarka's comparison of the NPC's governance of Tivmen, to the colonial system of indirect rule, 
was very efficient in spurring a popular perception of the Nigerian State as facilitators of neo-
colonial subjugation. By the time Tarka proposed that violence was the only other option left 
to him and his tribesmen, he was quick to lay the blame on the Nigerian State by claiming that 
the nonresponsive nature of the Nigerian State, had necessitated the violence.62 The reasons 
Mr. Tarka and the UMBC had given in order to legitimize the use of violence for Tiv 
emancipation from NPC rule, had rendered the Nigerian State’s hitherto compression strategy 
worthless.  
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August - December 1960, Middle Belt Zone, Northern Region 
 A pro-Government supporter along with two Nigerian police officers, were assaulted by 
UMBC personnel while they were performing their routine tax collection activities in a market 
owned by a Mr. Akpai, an active UMBC supporter.63 The Nigerian State deployed additional 
police officers to potentially aid the tax collectors, and possibly arrest the assailants. These 
policemen were met with further attacks by UMBC personnel. Violence escalated quickly 
when the Nigerian State decided to shut down the market forcibly. Native Authority police 
officers who were to enforce the closure order were hindered by UMBC personnel, and on the 
25th of August, a riot squad was deployed to the area.64 This deployment was met with armed 
UMBC personnel wielding machetes and arrows, and about three policemen were injured by 
the UMBC personnel. This led to their subsequent withdrawal. In a timely fashion, the Nigerian 
Government responded by utilising a constraining strategy of military deployment; this would 
become its most recurring means of compression. By the time the Nigerian state deployed the 
first military officers to the Middle Belt Zone, it was a reinforcement tactic for the Nigerian 
police force stationed in the vicinities overseeing UMBC activity. This deployment was limited, 
and the primary assignment of the deployed Military officers was to assist the Nigerian police 
force in quelling UMBC violence. By December, UMBC personnel were actively involved in 
the looting and burning of property which they believed belonged to NPC supporters. Younger 
males supporting the UMBC soon formed themselves into militias, who spread violence.65 
  The Military deployment strategy was efficient and short-lived as the Nigerian 
Government subsequently withdrew the military officers as soon as they believed the Middle 
Belt situation had been stabilised to acceptable levels. In characterizing the nature of 
compression applied by the Nigerian State, it is visible that following the backfire of 
compelling compression, the Nigerian State escalated the severity of its strategic means to 
include limited military action against the UMBC. The military action suggested that the 
Nigerian government was intent on controlling movement and communications in the area, to 
quell the violence. In light of Mr taka's neutralisation of compelling compression against 
UMBC objectives, and the introduction of military action to curtail UMBC peripheral interests, 
it is the observer's assessment that the compression strategy of the Nigerian State was Coercive. 
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1961, Middle Belt Zone, Northern Region 
Following the inclusion of limited military deployment in compression strategy applied 
by the Nigerian State, the Tiv tribesmen remained effectively out from the political process 
altogether, with the enhancement of the supervisory powers of the Native Authority to rule the 
Tivmen indirectly.66 The escalation of the severity of compression strategy by the Nigerian 
state, suggests that the NPC led government was indeed repressive, and enhanced the UMBCs 
popularity. The native authority police, were essentially able-bodied men who were appointed 
by local chiefs to serve as personal security guards. However, on occasion their functions 
included those of maintaining law and order, and enforcing the will of local chiefs. These native 
authority policemen, differed from conventional police officers in the sense that, their functions 
were in the service of chiefs who appointed them and were only accountable to these chiefs.67 
The unpopularity of the Native Authority in the Middle Belt was also exacerbated by what was 
essentially the unwarranted victimisation and arbitrary arrest of UMBC supporters. Coupled 
with the frequent occurrence of arbitrary taxation, arrest and detention of even passive 
supporters of the UMBC party, it was only a matter of time before violent, aggressive means 
were utilised by the UMBC to counter the Nigerian state's strategy.68 The enhancement of the 
powers of the native authority, coupled with the arbitrary arrests and detention of UMBC 
supporters by the Nigerian state, pointed towards an increasingly constraining compression 
strategy pursued by the Nigerian state. In light of the utilisation of arrest and detention tactics 
by the Nigerian State, as well as intimidation of UMBC supporters, it is the observer’s 
assessment that the compression strategy of the Nigerian State was bordering on the 
Constraining end of the spectrum. However, because the compression strategy of the Nigerian 
State was limited to targeting only peripheral interests of the UMBC such as Mobility, the 
observer assesses that the compression strategy was still in fact Coercive. 
The Nigerian State's compression strategy became increasingly constraining in nature, 
the frequency of civil unrest was intensifying. The UMBC as an MNSA was not necessarily 
responding to compression strategy in a manner that was acceptable to the State. Hence, the 
intensification of compression strategy continued. In light of the intensification of UMBC 
activity, the immediate reaction of the Nigerian State to the civil unrest in the Middle Belt 
                                                 
66 Ibid 
67  Godwin Vaaseh, ‘Ethnic Politics and Conflicts in Nigeria’s First Republic: The Misuse of Native 
Administrative Police Forces and the Tov Riots of Central Nigeria, 1960-1964’ (2011) 3 Canadian Social Science 
pp. 214-222 
68  Elaigwu V, The Military and the Management of Civil Crises In Nigeria, 1960-1993 (Nigerian defence 
Academy Press 2003) 
Olamide Samuel - 1401236 - University of Buckingham 
 120 
Zones was to send in additional anti-riot squads from the North to quell the riots which were 
widespread and increasingly destructive. The Nigerian police estimated that about 5000 people 
were arrested and temporarily detained for their participation in the violence, and about 3,880 
were convicted of various crimes related to the riots.69 The Nigerian State also ordered the 
arrest and detention of UMBC leader, Mr Tarka. Following the arrests and detention of rioters, 
the Nigerian State sought to address the underlying political grievances of the Tivmen. This 
second phase of the response was characterised by the facilitating of dialogue between the 
Government and the UMBC party, which resulted in the dissolution of the unpopular Native 
Authority.70  With the apparent willingness of the Nigerian State to engage in negotiations with 
the Tivmen and UMBC, political and legal reforms which were a result of the dialogue between 
the Nigerian Government and the UMBC were effective, and Mr. Tarka was released from 
detention. Civil unrest seemed to be reduced to acceptable minimums. The compression 
strategy of the Nigerian State was temporarily intensified to cope with the outbreak of violence 
by UMBC personnel, the deployment of additional physical force in the form of anti-riot squads 
from the North, was effective in quelling the violence. The Nigerian state also pursued a policy 
of mass arrests and detention in order to separate the personnel of the UMBC, thereby reducing 
its capacity for violence. The Nigerian state also directly targeted UMBC leader, Tarka, and 
placed him in detention. 71  This strategic move significantly weakened the organisational 
buoyancy of the UMBC. It would seem to an observer that the Nigerian State's compression 
strategy had indeed become constraining. However, what was unique to this period of the case 
study, was the swift reintroduction of a compelling compression strategy by the Nigerian State. 
The reintroduction of negotiations between the Nigerian State and a temporarily leaderless 
UMBC was a hybrid application of constraining and compelling compression strategy. But, the 
fact that a major concession was made by the Nigerian State (with the dismantling of the Native 
Authority) violence was significantly reduced to minimum levels. The prompt release of Mr. 
Tarka from detention, also portrayed a symbolic gesture of goodwill from the Nigerian State. 
It is therefore the assessment of the observer that compression strategy pursued by the Nigerian 
State was Coercive as the strategy during this period was a simultaneous application of 
compelling and briefly, constraining compression. 
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January – May 1962, Western region 
Observing the events which occurred in the Western Region in 1962, it is clear that the 
Nigerian state was engaged with a similar designated MNSA within the Yoruba tribe namely, 
The Action Group. As tensions between two leaders of the western AG party namely; Chief 
Obafemi Awolowo and Chief Ladoke Akintola escalated, their clashes were becoming 
increasingly violent.72 The Nigerian state initiated subtle, but compelling compression against 
the AG party, by negotiating with its leaders in order to weaken its ideational stance. Following 
the Nigerian state’s proposition that the NPC and AG could form a ruling coalition, Awolowo 
was bent on maintaining the AG party as an effective opposition to NPC dominance. On the 
other hand, his deputy Akintola was in favour of agreeing to an alliance with the NPC led 
government, to form a ruling coalition. This split in ideational stance between Akintola and 
Awolowo, escalated to the point of splitting the AG party into two factions, with either faction 
supporting the leader and deputy respectively. The NPC led Nigerian state seemed to be well 
aware of the influence of the AG party over the Western Region and viewed its increasing 
dominance as a threat to its longevity in government. Therefore, in offering to absorb the AG 
party into the upper echelons of government, the Nigerian state perhaps sought to utilize the 
AG's influence to its advantage, thereby neutralising an opposition and effectively gaining an 
ally. 
As a result of this offer, violence quickly escalated in the Western Chambers of 
Parliament after the House met in May of 1962 to debate a motion of no confidence in 
Akintola.73 Akintola supporters in the AG party started a riot in the chambers of parliament as 
a response to the vote put forward.74 As chairs were flung by members of the house, the 
speaker's mace was converted into a weapon by one of the speakers, and furniture within the 
house were damaged as violence ensued. In a swift move, the Nigerian State ordered the 
deployment of Riot police in the western region. These riot-police were instructed to utilize 
non-lethal force in quelling the violence, and it is reported that canisters of teargas were thrown 
in the Parliament chambers. The meeting was subsequently adjourned as proceedings could not 
continue in such a violent manner. Subsequent attempts to reconvene the house of parliament 
resulted in similar outbreaks of violence and thus granted the western region its lasting 
reputation as a region prone to political violence.75 Following the initial negotiations between 
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the NPC led Nigerian State and the AG, the Nigerian State was effective in weakening the 
AG’s core ideational interests through the use of compelling coercion. The violence that swiftly 
erupted after the AG had been weakened ideologically, made it necessary for the Nigerian State 
to employ a more Coercive means of compressing the AG party. 
Judging by the actions of the Prime Minister, in which he promptly imposed martial 
law via a state of emergency declaration, it is suggestive that coercive compression was broadly 
targeted at members of western parliament, but more specifically, at the AG party. The Prime 
Minister’s installation of Dr Moses Majekodunmi as the interim Administrator of the Western 
region, was effective at delegitimizing the ideological interests of the AG party, and ostracised 
them from government altogether.76 The Nigerian government then proceeded to place several 
western leaders under house-arrest and to launch an investigation into Chief Awolowo. Thus, 
an observer can begin to understand that it was becoming routine practice for the Nigerian State 
to compress MNSAs by operationalising a compelling compression strategy followed swiftly 
by a Coercive compression strategy. 
The Nigerian state initiated hasty judicial proceedings against the Awolowo faction of the AG 
party, and convicted Awolowo among other AG politicians for treason. The Nigerian state, 
through these proceedings established that plans to overthrow the constitutional government 
through physical force, were a foreseeable threat and these threats had to be dealt with 
significantly. Thus, the AG party were identified and designated as MNSAs, through the 
Nigerian State's promulgation of condemnation of the AG's ideological interests. From these 
chain of events, an observer can deduce that the Nigerian State initiated an effective 
compression campaign against the AG party, which damaged the core ideational interests as 
well as the physical capability of AG personnel to continue their existence as such. The overall 
characteristics of the Nigerian State's compression against the AG at this time was Coercive. 
Western Region 1963 
A new democratically created region emerged in early 1963. The mid-Western region. 
This region was carved out of the Western region, with popular hopes that it would highlight a 
new phase of political inclusion of minor tribes. However, the creation of the Mid-Western 
Region essentially weakened the Western region's position as an effective opposition to the 
Nigerian State. The State-sponsored creation of a new western-based political party, the 
Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), led by the AG's former deputy leader, Chief 
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Akintola, was the Nigerian State's means of quickly replacing the vacuum that had been created 
by the incarceration of a majority of AG leaders. Even though the party was widely unpopular, 
this party was installed to lead the Western region. By securing the Western region, the 
Nigerian State was efficient at utilising compression to bolster its influence within the country. 
Middle Belt Zone, Northern Region 1964 
Meanwhile, in the Middle Belt Zones, UMBC violence had re-emerged following the 
unsolved grievances of the 1960 riots.77 UMBC supporters were increasingly irritated by the 
presence of the brutal Native Authority Police, which was an element of the Native Authority, 
strategically preserved by the Nigerian Government, to engage in inflationary containment and 
compression which could not be carried out by the conventional Police Force. The brutality of 
the Native Authority Police led the UMBC to call out for either a dissolution of the Native 
Authority Police or at the very least, a merger between the Native Authority police and the 
Nigerian Police Force, in order for increased supervision and accountability. The Nigerian 
government responded to Mr. Tarka's demands, by reorganising the Tiv Native Authority 
Police, under the administrative control of the Nigeria Police Force.78 The Nigerian State, had 
again been involved in coercive compression in the Middle Belt-Zones, and this strategy was 
proving to be backfiring. The Nigerian State's renegotiation with Mr. Tarka over the Native 
Authority Police Force's presence in the region appeared to be a strategic shift from coercive 
compression towards Compelling compression. As the Nigerian State's shift in compression 
strategy, had no significant value in quelling UMBC grievances which stemmed from their lack 
of formal representation in government, it was only a matter of time before numerous riots 
broke out in the Middle Belt Zones in February 1964. Police officers had been involved in the 
murder of a Tiv traditional clan head, and as a result, several Police officers were murdered as 
a reprisal to the murder of the Tiv traditional ruler.79 The murder of a Tiv ruler, whether 
targeted or by chance, marked a significant change in the character of Nigerian State 
compression strategy, as it appeared increasingly Constraining.   
The Police Force in the Middle Belt Zone appeared to be ill-equipped and understaffed 
to handle the unfolding crises. The deployment reinforcement forces from the Northern city of 
Kaduna on numerous occasions to assist in crises management, characterised by constraining 
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compression, signified a crucial shift in the nature of Nigeria’s compressive severity. It must 
be noted however, that Tivmen were increasingly organised in their mobilisation of personnel, 
organisation of attacks, and solicitation of popular sympathy and support, as a significant 
portion of the Tiv rioters were recently decommissioned military servicemen who served in the 
Second World War, fighting on behalf of the British Empire, the wealth of experience of these 
ex-servicemen proved a difficulty for the Nigerian State. 80  The UMBC also enjoyed popular 
support from members of the Tiv tribe, and the deployment of additional Nigerian forces did 
little to discourage the emboldened rioters who, instead, carried out direct attacks on the Police 
Force. The UMBC uprising was fast becoming an internal insurgency, following the failure of 
the State’s constraining compression strategies. The increasing intensity of the attacks on the 
Nigerian Police force, moved the Nigerian State to instigate a brutal military suppression of 
riots. On the 18th of November 1964, an entire Battalion of the Nigerian Army, as well as the 
Reece Squadron, was mobilised for a counter insurgency operation against the Tiv uprising.81 
The Army battalion was explicitly ordered by the Prime Minister, Sir. Balewa to neutralize the 
Tiv uprising by any means necessary. Following the events of 1964, an observer can decipher 
the constraining nature of Nigerian State compression, and this period of compression would 
be documented as Constraining. 
From the Formation case study, the author has produced a measurement scale, which 
characterizes the nature of Compression of Nigeria’s NSSP. This too, is represented in tabular 
form. Within this measurement scale, recorded events are tabularised, according to the severity 
of the compressive strategy implemented by the Nigerian state. Events represented in this 
measurement scale which are suggestive of constraining compression, are input in the 
‘Constraining’ column. In the same vein, events suggestive of coercive compression are placed 
in the ‘Coercive’ column. Finally, events which are assessed to be compelling communication, 
are entered into the ‘Compelling’ column, as follows: 
Table 7. Independent Variable Measurement: Compression 
 Constraining Coercive Compelling 
1960   Counter narratives - 
UMBC  
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1960  Riot Squads - UMBC  
1961  Mass Arrests / 
Detention - UMBC 
 
1962  Arrests / Detention -
AG 
 
1962  State of Emergency 
declared - AG 
 
1964 Assassination of 
Key Personnel - 
UMBC 
  
1964 Military Campaign 




 Judging by instances of compression observed within the Formation case study, one 
can deduce that the Nigerian State, remained largely Coercive in its compression strategy 
against MNSAs. Another significant finding from the data collected is that the observer 
witnessed the gradual intensification of compression strategy through the years. Initially, the 
Nigerian State sought to utilise more diplomatic means at delegitimising the positions of 
MNSA leaders, both in the western region, and in the middle belt zone. The compelling 
compressive strategy yielded limited success in its application. However, the limited successes 
achieved by the compelling strategy, in addition to the intensification of civil unrest spurred by 
MNSA's could argued to be the rationale behind the escalating the severity of compression 
efforts, ultimately resulting in the mobilisation of military campaigns against MNSAs, 
especially in the Northern Region. 
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5.9 THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIC PERSONALITY OF NIGERIA DURING THE “FORMATIVE 
PERIOD” 
At this point, the data extracted by the measured independent variables from the 
formation case study period is collated to give an observer an accurate description of Nigeria's 
NSSP. 
Assessment Question 4: What are the cumulative observed characteristics of the National 
Security Strategic Personality of the State? 
Based on state behaviour observed during this case study, it is reasonable to characterise 
Nigeria’s National Security Strategic Personality, as Introverted in its outlook, Interest-
Centric in its provision, and Coercive in its severity. 
Table 8. Dependent Variable Measurement: NSSP 
Orientation Inflationary Containment Compression 
Introverted * People-Centric  Constraining  
Extroverted  Interest-Centric * Coercive * 
5.10 LESSONS LEARNT FROM FORMATION CASE STUDY 
At the beginning of this chapter, the author set out to perform an in-depth empirical 
validation exercise of the NSSP theory. This was achieved through the utilisation of the case-
study methods of analysis, which investigated the interactions between the Nigerian state, and 
Malicious Non-State Actors, which were present from 1960-1966. The author was able to 
reasonably identify and characterise the National Security Strategic Personality of the Nigerian 
State. In addition, the author was made aware of the following considerations; 
From a research point of view, this analysis of the formation case study was largely 
satisfactory. However, the author did come across some challenges with regards to identifying 
all instances of observable state behaviour during this period. This was as a result of the lack 
of first-hand data sources which encompass this period, as the author discovered that many 
records of events were simply inaccessible, due to damage and loss of official documents in 
government archives. On occasion, the author visited the Nigerian police force headquarters 
and the National Library in Abuja, only to discover that archives available only dated as far 
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back as 1969. The author was made aware of the fact that, many documents and archives were 
destroyed or misplaced during the Nigerian civil war. This necessitated the author’s reliance 
on secondary data sources, in addition to archival data, to paint of comprehensive picture of 
events that occurred. However, due to the typological nature of the NSSP theory, the author 
realised that the available data sources were comprehensive enough to provide a reasonable 
account of events during the formation period.  
The formation case study, set the very first foundations for Nigerian NSSP. The 
ramifications of State behaviour, as well as MNSA activities, laid down precedents which both 
the Nigerian State and its perceived MNSAs followed. One of such precedents was the gradual 
intensification of Nigeria's compressive strategy. The compressive nature of Nigerian NSSP 
would carry on to influence its NSSP from 1966 onwards, signifying the reliance of the 
Nigerian State on constraining compression, and a limitation on the range of acceptable 
strategies which would be employed by the State onwards. This intensification of compressive 
strategy, also signified the nature of the mutually constitutive interactions between the Nigerian 
State and its perceived MNSAs, as one which was characterised by physical coercion, the 
superiority of the Nigerian state’s agendas, and the construction of MNSA identities by the 
Nigerian state.  Another lesson learnt from this case study was the incursion of the military into 
politics in the Nigerian state. This was in part aided by their increasing importance in Nigeria's 
compressive strategy, which, over time, recognised the Nigerian military as the primary 
enforcers of coercion. Undoubtedly, this intensification of strategy, familiarised Nigerians with 
the presence of the military in political matters. The Nigerian military, was playing an 
increasingly important role in the delivery of national security, identifying itself as a key player 
in the formation and safeguarding of national interests, to the extent that the military possessed 
the discretion and independence necessary to identify even members of the ruling elite, as 
threats to national security. Equally, (as shall be explained in the next chapter), popular 
perception of the Nigerian military as a legitimate political institution (actor), reinforced the 
social identity of the Nigerian Military as such, saddling it with a responsibility to interfere in 
national politics, independently. Therefore, it came as no surprise when the first Military coup 
occurred in January of 1966, signifying the incursion of a different organisation of men armed 
with rules and particularly brutal means of coercion, maintaining control over Nigeria's 
population.   
Another precedent set during this case study was, the interest-centric nature of Nigeria's 
NSSP during this period. Johnston posited that an ideational milieu existed, which limited state 
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behaviour and strategic choice, going further to state that such a milieu was the product of 
shared assumptions by the elite which impose a degree of order on the relationship between 
entities and their political environment.82 The interest centric nature of Nigerian NSSP as 
observed in this case study, was as a by-product of these dominant elitist politicians preserving 
the status-quo. Considering that these elitist politicians, by virtue of their speeches and actions, 
identified their interests, as being equivalent to the interests of the state, it is no surprise that 
entire political parties, and ethnic groups could be constructed by these politicians, as being 
malicious non-state actors. After all, it was these elite politicians in Nigeria, who facilitated its 
independence from foreign colonial powers in the first place, and that their immediate interests 
would have more influence over Nigerian NSSP. Elitist politics would remain a lasting feature 
of Nigerian politics, imposing the idea of ‘unity', over the population residing within Nigerian 
territory – regardless of ethno-religious disparities. This elitist ontology within Nigerian 
politics is something Nigerians would become familiar with, and still, plays a crucial role in 
Nigerian NSSP till this day. 
The author began this chapter in order to initiate an in-depth empirical validation 
exercise of the NSSP theory. In doing so, the author utilised the case-study methods of analysis, 
which investigated the interactions between the Nigerian state, and its declared or otherwise 
implied Malicious Non-State Actors. Relying on archival data, the author was able to 
reasonably identify and characterise the National Security Strategic Personality of the Nigerian 
State during the Formation period. The next chapter will also initiate empirical validation 
exercise of the NSSP theory utilising the case-study methods of analysis, this time, on the 
Secession period of 1967 to 1970. The next chapter would employ a similar methodology to 
this chapter, in terms of qualitatively analysing Nigerian NSSP through the case study method.   
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6 CHAPTER SIX: THE SECESSION CASE STUDY 1967-1970 
A snapshot of Nigeria as at 1967, portrayed a much different picture of the country. At 
the time, Nigeria was a federal nation governed by a Supreme Military Council, headed by 
Yakubu Gowon. Nigeria's NSSP during the formation period enabled the researcher to fully 
comprehend how this newly independent democratic Nation had now become an authoritarian 
state on the verge of a Civil War. As mentioned previously, Nigeria's NSSP during the 
formation period, was Introverted, Interest-Centric and Coercive, with designated MNSAs that 
were essentially ethnocentric organisations opposing the central government. This NSSP 
configuration highlighted the fact that, the role of popular legitimacy in governance was 
relegated, and Nigeria's NSSP was centred on interests, interests which were protected in an 
increasingly militarised manner by the end of the formation case study. The situation in the 
Western Region had deteriorated to the extent that emergency rule was imposed, and the 
Middle Belt Zones of the Northern region had become accustomed to military deployment as 
part and parcel of State compressive strategy. Nationwide, the duty of safeguarding the 
remnants of political processes of suffrage was devolved to the Nigerian Military, and power 
struggles between the President and the Prime Minister were made evident by their competition 
over military loyalty. 
MILITARY INCURSION INTO NIGERIAN POLITICS 
With the state of affairs within the Nigerian state during the formation period, individuals 
within the Nigerian military had become increasingly convinced of their salient importance in 
Nigerian politics. One of such individuals at the time, was Second lieutenant Azubuogu who 
narrated what was arguably the collective experience of military personnel at the time:  
Any army officer was being harangued by civilians because of the state of the 
nation. People felt that the army should do something, that the country should 
be salvaged…Most army officers at that time had the same problem of people 
coming to us, saying, what are you doing? The country is on fire. Why don’t you 
do something about it?1 
Civilians were observed to aggressively transfer their frustration with the civilian 
government, on members of the armed forces. The general rationale behind this transfer of 
aggression was spurred by the conclusion that the armed forces could utilise their strategic 
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positioning at major governmental establishments, to overthrow the corrupt government. This 
transfer of aggression, can be said to be as a result of expectations, within and outside the 
military establishment, that the social behaviour of the military should reflect their increasingly 
important, and independent role in political affairs. The Nigerian military, was gradually 
ceasing to be merely an executor of the political will of the elite, to an instigator of its own 
version of a preferred social order. Civilian aggression was characterised by passive-aggressive 
means of frustrating members of the armed forces, such as the purposeful increment of food 
prices in areas where military barracks had been established. In many cases, soldiers were 
harassed by civilians, many of whom were involved in spitting on soldiers which they found 
in markets shopping for foodstuff.2  
With the extinction of the importance of popular legitimacy within Nigerian politics at 
the time, many individuals within and outside the Nigerian military disregarded the importance 
of elections and the political process altogether, thereby making the proposition of a military 
takeover of government more tolerable and even perhaps, desirable. Eventually, a group of 
military officers within the Nigerian Army decided to act upon what they perceived as a moral 
duty to restore accountability within government. In January of 1966 the group of Army 
officers comprising of Major Nzeogwu, Major Ifeajuna, Major Anuforo, Major Ademoyega 
and Major Okafor, enacted a coup plot against the Nigerian State. Their primary objectives 
were to arrest or otherwise kill all leading political and military figures in the country, and 
eventually form a new military government. Major Nzeogwu claimed that the rationale behind 
the coup was that: 
Our enemies are the political profiteers, the swindlers, the men in high and low 
places that seek bribes and demand 10 percent; those that seek to keep the 
country divided permanently so that they can remain in office as ministers or 
VIPs at least, the tribalists, the nepotists, those that make the country look big 
for nothing before international circles, those that have corrupted our society 
and put the Nigerian political calendar back by their words and deeds3 
They utilised the Commonwealth conference of January 15 1966, which was held in 
Lagos, Nigeria as a distraction to organise their attack.4 These officers carried out simultaneous 
attacks in the three regions, starting on the 15th of January and concluding on the 16th. In the 
Northern region, the officers assassinated Sir Ahmadu Bello (the Northern Premier), after 
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which they ransacked his residence before setting it ablaze.5 In the Western region, the officers 
assassinated the Western Premier Chief Akintola, who initially resisted arrest by fighting back 
with a machine gun. They also assassinated the prime minister, Sir Balewa, The Finance 
Minister, Chief Okotie-Eboh and several senior military officials. 6 In the Eastern Region, the 
Eastern Premier, Chief Dennis Osadebay was also temporarily placed under house arrest.7 A 
newspaper article published on the 16th of January 1966 assumed that these leaders had been 
abducted:  
In the early hours of this morning, January 15 1966, a dissident section of the 
Nigerian Army kidnapped the Prime minister and the Minister of Finance and 
took them to an unknown destination8  
After the assassinations occurred, the coup plotters fled Lagos. These coup plotters were 
hunted down by Maj Gen Aguyi-Ironsi, who did not approve of their actions. Notwithstanding 
the fact that the coup plotters were unsuccessful in taking over the government, they were 
remarkably effective at destabilising it. Incidentally, President Azikiwe was outside the country 
on an extended medical vacation. With the Prime Minister, Northern and Western Premiers 
dead, the Acting President and The Council of Ministers were forced to hand over power to the 
most senior officer in the Nigerian Army, Major-General Aguyi-Ironsi. This handover was 
spurred by fears that the coup plotters would attempt to take over the government in the near 
future forcefully, and that such a takeover would be better suppressed if the entire nation was 
under the control of the Army's most senior officer. At a brief meeting of the aforementioned 
personalities, a handover document was hastily written to confirm the transfer of the Nigerian 
Government, to its Armed Forces: 
The Council of ministers, meeting on 16th January 1966, have asked us to 
convey to you their unanimous decision to transfer voluntarily the government 
to the armed forces of the republic and wish the armed forces success to bring 
about peace and stability in Nigeria, and that the welfare of our people shall be 
their paramount task.9 
This handover was subsequently confirmed in the Daily Times newspaper the following 
morning: 
At 11.50 last night the acting President, Dr Nwafor Orizu, told the nation in a 
broadcast that he has been advised by the Council of Ministers that they have 
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unanimously decided to hand over government of the Federation to the Armed 
Forces in view of the present situation10  
 Following the broadcast by the acting President, Major-General Aguyi-Ironsi held a 
press conference to address the Nation, in which he asserted his ascension to political power, 
stating that: 
The federal Military Government of Nigeria has taken over the administration 
of the country. Functions of the Federal Military Government shall be exercised 
by the supreme military council…my main concern is to restore law and order, 
as soon as possible11 
He also went further to state that Nigeria's external relations would not be altered in any way 
by the new administration, but that press censorship was likely if he deemed it necessary. In 
this regard, he essentially hinted at the fact that Nigerian NSSP would continue to remain 
introverted in its outlook, focusing on neutralising domestic elements of destabilisation.   
  Popular opinion regarding the military takeover of government seemed to support this 
development. It was reported that there was hardly any resistance to military rule from the 
civilian population and that in fact, a majority of the population welcomed this development. 
One journalist in Lagos, Mr. Gabriel Fangbore, was of the opinion that "corruption, nepotism 
on the part of politicians of all parties, and the danger of internal strife in Nigeria, swept the 
army into power. Some of these soldiers, I believe, are much more intelligent, are much more 
patriotic than the politicians, who we all condemn…”12 His opinion reflected much of the 
popular belief that since the political process was inaccessible to the general populace under 
civilian rule, it was hardly different to military rule -except for the belief that Nigerians 
expected a higher degree of discipline from the military in government affairs as opposed to 
civilian politicians. Astonishingly, the NPC party also issued an official statement, proclaiming 
its unquestioned support for the military takeover: 
The Party gives its unqualified support to the military regime and to the Major 
general in particular. We call on all our party members and supporters to co-
operate with the military regime and to give the new administration unflinching 
support in its great task of bringing peace and stability to Nigeria13 
Considering the overall reaction to the coup, general opinion indicated that the new 
Federal Military Government possessed quite a degree of popular legitimacy, which arguably, 
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surpassed that which the NPC led government of the first republic possessed. More 
importantly, Nigeria had effectively entered into a new era of military government, within 
which supreme power was obtainable by those who had the means and interest in enacting a 
coup. 
6.1 ASSESSMENT QUESTION 1 - DELINEATING BETWEEN THE STATE AND ITS PROPOSED MNSAS 
As the events mentioned earlier show, the nature of the Nigerian State as a unitary 
rational actor, had changed in terms of its internal configuration. The Nigerian State which was 
primarily NPC and Northern led in a democratic arrangement had become a military 
dictatorship, orchestrated by mostly Eastern and Western Majors, and headed by an Eastern 
Major-General. For the sake of clarity, it must be noted that the occurrence of the first military 
coup, does not neutralise the effectiveness of NSSP analysis within the Secession case study 
period. All that is required by an observer to apply the NSSP theoretical framework on such a 
case study is the delineation of the new State structure, by identifying the organisation of men 
with the means of coercion to maintain order over the entirety of Nigeria's population. In this 
case study, the NPC was deposed and substituted by the Nigerian military. 
6.1.1 The State 
As at January 1966 following the First Military Coup, the Nigerian State was structurally 
configured as a military dictatorship, which suspended the 1960 Nigerian constitution. It was 
primarily governed by the Supreme Military Council, which was comprised of ten positions, 
all of which oversaw specific facets of governance. The Supreme Military Council reported 
directly to Major-General Aguyi-Ironsi. See diagram below: 
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Figure 6. The Nigerian State, Jan. 1966 
The configuration of Nigerian Government, was essentially centralised, with the 
Regional Governors and heads of the Army, Navy and Air-force bearing the same military 
rank. 14  However, the occupants of this configuration did not last for very long. Tribal 
sentiments which plagued the political scene of the first republic remained omnipresent in all 
spheres of politics. Various individuals of Northern origin within the Military were convinced 
that Aguyi-Ironsi could not be accepted as Supreme leader. It was widely believed that because 
of Aguyi-Ironsi's ethnicity, he was most probably a facilitator of the military coup which he 
publicly condemned. These inter-tribal sentiments continued to plague the rank and file of the 
Nigerian Military establishment. Northern soldiers were increasingly suspicious of Eastern 
soldiers and embittered by the murder of two of the most senior Northern politicians in the 
country. The situation was worsened by the general lack of sympathy shown by most 
Westerners and Easterners, as the welcoming jubilations which surrounded the coup 
developments, were interpreted by Northerners as jubilation in the face of the murder of their 
beloved leaders. At a military conference in the Southern town of Abeokuta, these tensions 
were brought to light as Northern soldiers began to massacre Eastern soldiers on the 27th of 
July, 1966. This massacre marked the beginning of a Second Military Coup, characterised 
                                                 
14 It must be noted that Aguyi-Ironsi's government promptly identified and quashed a revolt in the Eastern Region, 
led by Isaac Boro, who declared an independent Niger-Delta republic on the 23rd of February, 1966. See; Sanya 
Osha, 'Birth Of The Ogoni Protest Movement' (2006) 41 Journal of Asian and African Studies. 
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today as the Northern Counter-Coup. 15 This violence quickly spread across the country and 
resulted in a full-scale insurgency. In some way, this Northern Counter-Coup was inevitable 
for two reasons. Firstly, the incursion of the Military into politics neutralised the advantage 
given to the Northern region in the Houses of Parliament in the Formation period, by the now 
suspended constitution. Secondly, given that the Northern leaders suffered the most casualties 
in the January coup, and that the majority of coup planners were Easterners, inter-tribal tensions 
leading to a full-scale confrontation was considered imminent.   
On the 29th of July, the Supreme Leader, Major-General Aguyi-Ironsi was turned on by 
his guards, brutalised by his head of personal security detail, and murdered. The Military 
Governor for the Western Region, Lt. Col. Fajuyi, was also murdered in Aguyi-Ironsi's 
company.16 The principal coup plotters were Majors Muritala Mohammed and Theophilus 
Danjuma, both Northern officers of the Nigerian Army. The intertribal insurgency was not only 
limited to the upper echelons of military government. A majority of Eastern Nigerians who 
resided in the Northern region were brutalised by both Northern military officers and civilians. 
It is estimated that between 200 and 250 non-commissioned officers lost their lives in the 
counter-coup. 17  The Easterners eventually fled the Northern and Western regions, to the 
Eastern Region, where they were welcomed by their Military Governor, Lt. Col. Ojukwu. 
Ojukwu was explicit in his condemnation of Northern violence against his Eastern kinsmen, 
proclaiming that even though he had no intention to launch an attack against Northerners in 
Eastern territory: "We had sufficient cause to retaliate and could have done so with good 
effect"18 With the assassination of the Supreme Leader by the Muritala-led coup plotters, a 
senior Northern Military Officer, Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon assumed leadership of the Country. 
Interestingly, Lt. Col. Gowon originated from the Middle-Belt Zone of the Northern Region.19  
By the 2nd of August 1966, after tense negotiations between the coup-plotters and 
members of the civil service, Nigeria was placed under Lt. Col. Gowon's military leadership. 
In the Eastern region, however, Ojukwu immediately rejected this development. Citing the 
critical fact that notwithstanding Lt. Col. Gowon's post as the most senior Northern Officer, a 
higher ranking officer, Brigadier Babafemi Ogundipe from the Western region was still alive 
and in active service. In addition, Colonel Adebayo, also from the Western region was superior 
                                                 
15 Daily Times, 'Trouble In The Army' (1966) 
16 Max Siollun, Oil, Politics and Violence (Algora Pub 2009 
17 Daily Times, ‘New Military Government’ (1966) 
18 Daily Times, ‘East Won't Plan Attack’’ (1966) 
19 Daily Times, ‘New Military Government’ (1966) 
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to Lt. Col. Gowon, along with five other serving military officers. Ojukwu's protests 
highlighted the fact that, tribal sentiments were observed to be a much more determinant factor 
in the enactment of the counter-coup, and the subsequent allocation of positions within the 
newly formed government. For example, several colonels served as subordinate to lieutenant 
colonels, regardless of standardised military hierarchy. Below is a diagram which is more 
illustrative of the governance structure of the Nigerian state following the counter-coup.
 
Figure 7. The Nigerian State, Jul. 1966 
6.1.2 Malicious Non- State Actors 
Following the multiple incidents of violence against Easterners which occurred before, 
and after Lt. Col. Gowon's ascension to power, it became increasingly clear that inter-tribal 
tensions would preoccupy Nigeria's NSSP and dictate the selection of MNSAs within this case 
study period. When one analyses the nature of Nigerian strategic outlook at the time, 
information points primarily toward the survival of the nation as a single entity, as the 
predominant concern. The Northern counter-coup was an explicit manifestation of the potency 
of underlying tribalist tensions between Northerners and Easterners, which threatened the 
survival of the Nigerian state. Therefore, such tensions were viewed as the primary source of 
political instability, and as a result, individuals or organisations who were identified as willing 
and capable of exacerbating inter-tribal tensions, to an extent whereby the continued existence 
of Nigeria was jeopardised, were designated as the principal MNSAs. As we shall see in this 
case study, Nigerian NSSP was to be predominantly dictated by ethnic rivalry which permeated 
both civilian and military institutions.  
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6.2 CHRONOLOGY OF THE 1967-1970 SECESSION CASE STUDY 
1966: The Return of Northern Dominance 
The 1966 counter-coup initiated Gowon's rise to power and the subsequent consolidation 
of Northern control over the entirety of the Nigerian state. Initially, Gowon was viewed as a 
"compromise" leader. This was as a result of his Northern origins, Southern religious beliefs 
and his reputation as an individual who favoured diplomatic solutions over violence. However, 
the perception of Gowon's neutrality was not shared by Eastern Nigerians, who were still 
effectively under persecution by Northern soldiers.20  In various incidents in Sabon Garis 
(foreigner's settlements) in the Northern region, it was estimated that riots by Northerners 
claimed Eastern lives in the tens of thousands. These riots led to the subsequent evacuation of 
over a million refugees to the Eastern region. From September to October 1966, violence 
against Easterners by Northerners intensified significantly. This violent episode saw the murder 
of between 80,000 and 100,000 Easterners, as the internal situation deteriorated further.21 To 
the Easterners, it was becoming increasingly clear that the government was either unwilling or 
unable to stop the violence against their kinsmen.  
The period spanning from July to October 1966 also saw failed attempts at negotiations 
between delegates of the SMC and the Eastern region. For example, on the 9th of August 1966, 
a meeting between representatives of all regional military governors and Gowon, was held. In 
this meeting, vital issues concerning the immediate fate of the country were discussed. Of 
primary importance to the Eastern government, was that the repatriation of soldiers to their 
regions of origin. This measure was discussed to reduce occurrences of inter-tribal violence, 
which was primarily orchestrated by Northern soldiers against Easterners. Within the 
framework of this repatriation exercise, Gowon agreed to Ojukwu's demands that Eastern 
soldiers be granted access to weapons with which they could utilise for self-defence during 
their journeys home.22 The Easterners were perceived by other representatives at the meeting, 
as exaggerating the severity of their plight, but in a significant turn of events, it was reported 
that several Eastern Nigerians were massacred on the day of the meeting in the Northern region, 
and a few hundred Easterners had been killed by Northern soldiers in Lagos. Some of these 
murders were carried out only a few hundred yards from where the meeting was being held. 
                                                 
20 Lasse Heerten and A. Dirk Moses, The Nigeria-Biafra War, 1967-1970 (Routledge 2014) p.173 
21 Herbert Ekwe-Ekwe, The Biafra War (The Edwin Mellen Press 1990) p.55-56  
22 'THE MEETING OF THE SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL Republic Of Biafra' (Africafederation.net, 2017) 
<http://africafederation.net/Biafra_Military_docs.htm> accessed 03 October 2016. 
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The Gowon-led government eventually appeared sympathetic to the Easterners' jeopardy, and 
embarking on negotiations with these delegates seemed like a positive development. However, 
relations between the Ojukwu and Gowon would significantly worsen after Gowon, without 
consultation with Eastern leaders, announced his dismissal of the resolutions of this conference, 
on the 30th of November 1966. 
For the Gowon-led government, the implications of the persecution of Easterners led to 
irreconcilable rifts between the Supreme Commander, Gowon and the Military Governor of 
the Eastern region, Ojukwu, as the latter was infuriated by recent developments in the country. 
As a result, the Supreme Military Council (SMC), was unable to organise meetings with all its 
members present. This was because Ojukwu rightly feared for his safety at SMC proceedings. 
Ojukwu, hailing from the Eastern region, believed that his presence at any of the SMC meetings 
would jeopardise his safety as many Northern soldiers would be present, and he believed that 
he too might be murdered at one of such meetings. Ojukwu's absence from these SMC meetings 
served to further isolate the interests of Eastern Nigerians at the central level of Government. 
This practical absence of Eastern representation within the government was, in many ways, 
like the disenfranchisement of Western and Middle-Belt interests during the formation case-
study. The SMC would eventually meet in a conference, the early months of 1967. But, in the 
months preceding the SMC conference, Ojukwu became increasingly explicit in his 
condemnation of the SMC and the violence which was meted out against Easterners. Ojukwu 
frequently reiterated his opinion that, as Military governor of the Eastern Region, any SMC 
meeting would have to be held on politically neutral grounds, where Northern soldiers were 
absent. Ojukwu's conviction practically eliminated the possibility of SMC proceedings 
anywhere within Nigerian territory. 23  Simultaneously, the Western and Northern regions 
witnessed the mass emigration of Eastern military officers, who abandoned their postings for 
fears of their safety. It was widely suspected that Ojukwu's outward condemnation of the SMC 
would culminate in a proposal for the Eastern region to secede from Nigeria. By this time, 
thousands of civilians had become victims of violence, and the nation was descending into 
anarchy. A situation needed to be found. In a bid to prevent hostilities, both sides decided to 
negotiate a settlement on neutral territory, in neighbouring Ghana. 24  In January 1967 in Aburi, 
                                                 
23 Max Siollun, Oil, Politics and Violence (Algora Pub 2009) p.152 
24 Daily Times, ‘Gowon, Ojukwu in Ghana’ (1967) 
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guests of Lieutenant General Joseph Ankrah, included all members of the SMC, and they 
embarked on peace talks. 25  
The Aburi Conference of 1967 
On the 4th and 5th of January 1967, the SMC met for the first time since its constitution 
in August 1966, in the town of Aburi, Ghana (a neighbouring West-African state). This meeting 
was orchestrated by the then Military Head of State of Ghana, Lt. Gen. Joseph Ankrah. Lt. Gen. 
Ankrah was interested in the survival of neighbouring Nigeria as a single entity, as political 
instability in the West-African region would be greatly accelerated if the largest State in the 
region disintegrated into chaos.   
The Aburi conference was essentially a constitutional conference wherein the future of 
Nigeria's union would be discussed in detail, by the members of Nigeria's Supreme Military 
Council. The physical situation of this conference in Ghana, was instrumental in providing 
neutral territory, which was a necessary precondition for Ojukwu's presence at any SMC 
meeting. Fortunately, proceedings at the Aburi conference were documented in detail, via video 
and audio recordings facilitated by the Ghanaians, and detailed minutes of the meeting were 
documented by Ojukwu's aides. It is from these recordings that the researcher could gain further 
insight into the state of the Nigerian union at the time. In one of the audio recordings, Lt. Gen. 
Ankrah was recorded in his opening remarks, stating that: "The whole world is looking up to 
you as military men and if there is any failure to reunify or even bring perfect understanding 
to Nigeria as a whole, you will find that the blame will rest with us through the centuries”26  
At this constitutional conference, Ojukwu once again challenged the legality of Gowon's 
leadership, citing the existence of Military officers who outranked him. He also advocated for 
a more decentralised government, wherein decisions could not be taken at the central level of 
government without the approval of the military Governors, especially in instances where a 
particular region was to be directly affected. The remaining members of the SMC however, 
advocated for a strong, centralised government, wherein the military governors of the regions 
were nothing more than an extension of central control. In this conference, Ojukwu maintained 
his defiance, repeatedly referring to Gowon as the Chief of Army Staff and not the Supreme 
Military Commander. The recordings of this conference captured Ojukwu as saying: 
                                                 
25 Daily Times, ‘The Best For Nigeria is a Confederation’ (1967) 
26 'Aburi Meetings | Openmind Foundation' (Openmindfoundation.com) 
<http://www.openmindfoundation.com/index.php/national-issues/nigeria-today/aburi-minutes/> accessed 10 
February 2017. 
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A break at this time from our normal line (referring to military hierarchy) would 
write in something into the Nigerian Army which is bigger than all of us and 
that thing is indiscipline…because you are the head of a group who have their 
fingers poised on the trigger? If you do it you remain forever a living example 
of that indiscipline which we want to get rid of because tomorrow a Corporal 
will think that, he could just take over the company from the Major commanding 
the company27 
Eventually, Ojukwu was able to convince the SMC to adopt a less centralised system of 
government within which regional governors enjoyed more autonomy in the decision-making 
procedures of their respective regions. Ojukwu also put forward a resolution which denounced 
the use of further violence by the SMC as a means of resolving the Nigerian crisis.28 It was 
perhaps Ojukwu's hope that if the SMC were seen to denounce the use of military force publicly, 
then he might have a better chance at seceding from Nigeria without bloodshed. The issue of 
publicly declaring the demise of the previous Supreme Commander, Lt. Gen. Aguyi-Ironsi was 
also discussed. (It must be noted that the demise of Aguyi-Ironsi was still not public knowledge 
at the time, and many Nigerians still believed he was alive, but missing.) Lt. Col. Gowon was 
in favour of Ojukwu's proposition to announce the demise of Aguyi-Ironsi. Perhaps Gowon's 
agreement with Ojukwu's proposition was in the spirit of goodwill, but it is much more 
plausible that Gowon was acting in his self-interest. The speculation surrounding Aguyi-
Ironsi's disappearance, in a way, delegitimised Gowon's authority as supreme commander. The 
conference also deliberated on the plights of internally displaced persons, and the status and 
recovery of their abandoned assets in the Northern and Western regions. Detailed minutes of 
the Aburi conference were also documented by Ojukwu's entourage, and have been included 
in this paper, in Appendix B. 
1967: Eastern Secession 
The outcomes of the Aburi conference, however, were never implemented upon the 
SMC's return to Nigeria. On the 14th and 15th of January 1967, a follow-up meeting was held 
in the Mid-Western region. In attendance were Solicitors-General of the regions, who were 
acting as representatives of the military governors. It was at this meeting that Ojukwu became 
aware of the SMC's plans to renege on the agreements reached at Aburi. In Ojukwu's absence 
in subsequent SMC meetings, some SMC members expressed their opposition to most of 
                                                 
27 'Aburi Meetings | Openmind Foundation' (Openmindfoundation.com) 
<http://www.openmindfoundation.com/index.php/national-issues/nigeria-today/aburi-minutes/> accessed 10 
February 2017. 
28 'THE MEETING OF THE SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL Republic Of Biafra' (Africafederation.net, 2017) 
<http://africafederation.net/Biafra_Military_docs.htm> accessed 03 October 2016. 
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Ojukwu's propositions at Aburi. Decisions were still made at the central levels of government, 
with little regard for the wishes of people in the Eastern region. It was revealed at the follow-
up meeting that the SMC had refused to grant regional governors more autonomy within the 
regions and instead, repealed constitutional provisions which enabled the military governors to 
act with the hitherto existing degree of autonomy. It became apparent that not only was Gowon 
trying to restrict Ojukwu's powers, but Gowon would also rather see Ojukwu's powers 
significantly diminished. Gowon also pushed for the elimination of unanimous votes in the 
SMC and replaced it with a simple majority vote system, in which he had the veto vote. For 
Ojukwu this meant that significant decisions which directly affected his region could be taken 
in his continued absence from the SMC. 
Another issue which complicated the fulfilment of the resolutions at Aburi was the 
discovery of massive deposits of Crude Oil in the Eastern region in 1956. Further exploration 
of these oil reserves, meant that it was becoming increasingly clear the amount of wealth that 
could be made from this valuable resource. Many within the SMC were aware of the economic 
benefits of maintaining the Eastern region within the Nigerian state and were vehemently 
opposed to increased regional autonomy as a result. Ojukwu was also well aware of the benefits 
of the resources within his region and perceived the failure of Gowon to implement the Aburi 
resolutions as a grave threat to the well-being of the already embittered Easterners. The Central 
government ensured that it assumed control of the exploitation of the Oil deposits within the 
Eastern region, and subsequently dispersed the proceeds of Oil exploration equitably amongst 
the Regions. This method of resource exploitation was perceived as wholly unfair by the 
Easterners, who believed that they should be receiving a significantly higher percentage of the 
proceeds, being that the oil deposits were extracted from their region with significant impact 
on the local environment.29 
 Another independent development which further compounded the Easterners feelings of 
marginalisation, was the release of Chief Obafemi Awolowo from prison, by Lt. Col. Gowon. 
Many had hoped that the release of Awolowo from prison would have ensured an amicable 
split of all the three regions into separate independent entities. As one would recall, Awolowo 
was one of the leaders of the AG party, and frequently called for the emancipation of the 
Western region from the Nigerian union. Awolowo was perceived as an MNSA leader during 
the Formation case-study. However, upon his release, Awolowo immediately took sides with 
                                                 
29 Daily Times, ‘The Best For Nigeria is a Confederation’ (1967) 
Olamide Samuel - 1401236 - University of Buckingham 
 142 
his liberators from the North and declared his allegiance with Gowon, and by extension, 
Nigerian unity. This development essentially pitted the Western and Northern regions against 
the Eastern Region. With the North and South in an alliance against the East, coupled with the 
ongoing massacre of Easterners, Ojukwu was facing increasing pressures from Easterners to 
lead them out of the Nigerian union. However, Gowon was prompt to declare that any such 
secession led by Ojukwu would be unacceptable and would result in a police action for the 
crimes of treason.  
On the 27th of May 1967, Gowon effectively divided Nigeria into twelve States. These 
States were a strategic sub-division of the existing regions, and for the Easterners, was an 
unacceptable development, as it further created an administrative split, which saw Ojukwu only 
in charge of a much smaller portion of the Eastern region than he had been, before the 27th of 
May. This sub-division of the regions was perhaps the final catalyst for Eastern secession from 
Nigeria. Gowon's proclamation divided the Eastern region into Rivers State, East Central State, 
and South Eastern States respectively. Three days after Gowon's announcement, Ojukwu 
announced the Republic of Biafra as a Sovereign independent state, on the 30th of May 1967. 
Ojukwu announced the rationale behind his decision as being a response to the genocidal 
killing of people of predominantly eastern origin. He stated that: “in our case, that thousands 
have been massacred is not in dispute, one then might be permitted to ask, at what stage does 
this massacre become genocide”30 Ojukwu essentially announced his readiness for war against 
the Nigerian government in a televised interview: 
if civil war comes, and I do think it is imminent, you're quite right; it will for us 
be the price of freedom. Our people here, have for a long time been prepared 
for this eventuality, and I am confident of their readiness. I think that when it 
does come, that the people on the other side would be surprised, as to what 
they're going to get, and I'm confident that it will not last long31 
Gowon issued a countering statement to that of Ojukwu, claiming that the secession 
would be met with forceful resistance from the Nigerian government, and ordered a ‘police 
action' against Ojukwu. Popular support for Ojukwu from the Easterners meant that this action 
was met with forceful resistance. Thus, Gowon announced the beginning of the war:  
We are fighting this war in order to avoid the disintegration of the country into 
several mini-states which would become the protectorates of foreign powers. 
Everyone knows what the consequence of such disintegration would be. The tiny 
                                                 
30  'Chukwuemeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu, Biafran Commander. Archive Film 93590' (YouTube, 2015) 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bfuoNnKEfQc> accessed 16 January 2017. 
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states would all recklessly acquire arms from their protectors. There would be 
continuous war, insecurity of life and property and much greater sufferings than 
we have yet experienced.32  
Gowon also enforced the creation of a Military Blockade, which effectively cut off 
Eastern air and sea ports, as well as most forms of telecommunications in the region.33 As the 
blockade materialised, it was clear that the FMG’s aim was to isolate the Eastern region from 
sources of revenue. The recently established oil extracting companies which were within the 
Eastern region, were also included in the blockade, so as to halt any economic advantages 
which were to be gained by the Biafrans from the sale of oil.34 The FMG’s actions in the very 
early stages of the military confrontation were focused on the capture of Bonny Island from 
Ojukwu’s control, specifically because of the presence of valuable shell-BP installations, and 
the island’s strategic importance as a shipping route for oil exportation.35 
The initial police action36 ordered by Gowon, was met with a sporadic offensive from 
Ojukwu, who renamed the Eastern region of Nigeria, as the Independent Republic of Biafra. 
The Biafrans (as they are subsequently identified), attempted to capture the Mid-Western 
Region of Nigeria. This invasion mostly caught the Nigerian government by surprise. The 
Biafrans' offensive managed to frighten the Mid-Western Military Governor, Lt. Col. Ejoor, 
and he fled his region. More significantly however, the invasion of the Mid-Western region by 
the Biafrans indicated to the Federal Military Government of Nigeria (FMG) that the Biafrans 
also favoured territorial expansion. The United States was sceptical of the FMG's ability to 
decisively win the conflict against Biafra. As an excerpt from publications by the United States' 
interdepartmental Group for Africa shows below: 
General Gowon leads a fragile, relatively moderate and regionally balanced 
coalition, determined to preserve national unity and convinced that rebel 
success would tear apart the country. The military stalemate accentuates inner 
stresses and strains…but the common interest nevertheless continues to hold 
the coalition together37 
The reprisal by the FMG was a sign of things to come in the ensuing civil war. Firstly, 
the FMG mobilised its 2nd Division to recapture the Mid-Western region from the Biafrans on 
                                                 
32  'Chukwuemeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu, Biafran Commander. Archive Film 93590' (YouTube, 2015) 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bfuoNnKEfQc> accessed 16 January 2017. 
33 View mexzyr, 'Much Ado About Biafra' (Thoughtendom, 2017) 
<https://thoughtendom.wordpress.com/2017/08/26/much-ado-about-biafra/> accessed 17 May 2017. 
34 Chibuike Ugochukwu Uche, Oil, British Interests And The Nigerian Civil War (2008). 
35 Chibuike Ugochukwu Uche, Oil, British Interests And The Nigerian Civil War (2008). 
36 A Police action being a partial military operation desined to eliminate what is viewed as an internal insurrection 
37 NSCGIF/AF 69-1/Rev.A February 10 1969 NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa    Background Paper on 
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the 6th of July 1967. The counter-offensive orchestrated by the FMG was swift, decisive, and 
brutal. The ensuing massacre of hundreds of civilians in the Mid-West was as a result of their 
tribal origins or affiliations. 38  The Mid-Western Region, was populated by a significant 
proportion of Igbo tribesmen who historically originated from the Eastern region, as well as 
the Benin tribesmen, many of which were fluent in Eastern and Western local languages. The 
indiscriminate massacre of Mid-Westerners was essentially a policy characterised by 
widespread killings of individuals on the basis of their cultural heritage. One could reasonably 
argue that these killings were remarkably characteristic of genocide. One of the Counter-coup 
plotters of July 1966, Major Muritala Mohammed, (later Colonel in April 1968) was the head 
of 2nd Division at the time, and personally oversaw this ethnic cleansing in the Mid-West.39  A 
portion of an American diplomatic cable shown below, highlights the perception of the 
international community towards the FMG policy: 
If the FMG overruns Biafra, at least some excesses against the Ibos are 
inevitable. However, the reports of international observers have stated that 
there is no evidence that the FMG is pursuing a policy of genocide. But there 
are historical reasons… for Ibo fears.40 
1968-1969: Repercussions of Strategy 
Through the latter months of 1967 up until March of 1968, the FMG carried out 
sustained military attacks against the Biafrans, capturing significant Biafran towns on the 12th 
and 14th of July 1967. In the Northern region, the 1st Division of the Nigerian Army, utilised 
the pre-existing soldiers stationed in the Middle-Belt Zones, to enforce a military blockade 
against the Eastern region. Most of the soldiers in the 1st Division were already accustomed to 
domestic warfare, as they had been actively engaged with UMBC supporters prior to the civil 
war.41 In the Mid-Western region, 2nd Division of the Nigerian Army were able to put down 
several Biafran offences, and on three occasions, launched an amphibious assault towards the 
town of Onitsha. 2nd Division sustained significant losses during all of their unsuccessful 
amphibious assaults, and eventually captured Onitsha, via assistance from 1st division, by 
advancing through the military blockade from the North. 
For a brief period in the beginning of 1968, both the Nigerian and Biafran sides were 
unable to make significant advances, and there was a state of deadlock. However, after 2nd 
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Division's successful advances in April 1968, the FMG was able to surround Biafra effectively. 
However, this blockade around Biafra was responsible for widespread civilian casualties from 
starvation. 42  Increasing international pressure was ramped up against Nigeria's starvation 
strategy, as propaganda images were carefully constructed and promulgated by the Biafrans in 
international media. It appeared as though, the FMG was actively in support of suffocating 
Biafran civilians at all costs, and in response, some French medical practitioners travelled to 
Biafra, in order to provide independent humanitarian aid to Biafrans. Independent and critical 
of the Red-Cross, these doctors (who would form the famed ‘Doctors Without Borders' 
organisation two years later), were subjected to military attacks from the FMG, which were 
supported by Soviet airstrikes. As at the 20th of October 1968, the FMG had successfully 
captured a number of Biafran strongholds, including Port-Harcourt city, Enugu city and the 
towns of Calabar and Bonny. The FMG also strategically focused on controlling territories 
where foreign oil companies were in operation. When oil installations were captured by the 
FMG, swift repairs were commenced to ramp up production and sales of oil. These sales were 
crucial in enabling the FMG to procure newer arms and equipment to sustain the offensive 
against Biafra. This strategy significantly weakened the Biafran side of the conflict, as they 
were essentially cut off from their economic assets, and forced to rely on foreign aid, which 
was in the most part, provided by France and Sweden.   
Seemingly emboldened by their various strategies of isolating Biafra, the FMG 
attempted to overrun Biafra at the end of 1968, but was surprisingly faced with resistance from 
increasingly weakened and starved Biafrans. FMG offensives were effectively resisted by the 
Biafrans, and occasionally between 1968 and 1969 the Biafrans launched surprise strategic 
offensives against the FMG. Another dimension to this conflict which has received little 
attention was the plight of ethnic minorities in the Mid-Western regions. Various accounts from 
survivors of the war stated that the FMG indiscriminately targeted civilians who were caught 
in the cross-fire between Biafra and the FMG. In towns like Port-Harcourt for example, Saro-
Wiwa documented that a majority of the inhabitants did not actively support either of the 
warring sides and were "treated as saboteurs, and so cruelly treated"43In Biafran strongholds, 
Russian military jets serving alongside the FMG were accused of indiscriminately bombing 
civilian centres.44 On the ground, a majority of civilians were killed, "not by bullet wounds but 
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by cruel handling"45 Individuals belonging to ethnic minority tribes were often suspected by 
both the FMG and Biafran soldiers of harbouring divided loyalties. These minority members 
were often blamed for successes gained by both of the warring sides. For example, on the 2nd 
of April 1968 some men belonging to the Ikun tribe (residing in Biafran territory) were 
suspected by Biafran soldiers of colluding with FMG soldiers and leaking vital information 
which could lead to military advances by the FMG. As a result of these suspicions, Biafran 
soldiers arrested Ikun tribesmen, looted their properties and allegedly raped Ikun 
tribeswomen.46 It was also reported that Ikpeme tribesmen were routinely carted into what they 
described as concentration camps and severely maltreated. Even to the point that they were 
offered urine to drink when they requested water.47 Nigerian troops were also undeniably 
ruthless in their manhandling of members of ethnic minority tribes. Nigerian soldiers were 
involved in the summary execution of individuals whom they believed had even the slightest 
sympathy for Biafran ideals, and in Biafran towns that were captured by Nigerian soldiers, 
lootings, rapes and arbitrary executions were the norm.48  One of such examples, was the 
reported summary execution of about 2000 Efik tribesmen by Nigerian troops in the town of 
Calabar.49 
1970: End of Secession   
Increasing support for the FMG over the course of 1969, enabled more frequent 
offensives into Biafra. From the 23rd of December 1969, till the 6th January 1970, Col. 
Obasanjo led a final, sustained push into the Biafran town of Owerri. This manoeuvre, 
essentially split Biafran territory into two, and marked the beginning of Biafra’s demise. On 
the 8th of January 1970, it was reported that Ojukwu had fled the war, less than a week after 
Col. Obasanjo’s incursion into Biafra. Gen. Ojukwu handed over surrender responsibilities to 
his second in command, Phillip Effiong.  
At forty minutes past four pm today Nigerian time, Africa's worst war came to 
an end, that’s between Nigeria and breakaway Biafra. Major general Phillip 
Effiong, left in charge of Biafra when gen Ojukwu fled Sunday, announced the 
end on radio Biafra…He appealed to the federal military leader General 
Gowon, for a cease fire to negotiate a settlement within the framework of a 
united Nigeria. The war has lasted two and a half years, around two million 
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people have died. The peril that remains now is starvation of 4 million Biafrans 
or slaughter by federal troops50 
The official date of Biafra’s surrender was on the 16th of January 1970. Footage of 
Effiong’s surrender statement was obtained by the researcher. Excerpts from this statement are 
below: 
I would like to take this formal opportunity to say that I, major general Phillip 
Effiong, officer administering the government of the republic of Biafra, now 
wish to make the following declaration. That we affirm that we are loyal 
Nigerian citizens and accept the authority of the federal military government of 
Nigeria. That we accept the existing administrative and political structure of 
the federation of Nigeria. That any future constitutional arrangement would be 
worked out by representatives of the people of Nigeria. That the republic of 
Biafra hereby ceases to exist.51 
Effiong’s official surrender statement was received by Gen. Gowon, at Dodan Barracks in 
Lagos, Nigeria. Gen. Gowon proceeded to make a statement following Effiong’s surrender: 
we have fought a long bitter battle, and it has ended in a victory for common 
sense, a victory for the unity of this country. And we have got cause to thank all 
the people of this country for what they have done, to help to keep this country 
one. I thank above all, the gallant officers and men who have given their lives 
that this nation might live. And we have with us today col. Obasanjo and 
unfortunately the other field commanders are not able to be with us at this 
moment52 
Gowon pursued a policy of "no Victor, No Vanquished" after the end of the war. Within 
the framework of his policy, he refused to award FMG troops any special recognition medals 
for their participation in the war. He also ordered the release of Biafran prisoners of war, and 
the unconditional pardon of Biafran soldiers.53 One notable exception to his policy, was the 
former Biafran leader, Ojukwu. Ojukwu would remain in exile for twelve years. Gowon was 
subsequently ousted from power by another military coup, which occurred on the 29th of 
January 1975. 
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6.3 ASSESSMENT QUESTION 2 ORIENTATION: WHERE CAN ONE OBSERVE THE PRESENCE OF 
INFLATIONARY CONTAINMENT AND COMPRESSION BY THE STATE? 
The occurrence of the First and Counter-Coups, signified a shift in the organisation at 
the helms of governance within the Nigerian state. The primary MNSA in existence during this 
period, was the Biafran MNSA, which was led by Ojukwu, and the Nigerian FMG led by 
Gowon. The designation of Biafra as an MNSA is based on the Nigerian State’s repeated 
condemnation of secessionist ideology and organisations. Although most scholastic literature 
identified Biafra as a self-proclaimed independent nation which waged war against the 
Nigerian state, the NSSP theoretical framework focuses on the description of Biafrans which 
was promulgated by the Nigerian State. The Nigerian State never recognised Biafra as an 
independent or sovereign nation, instead, Biafra was seen as a political entity which sought to 
undermine the territorial sovereignty and unity of Nigeria. Easterners that resided within 
Biafran controlled territory were described by the Nigerian state as Nigerians in need of 
emancipation from Biafran suppression. Therefore, within the NSSP theoretical framework, 
actions taken by the FMG against Biafra, are categorised as State behaviour against a perceived 
MNSA. These actions would be analysed in this second assessment question, with specific 
focus on the location where they occurred, for an observer to gain further insight with regards 
to the Orientation of Nigerian NSSP during the secession case-study period. 
The killing of an overwhelming number of Easterners in the latter half of 1966 was 
carried out by disgruntled Northern soldiers, as well as Northern civilians.54It must be noted 
that, the riots in Sabon Garis in the Northern region, which initiated the subsequent evacuation 
of over a million refugees to the Eastern region, was not as a result of a directive issued by 
Gowon. However, it is very likely that such widespread violence was a result of complacency 
by the Nigerian state. Also, Nigerian military personnel involved in the violence against 
Easterners, carried out their actions without any fears of sanctions or reprisals from the 
Nigerian State. Although it was recorded that Gowon repeatedly called for cessation of 
violence against the Easterners, there is no evidence which proves that he took any tangible 
action to curb the ensuing violence. Instead, what followed Gowon’s announcements was the 
intensification of violence against the Easterners from September to October 1966.55 The lack 
of any form of actual intervention against the violence was perhaps directly responsible for the 
emergence of Biafra as an MNSA in the first place. With these considerations in mind, an 
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observer must be aware of the fact that Northern soldiers engaged in violence against 
Easterners in 1966, were not acting under any specific orders from the Nigerian State, as was 
the case against the UMBC in the Middle-Belt zones in the formation case-study. Therefore, 
these episodes of violence should not be considered as the implementation of Nigerian NSSP.  
6.4 RESEARCH FINDINGS: ASSESSMENT OF ORIENTATION 
Within the secession case-study, instances of Inflationary Containment and 
Compression were predominantly within Nigerian territory, with the exception of the Aburi 
conference in Ghana, which is a neighbouring State. Therefore, in utilising Orientation as an 
independent variable within the NSSP theoretical framework, it must be noted that Nigeria was 
essentially an Introverted State. Below, is a measurement scale of Nigeria's orientation during 
the Secession period. Notable instances wherein the Nigerian government operationalised 
Inflationary Containment, and Compression are cited56: 









FMG and Eastern Region, 
Lagos. Jul-Oct 1966 
 
  







SMC and Ojukwu, 
Ghana. 
  
Jan 1967 Negotiations between 
Solicitors-General. Mid-
Western Region,  
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1968 FMG Military Offensives 
against Biafra  
 
  
1969 FMG Military Offensives 
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The NSSP assessment of Nigerian Orientation therefore, begins with the Nigerian State’s 
attempts at negotiation with delegates from the Eastern region in the period spanning July to 
October of 1966. These negotiations are included in Nigerian NSSP strategy as they were a 
consequence of directives issued by the FMG to embark on a peaceful settlement to the crises. 
The meeting held on the 9th of August in Lagos between representatives of the FMG and 
Eastern delegates, is identified as behaviour which was representative of state interests and 
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therefore documented as state behaviour. All of the meetings between the FMG and the Eastern 
region occurred within Nigerian territory in 1966.57 
The deterioration of relations between the Supreme Military Council (SMC) and Ojukwu, 
in addition to the escalation of violence against Easterners within Nigeria, meant that the SMC 
was unable to organise meetings with all its members present. The SMC’s decision to meet in 
a conference in Aburi, was significant as it was the first time in Nigeria’s history that it would 
attempt strategy against an MNSA outside Nigerian territory. 58  It also signified Ghana’s 
willingness to act as a facilitator for dialogue, to solve internal issues of its neighbour state. 
The subsequent meeting between Solicitors-General of the regions which occurred on the 14th 
and 15th of January 1967, is documented as state behaviour within Nigerian territory as it 
occurred in the Mid-Western region of Nigeria. All other documented instances of Inflationary 
Containment or Compression carried out by the Nigerian State against Biafra, occurred within 
Nigerian territory. Therefore, a culmination of observed state behaviour within the Secession 
case study, suggests that the Nigerian NSSP remained Introverted in its Orientation. 
6.5 ASSESSMENT QUESTION 3 (INFLATIONARY CONTAINMENT): WHAT REFERENT OBJECTS 
WITHIN REACH OF THE MNSA HAVE BEEN OBSERVED TO BE GRANTED PRIORITY BY THE STATE? 
As was carried out in the Formation case-study period, identifying the Prioritised 
Referent Objects of Nigeria's NNSP within the NSSP theoretical framework, is achieved 
through the application of a deductive process wherein the hierarchy of Referent Objects is 
introduced as a guide to identifying Prioritised Referent Objects. Referent Objects within this 
case study, refers to what the Nigerian government considered valuable enough to warrant the 
prioritised, conscious and continuous provision of Security, from threats posed by Biafra as its 
perceived Malicious Non-State Actor. It was clear during the first assessment question that the 
Nigerian government considered the withdrawal of the Eastern region from the country as a 
source of concern. The Nigerian government, unlike in the Formation case study, however, did 
not seem to be in the position to immediately identify key influential individuals as responsible 
for the perpetuation of political violence. This was because, in the secession case-study, it is 
arguable that the Nigerian government was involved in the promulgation of political instability, 
as shall be revealed in this assessment. Biafra as an MNSA proximally interacted with Nigerian 
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Citizens as well as Nigerian Interests such as Territory, Sovereignty, Economic Assets and the 
SMC. Once again, the superimposition of the hierarchy of referent objects serves as an aid in 
deciphering which of the aforementioned interests the Nigerian government had prioritised, 
above other considerations. 
Any satisfactory inquiry into the focus of Nigeria's Inflationary Containment in this case-
study period must take the nature of governance into consideration. Therefore, analysing the 
circumstances which enabled the emergence of a military dictatorship in the first place, enables 
an observer to fully comprehend the full spectrum of considerations which the FMG utilised to 
justify its actions. Considering that the Supreme Military Council (SMC) emerged as a 
consequence of the inadequacies which plagued the NPC led government of 1960-65, the 
relegation of the role of popular legitimacy in Nigerian governance during the period, was the 
most conspicuous ideological shift. Nigerian NSSP was already Interest-Centric in the 
Formation case-study, and these interests were protected by the NPC-led government, in an 
increasingly militarised fashion. With various regions of the country already accustomed to 
emergency rule (even under a democratic government), the transition into a military 
dictatorship from the Formation period through the Secession period, was hardly surprising. 
Arguably, neither was the occurrence of a counter-coup, which was spurred by underlying 
tribal tensions.  
MNSA designation by the FMG government in the Secession case-study was remarkably 
similar to MNSA designation by the NPC-led government in the Formation case-study. 
MNSAs in both case studies were; A political movement, hoping for emancipation from central 
rule, spurred by feelings of marginalisation of an ethnic group or region, championed by an 
organisation willing to utilise violence in response to military suppression. Another similarity 
between both case studies, was that leaders of MNSAs were individuals who embodied the 
aspirations of a particular ethnic group or geo-political region, to be more included in 
governance. These MNSA leaders believed that they had exhausted all legitimate avenues to 
achieve their aspirations, and resorted to unconventional means of challenging the government 
in question. Tarka championing the emancipation of the Middle-Belt Zones (Tiv tribesmen), 
Awolowo championing the emancipation of the Western region (Yoruba tribesmen), and 
Ojukwu championing the emancipation of the Eastern Region (Igbo tribesmen). The power 
struggles over control of the military between Gowon and Ojukwu, were reminiscent of power 
struggles which occurred between the President Azikiwe and Prime-Minister Balewa in the 
Formation case-study. But, as the focus of the NSSP theoretical framework is on observed state 
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behaviour, this assessment focuses on the considerations of the State apparatus, and the 
strategic means which were utilised.  
At the tail-end of the Formation case-study period, individuals within the Nigerian 
military had become increasingly allergic to the nature of NPC-led governance. In addition, 
the proximity of military personnel to strategic governmental establishments created a sort of 
familiarity between the military and these establishments. 59  The Army was ever-present at 
polling booths, as Aides de Camps of various senior politicians, as security providers within 
governmental buildings, as enforcers of the NPC’s political will in areas of political violence, 
and as recipients of aggression from the civilian population which believed that military 
intervention was necessary to cleanse Nigerian government of corruption. 60 The rationale 
promoted by the plotters of the eventual military coup of January 1966, shed light on the fact 
that these coup plotters, believed that they could annihilate the perpetrators of corruption within 
government, simply by killing individuals who held important positions within government 
and assuming their responsibilities. These coup plotters believed that their intervention, was in 
the interest of the general populace. However, the argument that these initial coup plotters 
represented a shift in Nigerian NSSP from Interest-centric to People-centric, is flawed. These 
coup plotters were not acting under the directives of the existing government, therefore, their 
actions cannot be categorised as representative of State behaviour or its NSSP.  
Although the actions of the coup plotters enabled a military takeover of government by 
Aguyi-Ironsi, they failed to envisage the repercussions of the targeted assassinations of 
predominantly Northern and Western leaders, on the tribal balance of power which underscored 
Nigerian government at the time. Their actions catalysed the overt expression of tribal 
animosity, and Aguyi-Ironsi's life, and leadership of the country would be cut short as a result. 
In hindsight, these coup-plotters only facilitated the promulgation of an NSSP which was 
similar to that of the Formation case-study. By setting the precedent that the control of the 
Nigerian State was within reach of individuals, with the military capabilities to obtain it, it 
could be argued that these coup plotters inadvertently maintained the nature of Nigeria's 
Interest-Centric, Introverted and Constraining NSSP. Aguyi-Ironsi's short-lived government 
was preoccupied with putting down a military insurrection in the barracks, maintaining the 
perception of Aguyi-Ironsi's non-involvement with the coup plotters, and quelling widespread 
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political violence from grieving supporters of the NPC-led government. All of which required 
the NSSP of the Formation case-study. 
The Northern Counter-Coup of July 1966, facilitated Gowon’s ascension to power, but 
this coup was much more significant in many ways. This counter-coup represented Northern 
determination to retain their control of the country, and that this determination was (from their 
perspective) more important than the norms of military hierarchy in an authoritarian regime, 
and the continued existence of Easterners in Nigeria. Gowon’s ascension to power overtly 
dismissed the norms of seniority within the military, and as Ojukwu pointed out, confirmed the 
crucial role which tribal sentiments played in Nigerian governance. Therefore, like Aguyi-
Ironsi, Gowon too inherited a country wherein the quelling of political violence, regime 
security and preservation of Nigeria as a single political entity, were priority concerns –even if 
it meant the slaughter of an uncountable number of Nigerian citizens. 
Interest Centric Inflationary Containment  
As it became increasingly clear that the prioritisation of the aforementioned interests 
over human life would become the norm during Gowon’s regime, the observer focused on 
identifying the specific interests which Nigerian NSSP prioritised.  
The early days of Gowon’s regime in 1966, were characterised by wide scale violence 
against Easterners in the Northern and Western regions. The failure of Gowon to halt the 
continued persecution of the Easterners was regarded by many to be due to his lack of concern 
for the plights of the Easterners. From an observer's perspective, Gowon's failure to isolate 
FMG soldiers from Easterners in order to protect Eastern Nigerian's from violence, signified 
the de-prioritisation of humans within Nigeria's NSSP. Ojukwu’s relevance to Easterners was 
significantly increasing at this time, as he became increasingly explicit in his condemnation of 
the violence against his kinsmen. Ojukwu's overt criticism of Northern soldiers in general, and 
Gowon in particular, soon ignited the belief that he was one day going to attempt secession 
from Nigeria, or plot a coup. Ojukwu occupied an important position within the Nigerian State 
after Gowon became the Supreme Leader, as he (Ojukwu) remained the Military governor of 
the Eastern region, and was still a member of the Supreme Military Council. When Ojukwu 
proclaimed in mainstream media, that he had no intention to attack Northerners in Eastern 
territory even though he had “sufficient cause to retaliate” His statement was interpreted by 
Gowon and his supporters, that perhaps in the near future, he might be facing retaliation from 
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the East, and a possible ‘counter-counter-coup’. 61 In addition, Ojukwu publicly challenged the 
legitimacy of Gowon’s government according to military hierarchy. Gradually, Ojukwu’s 
opinion alienated him from Gowon, and the persistent persecution of Easterners which Gowon 
failed to control, meant that Ojukwu might one day consider other strategies with which he 
could safeguard Easterners.62 These developments were interpreted by the SMC as precursors 
to the possibility of another military takeover enacted by dissidents within the military. As a 
result, regime security was a priority concern for the members of the SMC. 
Gowon’s focus on attempting to facilitate dialogue between the SMC and Ojukwu, serves 
to illustrate that the Nigerian State viewed the cooperation of Ojukwu and the Eastern region 
at large, as important to the well-being of the country. However, it is more illustrative to note 
that all these attempts at negotiation by Gowon, were not followed up with tangible measures 
to stop the killings of Nigerian citizens. The negotiations were largely pursued by the FMG 
with the ultimate aim of stabilising the SMC. But, when it became clear that stabilisation of the 
ruling regime would not be possible until Ojukwu’s demands were met, interests in 
implementing the recommendations of negotiations waned. The subsequent failure of the 
Gowon regime to implement the recommendations of the Aburi conference, makes more 
logical sense, if an observer views the preservation of the SMC as the primary interest of the 
1966 and 1967 negotiations. Therefore, it can be assessed that the preservation of the SMC's 
regime was prioritised over the well-being of Nigerian, specifically Eastern citizens.  
In addition, the discovery of oil in the Eastern region, played a crucial role in the nature 
of Nigerian NSSP in the secession period. The Nigerian State which was non-responsive to the 
plight of the Easterners, initiated strategic moves to secure the oil deposits which were in the 
Eastern Region. Gowon's demarcation of the Eastern Region into 3 States on the 27th of May 
1967, set out to accomplish two things. Firstly, by demarcating the Regions into States, Gowon 
essentially abolished Ojukwu's formal role as the Governor of the Eastern region. Secondly, if 
Ojukwu was to remain as a Governor of one of the Four States, he would have lost effective 
control over most of the Eastern region, and would have had no jurisdiction over the oil 
producing states. This strategic move, could not have been interpreted as prioritising the lives 
of the Easterners, as they were still effectively being persecuted, and now, in addition to Eastern 
persecution, their claims over oil deposits had been nullified by Gowon.  
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Ojukwu's proclamation of Biafra's independence, three days after Gowon had 
demarcated the Region, was in direct opposition with the SMC's agenda for Nigeria. Ojukwu's 
proclamation, effectively meant that the FMG was able to then view Ojukwu and Easterners as 
an MNSA. Ojukwu's subsequent televised interview wherein he declared his readiness for war 
against the FMG, only helped to facilitate the FMG's categorisation of Easterners loyal to 
Ojukwu, as part and parcel of an MNSA. Gowon's reprisal statement created a clear 
demarcation of the Nigerian State from its prioritised MNSA, Biafra, and thus marked the 
beginning of the Nigerian Civil war. 
The operationalisation of Gowon's 'Police Action' was brutal, and illustrative of the 
prioritisation of interests over human life, by the FMG. In Gowon's address, he narrated his 
rationale behind authorising a police action, stating that he was trying to stop the further 
fragmentation of Nigeria into 'mini-states' which would be nothing more than protectorates of 
foreign powers. He cited the promulgation of arms and ammunitions from these foreign powers 
as a development which would be detrimental to the well-being of Nigeria. During the 
operationalisation of Gowon's police action, one of the first strategic offensives initiated by the 
FMG was the establishment of a military blockade, which would effectively isolate Easterners 
from the rest of Nigeria. This blockade was extended to cordon off Airports, sea-ports as well 
as any forms of telecommunications within the region. The FMG was indiscriminate in its 
application of the blockade to include all of the Eastern territory, as there were no attempts to 
isolate its Nigerian citizens from Biafran control. Of course, this isolation would have been 
impossible, as most Easterners were better off allying with the Biafran MNSA, as the violence 
against Easterners, before the war, was carried out by FMG soldiers. Thus further illustrating 
that the Citizens of the country were not the FMG's prioritised concern. 
The development of the military blockade, was optimised towards isolating the Biafran 
MNSA from sources of revenue, and from external contact. Oil companies which were 
established in the Eastern region, were the first to be isolated from Biafran influence. 63 
Focusing primarily on the recapture of Bonny Island from Ojukwu's control, as the presence of 
valuable shell-BP installations, and the island's strategic importance as a shipping route for oil 
exportation were prioritised concerns for the FMG.64 When the Biafran MNSA reacted to 
Gowon's police action with a military offensive to capture the Mid-Western region, the stability 
of FMG control over the remainder of Nigerian territory was in question. The FMG's swift 
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offensive to take back the Mid-Western region with brutal military force, on the 6th of July 
1967, saw the indiscriminate massacre of Nigerian citizens in the Mid-Western Region by 
FMG troops, led by Murtala Mohammed. These widespread killings of Nigerian citizens, 
served to show the FMGs prioritisation of Territorial sovereignty over the lives of Nigerian 
citizens. 65 
As the FMG continued its conquests of Biafran-held territory in 1967 and 1968, this 
policy of ethnic cleansing was hardly discouraged. Nigerian soldiers were involved in looting, 
indiscriminate killing and rapes on a wide-scale. The military blockade was intensified at the 
beginning of 1968, wherein millions of Biafrans were subjected to a lack of food, water and 
basic supplies, as these goods were not permitted through the FMG's blockade. As the civilian 
death-toll rose, independent humanitarian organisations began establishing themselves in the 
Biafran-held territory with the purpose of alleviating as many civilians as possible. These 
organisations soon became aware of the harsh realities of FMG policy. On several occasions, 
the FMG carried out Russian facilitated airstrikes, which indiscriminately targeted civilian 
dwellings, and jeopardised the operations of humanitarian organisations in Biafran-held 
territory. Summary executions of captured civilians as well as even passive supporters of Biafra 
were the norm. 66 These indiscriminate attacks by the FMG, continued until the end of the civil 
war, when Biafra as an MNSA was forced into submission.  
6.6 RESEARCH FINDINGS: ASSESSMENT OF INFLATIONARY CONTAINMENT 
In assessing the nature of Inflationary Containment, the identification of Target 
Hardening strategies as well as Damage Mitigation strategies on Referent Objects enable us to 
identify where the State’s Inflationary Containment is centred upon. In the secession case study, 
one can easily identify target hardening and damage mitigation strategies employed by the 
FMG, as optimised to protect Interest Referent Objects. As the Biafra MNSA developed and 
expanded, Nigeria's police action, its prioritised recapture of territory with significant assets, 
the indiscriminate killing of civilians, and its dismissal of recommendations devised during 
negotiations, vividly illustrate to an observer, that; Regime Security, Territorial Sovereignty, 
Valuable Assets and the Preservation of Nigeria as a single political entity, were the Prioritised 
Referent Objects. 
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In light of the information gathered from the Secession case study, the measurement 
scale, which characterizes the focus of Inflationary Containment within Nigeria’s NSSP is 
represented below67:  




  Negotiations between SMC and 
Ojukwu, Ghana. Jan 1967 -Regime 
Security 
  Negotiations between FMG and 
Eastern Region, Lagos. Jul-Oct 1966 
-Regime Security 
  Release of Chief Awolowo, Lagos. 
1966 -Regime Security 
  Negotiations between Solicitors-
General. Mid-Western Region, Jan 
1967 -Regime Security 
  FMG Division of Eastern Region, 
May 1967 -Regime Security 
  FMG threat of ‘Police Action’ May 
1967-Territorial 
Sovereignty/Regime Security 
  Military Offensive against Biafra, 
Jun 1967 -Territorial Sovereignty 
  FMG Military blockade of Biafra Jul 
1967 -Territorial Sovereignty 
                                                 
67 Author’s compilation. See note 42 in Chapter 5 
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  FMG Ethnic Cleansing of Mid-West 
region Jul 1967 -Territorial 
Sovereignty 
  FMG Military Offensives against 
Biafra 1968 -Territorial Sovereignty 
  FMG Military Blockade of Biafra 
1968 -Territorial Sovereignty 
  FMG Military Offensives against 
Biafra 1968 -Territorial Sovereignty 
  FMG Military Offensives against 
Biafra 1969 -Territorial Sovereignty 
  FMG Military Offensives against 
Biafra, Jan 1970 -Territorial 
Sovereignty 
In applying the measurement scale for Inflationary Containment, Nigerian NSSP during 
the Secession case study was greatly inclined towards the protection of Interests, with the 
dismissal of people as the core focus of Nigerian NSSP. As a result, NSSP during this case 
study period would be characterised as Interest Centric.  
6.7 ASSESSMENT QUESTION 4 (COMPRESSION): WHAT STRATEGIC MEANS HAVE BEEN 
OBSERVED TO BE REPEATEDLY UTILISED BY THE STATE TO ELIMINATE THE VITAL INTERESTS OF 
THE MNSA? 
As was carried out in the Formation case-study, postulating this assessment question, 
serves as a means through which the observer can identify and document the strategic means 
with which the Nigerian state sought to extinguish the existence of its designated Malicious 
Non-State Actors. Compression of an MNSA is best achieved through the separation, isolation 
or elimination of the vital interests of an MNSA. These vital interests are the Core and 
Peripheral interests of an MNSA that, in a functional arrangement, ensures the continued 
existence of an MNSA as such. The Core interests of an MNSA are; Objectives and Personnel, 
whilst the peripheral interests of an MNSA are; Mobility, Communication and Supplies. 
Eliminating the Core interests of an MNSA, is a strategic move which offers definitive results 
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in the compression of an MNSA. However, the elimination of peripheral MNSA interests, 
serves to limit the capability and willingness of an MNSA to continue its existence.  
This postulated assessment question when asked within the context of the Secession 
case study, focuses on the strategic means which was operationalised against eliminating the 
organisational form, ideological motives and operational capability of Nigeria’s designated 
MNSA, Biafra. The step by step characterisation of the compressive severity of strategy 
against the vital interests of an MNSA, enables one to understand and characterise this facet of 
the NSSP dependent variable. This procedure is an essential step towards enabling an observer 
to determine whether the NSSP dependent variable is either; Constraining, meaning that case 
studies observed expose a continued reliance by the State on brute military force to physically 
eliminate MNSA personnel, Coercive, meaning that case studies highlight a reliance of the 
State on eliminating MNSA peripheral interests (Communication, mobility and supply) or 
Compelling, meaning that case studies observed expose a continued reliance on strategy aimed 
at eliminating MNSA Objectives, through the utilisation of compelling communication.  This 
characterisation of severity is guided by the spectrum of compressive severity as proposed in 
the third chapter of this work.  
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6.8 RESEARCH FINDINGS: ASSESSMENT OF COMPRESSION 
August 1966 - May 1967 
Before Ojukwu's declaration of Biafra as an independent state, 1966 saw the 
simultaneous occurrence of mass persecution and slaughter of Easterners at the hands of FMG 
soldiers at the grass-roots level, and numerous attempts at negotiation and reconciliation of 
Gowon and Ojukwu at the upper echelons of government. Earlier, the author made specific 
remarks with regards to the inclusion of negotiations attempted by the FMG, and the exclusion 
of the persecution of Easterners, in the application of the NSSP framework within August 1966 
and May 1967. To reiterate, the author specifically noted that the various attempts at 
negotiation between Ojukwu and Gowon, were orchestrated and sanctioned by the FMG. Thus, 
the deliberate utilisation of negotiation by the FMG was an extension of Nigerian NSSP during 
this period, by virtue of its origins within the FMG. The persecution of Easterners at this time 
however, was openly condemned by the FMG, up until the beginning of the civil war. The 
observer believes that the FMG does bear responsibility for the behaviour of its foot-soldiers 
at the grassroots level during this period, but the inclusion of these sporadic orchestrated acts 
of violence within the NSSP assessment would be erroneous, as it did not represent an 
extension of any official FMG policy at the time. Even though the FMG could have been 
expected to ramp up its efforts in discouraging violence perpetrated by its foot-soldiers, we 
must be mindful of the fact that the most senior officials of FMG had only just assumed office 
due to the repercussions of the chaotic Northern Counter-coup, and a majority of FMG foot-
soldiers were still actively acting as though the internal insurgency which started in July 1966, 
was still in effect.  
Various negotiations between representatives of the FMG and the Eastern region were 
held between July and October 1966 in Lagos, Western Region. These meetings deliberated 
extensively upon means with which the FMG could quell the violence perpetrated by Northern 
soldiers against Eastern soldiers and civillians. For example, the numerous calls for the 
repatriation of all Nigerian soldiers to their regions of origin, were formally discussed within 
these meetings. These negotiations served as avenues through which the FMG could effectively 
maintain contact with Ojukwu who was still officially a member of the SMC. As one can recall, 
Ojukwu had refused to personally attend any SMC meetings for fears about his safety. Due to 
Ojukwu's concerns, the SMC agreed to meet on the 4th and 5th of January 1967 in Aburi, Ghana, 
where in-depth negotiations occurred. For the first time since the persecution of Easterners in 
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Nigeria, an SMC meeting with all members present, was held. These negotiations were 
essentially aimed at reconciling the interests of the regional military governors. In other words, 
Gowon and other members of the SMC attempted to pacify Ojukwu, and agree to terms upon 
which the future of Nigeria as a single entity would be based on. At this time, Ojukwu had not 
yet formally declared any interest to secede from Nigeria and Biafra as an MNSA was non-
existent per-se. However, it was apparent that a solution to the fragmentation of Nigeria had to 
be found, and urgently. Ojukwu's explicit condemnation of the FMG, had already made it clear 
that such an MNSA was a real possibility. These negotiations, were a pre-emptive means of 
extinguishing political Objectives which were needed to create the Biafra MNSA. Therefore, 
the Observer assesses that the Nigerian State, utilised negotiations as a means of neutralising 
the Objectives of Biafra MNSA during this period, and this strategy should be categorised as 
Compelling Communication. 
 Another notable strategy employed by the FMG occurred on the 27th of May 1967. 
Gowon announced the demarcation of Nigeria into States, which were carved out of the 
existing regions in an administrative overhaul. This demarcation of Nigeria was most 
interesting in the Eastern region, which was divided into 3 states. As pointed out in the previous 
assessment question, these states firstly abolished Ojukwu's formal position within the SMC, 
as Regional Military Governors would be replaced with State governors under Gowon's 
directive. Secondly, the geographic details of this demarcation showed that even if Ojukwu 
were to remain as governor of one of the states, he would have lost administrative control over 
a majority of the oil producing assets within the Eastern Region as a whole. This strategic move 
employed by the FMG, was meant to isolate Ojukwu from a variety of MNSA vital interests. 
Firstly, Ojukwu under this directive would have lost legitimate control over a majority of 
Nigerian civilians in the Eastern region, equating to a loss of MNSA Personnel. Secondly, 
Ojukwu would have lost access to oil deposits and valuable oil extracting installations, 
signifying a loss of Supply. Thirdly, Ojukwu would have possibly lost all administrative control, 
if he were not appointed Governor of any of the four states at all, equating to a loss of Personnel. 
Finally, new Military Governors who would have been appointed, would most likely have been 
from an infinitesimal portion of senior Eastern Officers, who were allies of Gowon, equating 
to a loss of Objective. This pre-emptive means of compression, was never operationalised. 
However, it did prove a credible strategic threat, which could have annihilated the Biafra 
MNSA. This is assessed by the observer as Compelling Communication. 
Olamide Samuel - 1401236 - University of Buckingham 
 163 
Following Ojukwu’s declaration of Biafra as an independent state, Gowon issued threats of 
Police Actions, if any individuals or organisations were seen to be actively promoting the 
secession of any portion of Nigeria. Gowon’s threats were promptly ignored. Less than a week 
after the threats were issued, Biafra MNSA launched an offensive into the Mid-Western region. 
Although the threat of police action fell on deaf ears, it signified the end of Compelling 
Communication compression, and the beginning of the Nigerian civil war. 
June 1967 - June 1968 
Following Ojukwu’s declaration on the 30th of June 1967, the FMG moved to restrict 
all shipping to and from the Eastern region, which Biafra now claimed.  This blockade, utilised 
soldiers already deployed in various regions of Nigeria, and was remarkably swift. The 
blockade essentially halted all traffic to and from Air-ports, sea-ports, postage and 
telecommunications. As Biafra moved to demonstrate control over Shell-BP installations, by 
demanding royalties from their establishments in the Eastern region, the FMG immediately 
increased the severity of the blockade to include the halting of oil tankers as well. The strategic 
importance of these installations was well understood by both the FMG and Biafra, hence, the 
decision on the FMG’s part to immediately reassert control over them. The observer assesses 
the initial implementation of this blockade, as a strategic means of isolating Core interests of 
Biafra, Personnel from Peripheral interests, Supply. As these strategic means were 
implemented directly against Biafra's supply, it is reasonable to categorise this form of 
compression as Coercive. 
The FMG then proceeded to implement the aforementioned police action in order to 
recapture territories claimed by Biafra. On the 6th of July 1967, the FMG mobilised its 2nd 
division, beginning two years of sustained offensives by the FMG. This offensive saw the 
beginning of an unimaginably brutal, militarised strategy employed by the FMG. This 
sustained offensive initially led to the FMG’s recapture of Bonny island, in the River’s province. 
“This not only tightens the grip on the blockade and gives the Federal Government first footing 
in the Rivers province; it places in their hands the most valuable part of the Shell-BP 
installations, for the storage tanks, the pumping station and the tanker terminal are all at 
Bonny”68 Through the latter end of 1967, till July 1968 the FMG would soon be internationally 
identified as brutal and unforgiving in its strategy. The observer assesses that the FMG 
employed strategy primarily aimed at eliminating all MNSA personnel from Biafra-held 
                                                 
68 Chibuike Ugochukwu Uche, Oil, British Interests And The Nigerian Civil War (2008) 
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territory. In the state of active warfare, all combatant MNSA personnel were to be shot on sight, 
and in many cases non-combatant MNSA faced the same fate. This strategy, falls explicitly on 
the Constraining end of the spectrum. 
In the beginning of 1968, repercussions of the FMG’s blockade had filtered through 
international media. This blockade was responsible for the deaths and starvation of an 
overwhelming number of civilians in Biafran-held territory. This blockade was not only 
affecting peripheral interests of Biafra, but the direct elimination of MNSA personnel, at an 
overwhelming cost to civilians as well. As a result of these repercussions, the Observer assesses 
that FMG blockade strategy was on the Constraining end of compressive strategy. 
July 1968 - August 1969 
Biafra was virtually blocked off by the FMG by June 1969. The Compressive strategy 
of the FMG was successful in recapturing important Biafran strongholds, and by the 20th of 
October 1968, the FMG had managed to capture the towns of Port-Harcourt, Enugu, Calabar 
and Bonny, along with other numerous other villages. It was reported that by January of 1969, 
an estimated 1,000 children living in the Biafran-held territory were starving to death as a direct 
consequence of the FMG's blockade. Representatives of the FMG were unambiguous in stating 
that they viewed starvation as a result of the blockade, as an acceptable weapon of warfare, and 
that the FMG was expected to continue utilising the blockade to its advantage –irrespective of 
collateral damage.69 
The FMG's strategy was criticised by a plethora of organisations, in light of the 
humanitarian crisis which its strategy was responsible for. Non-Governmental Organisations 
and religious organisations sympathised with victims of FMG strategy and subsequently 
intervened. These organisations intervened in the form of relief aid efforts to civilians in 
Biafran-held territory, and against the FMG's directives, began airlifting supplies to these 
territories. In an extension of FMG strategy, these airlifts were seen as allies helping of Biafra, 
and soon became legitimate targets for FMG soldiers. Numerous relief flights were shot down 
by the FMG, irrespective of the organisation they belonged to. A letter from the Joint Church 
Aid organisation to the U.S department of State, is illustrative of the frustration expressed by 
one of such relief organisations: 
                                                 
69 Philip Gourevitch, 'Alms Dealers' (The New Yorker, 2010) 
<https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/10/11/alms-dealers> accessed 21 July 2017. 
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we are very aware of the fact that the FMG considers the Uli airstrip a military 
target. However, its nightly bombings have had little or no effect on the delivery 
of munitions. Instead, our pilots tell us…that the bombs carried by the Nigerian 
‘intruder' are deliberately directed toward the destruction of the relief aircraft. 
Within the past fortnight five of the church planes have been damaged by anti-
personnel bombs dropped by the Nigerian bomber while they were being 
unloaded at Uli. Moreover, as I am sure you know or will be informed, the 
harassment is particularly directed toward the American crews and has been 
the principal reason for the resignation of three American pilots who 
considered the risks too great concerning their family responsibilities at home70 
It is estimated that more than 30 pilots and crew members were killed by FMG attacks 
on about ten different occasions. The FMG was unwilling to suspend its blockade because of 
the presence of humanitarian organisations, many of which the FMG considered to be 
clandestinely supplying arms and ammunition to Biafra, under the auspices of humanitarian 
aid. For the remainder of this period, the FMG continued its explicit, Constraining 
compression strategies. 
September 1969 - January 1970 
From September 1969 to January 1970, the FMG sustained all its strategic approaches, 
increasing the severity of the blockade and the frequency of offensives. Col. Olusegun 
Obasanjo eventually led a final sustained incursion into Biafran territory on the 6th of January 
1970, when FMG troops were able to overrun the entirety of Biafran strongholds. 
Table 11. Independent Variable Measurement: Compression 
 Constraining Coercive Compelling 
August 1966 – 
May 1967   
Negotiations between 
SMC and Ojukwu, Ghana. 
Jan 196771  
August 1966 – 
May 1967   
Negotiations between 
FMG and Eastern Region, 
Lagos. Jul-Oct 196672  
                                                 
70 'Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–5, Part 1, Documents On Sub-Saharan 
Africa, 1969–1972 - Office Of The Historian' (History.state.gov, 2009) 
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve05p1/d47> accessed 10 June 2017. 
71 Held on the 4th and 5th of January 1967 in Aburi, Ghana.  
72 Referring to negotiations including that of the 9th of August 1966, which occurred on the same day as the 
massacre of Easterners in Lagos. 
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Western Region, Jan 
196773 
August 1966 – 
May 1967 
  
Release of Chief 
Awolowo, Lagos. 1966 
August 1966 – 
May 1967 
  
FMG Division of Eastern 
Region, May 196774 
August 1966 – 
May 1967 
  
FMG threat of ‘Police 
Action’ May 196775 


















                                                 
73 A Follow-Up meeting wherein the finer points of the Aburi conference were discussed in detail by the solicitors 
general of the Regions.  
74 The FMG divided the entire country into twelve states. In the Eastern region, this division was interpreted by 
Ojukwu to be designed to forestall secession. The three states of the Eastern region 'mischievously' emphasised 
underlying tribal tensions between minority tribes in the Region. Especially the long-standing Calabar-Ogoja-
Rivers animosity.    
75 The delay between the issue of the threat of police action and the action itself, suggests that this threat served 
an independent purpose to the operationalisation of police action. It was a further means through which Gowon 
could dissuade secessionists from operationalising their agendas. As one would recall, one of the resolutions of 
the Aburi conference, was that the FMG would not attempt to solve its 'problems' with force. Ojukwu perhaps 
thought that by persuading the FMG to denounce the use of force at the conference, subsequent secessionist 
movements would be exempt from the wrath of the FMG military.  
76 The operationalisation of the police action, was characterised by military offensives by the FMG, to regain 
territories held by the Biafra MNSA.  
77 The intensification of the brutality of the FMG military, signified the willingness of the FMG to utilise any 
strategy which it believed to be efficient in achieving its objectives, regardless of public perceptions about these 
means.  
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Biafra, Jan 197081 
  
 
 Judging by instances of compression observed within the Secession case study, one can 
deduce that the Nigerian State, had evolved to become Constraining in its compression strategy 
against MNSAs. What is also evident from the data collected, is the more sudden intensification 
of compression strategy through the years. Initially, the Nigerian State sought to utilise more 
diplomatic, as well as tactical means (administrative reform), at delegitimising the positions of 
MNSA leaders, utilising strategy that could be viewed as equally affecting all regions of the 
country, to subliminally target Ojukwu's formal position of authority. However, the amount of 
popular support which Biafra MNSA received, especially from Easterners meant that the FMG 
viewed constraining compressive strategy as the most efficient means of neutralising Biafra 
MNSA. These successes of the Nigerian State, were characterised by significant blood-shed 
                                                 
78 Murtala Mohammed, heading the 2 division, personally oversaw the ethnic cleansing of the Mid-Western region. 
79  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. 
Secret. Nixon checked and initialled "Authorize NSSM." An adjacent note states, "NSSM 11 issued 1/28/69, 
distributed 1/29/69 
80 Amid pressure from international NGOs the FMG remained resilient in its operationalisation of a total blockade 
to suffocate Biafra 
81 From September 1969 to January 1970, the FMG sustained all its strategic approaches, increasing the severity 
of the blockade and the frequency of offensives. Col. Olusegun Obasanjo eventually led a final sustained incursion 
into Biafran territory on the 6th of January 1970, when FMG troops were able to overrun the entirety of Biafran 
strongholds. 
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and violent repression of citizens within Nigerian territory. The implications of this episode in 
Nigeria's history, continues to influence Nigerian politics and governance today.  
6.9 THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIC PERSONALITY OF NIGERIA DURING THE “SECESSION 
PERIOD” 
Based on State behaviour observed during this case study, it is reasonable for an observer 
to characterise Nigeria’s National Security Strategic Personality, as Introverted in its outlook, 
Interest-Centric in its provision, and Constraining in its severity. 
Table 12. Dependent Variable Measurement: Compression 
Orientation Inflationary Containment Compression 
Introverted * People-Centric  Constraining * 
Extroverted  Interest-Centric * Coercive  
6.10 CONCLUSION 
Much like the previous chapter, the author set out to perform an in-depth empirical 
validation exercise of the NSSP theory, through the utilisation of the case-study methods of 
analysis, which investigated the interactions between the Nigerian state, and its perceived 
Malicious Non-State Actors, which were present from 1967-1970. The author was able to 
reasonably identify and characterise the National Security Strategic Personality of the Nigerian 
State, as Introverted, Interest-Centric and Constraining. Drawing from this conclusion, the 
following dynamics were granted deeper insight. At the start of the secession case study, the 
Nigerian military had already been increasingly identified by the civilian populace and political 
elite, as an independent political actor, capable of influencing the formation and execution of 
Nigeria’s national interests. As a result of this new social identity, the Nigerian military acted 
in accordance with accompanying expectations of such an actor. However, upon attaining 
complete control over the Nigerian State, the tribal, hierarchical and ethical dynamics within 
Military as an institution, had direct ramifications upon the events that occurred in the Nigerian 
state. The perceptions (prior to the military takeover of government) that the Nigerian military 
was somehow distanced from the tribal and hierarchical dynamics of the Nigerian state, were 
erroneous. What was observed instead, was that the tribal and hierarchical dynamics within the 
Olamide Samuel - 1401236 - University of Buckingham 
 169 
Nigerian military, were almost identical to those dynamics within the civilian government. The 
military was not truly independent of tribalism, nepotism and corruption, and these were to be 
exposed during the recurrent conflicts of interests within the upper echelons the military, the 
resulted in repeated coups. Perhaps, these aforementioned dynamics would have only 
influenced the leadership of the military, had the military not been in control of the Nigerian 
state. The consequent marginalisation of Easterners, and their designation as an MNSA by the 
Military-run government, were merely symptoms of pre-existing tensions in the military. The 
consequent direction, and operationalisation of Nigerian NSSP was principally determined by 
these interests. In addition, the essentially brutal campaigns by the Military-run Nigerian state, 
against Easterners, signified a crystallisation of brute physical force, as an acceptable form of 
social behaviour, by the Nigerian military. It suffices to assume, that such a brutal campaign 
against Easterners might not have been carried out by other ruling institutions such as the NPC, 
who had not been explicitly associated with brute military force as an acceptable form of social 
behaviour. In the next chapter, the author would highlight the lasting effects of identities and 
norms constructed during the formation and secession periods, on the Nigerian state from 1970 
to 1999. 
In addition to the aforementioned insights, the following methodological observations 
were also made; 
Recalling the challenges which the author faced with regards to data collection in the 
Formation case study, the same could be said about the Secession case study. In attempting to 
observe all instances of observable state behaviour during this period, the author realised that 
secondary sources of data would be required to augment the scarcity of primary data. However, 
unlike the Formation case study, the author was able to access much more information, as a 
result of international media coverage and independent accounts of the civil war.  This enabled 
the author to offer a comprehensive account of events that occurred during the secession period. 
The availability of data spanning this period, also enabled the author to observe if the NSSP 
theory, would remain effective even with the inclusion of significantly larger instances of 
observable state behaviour. The next chapter surveys the influence of Nigerian NSSP from the 
Formation and Secession periods, on Nigeria from 1970-1999. Within this survey, the author 
tracks the evolution of the Nigerian state, with specific focus on its leadership structure, as well 
as its NSSP.   
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7 CHAPTER SEVEN: LASTING EFFECTS OF FORMATION AND SECESSION ON 
THE NIGERIAN STATE, FROM 1970 TO 1999 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Insights gained from the Formation and Secession case studies played a crucial role in the 
author's analysis of the Nigerian State from 1970-1999 in this chapter. This chapter highlights 
the evolution of the Nigerian State's leadership structure, the social construction of the Nigerian 
military as a central actor in Nigerian politics, the normalisation of compressive strategy, and 
the influence of popular legitimacy on the State, from 1970 to 1999. In light of Nigeria’s NSSP 
as understood from the preceding case studies within this period, this chapter, then surveys 
Nigerian NSSP from the end of the Nigerian civil war, through to the fourth republic, citing 
notable incidents throughout Nigeria's history which indicate periods of constancy and change 
in Nigerian NSSP.  
7.2 NIGERIA FROM 1970-1979 
7.2.1.1.1 Yakubu Gowon 
With the Biafran MNSA compressed in 1970, Nigeria was able to refocus on the 
development of the country in other respects. Under Gowon's leadership, it was believed that 
Nigeria finally had the chance to achieve its potential as an African super-power. Gowon's 
victory over the Biafrans, ushered in a period wherein National unity was at unprecedented 
levels, and popular opinion concerning Nigeria's strategic outlook was optimistic.1 This new 
phase, enabled the promulgation of a centralised power structure, which was acceptable to a 
majority of Nigerians. By this time Gowon who had been in power for four years, was enjoying 
unprecedented support from the people. The Supreme Military Council "was…in fact, little 
more than a ratifiactory organ" 2  His magnanimous no-victor, no-vanquished policy was 
instrumental in regaining the support of the Easterners, whom he had brutalised during the 
war.3 This policy was of phenomenal utility to Gowon, who needed to be perceived as an 
acceptable and sympathetic leader, embodying the identity of the Nigerian military as a 
legitimate and capable determinant of Nigeria’s national interests, in order to preserve such a 
                                                 
1 Sunday Times, ‘UK Papers Eat Their Words’ (1970) 
2 Billy Dudley, Instability and Political Crisis in Nigeria (Ibadan university press 1973) p.128 
3 Daily Times, ‘Lets Put The Past Crisis Behind Us’ (1970)  
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centralised government. Nigeria genuinely had a chance to reverse the mistakes of its 
immediate past and pursue a new course. 
Gowon's new image also depended on his ability to remain quite pro-active over the next 
few years of his regime. He actively ensured that there was no retaliation against Easterners for 
their participation in the war. He also provided funds for Eastern rehabilitation, which were 
entrusted to Chief Obafemi Awolowo (a previous MNSA leader, whom he had released from 
prison before the war). In the same vein, He went further to announce that Nigeria would soon 
be returned to civilian rule in 1976. Another important development credited to Gowon, was 
the creation of the Nigerian National Youth Service Corps (NYSC). An institution which was 
created to facilitate the ideology of National unity in the younger generation.4 The NYSC 
scheme, was targeted at recent graduates of Nigerian universities, whom were subjected to a 
year-long compulsory service in the country. This scheme was designed in a way that, young 
university graduates had to undertake their national service in a region other than that of their 
origin, to facilitate the integration of Nigerians from various tribes. This is an institution which 
still exists today. 
Gowon facilitated Nigeria's timely membership of the Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1971, in order to acclimatise the country with the global oil 
markets.5 In a way, this was to ensure that Nigeria's oil production would be guaranteed a share 
in the world's oil markets. In his string of unprecedented moves, he also created the very first 
indigenous Nigerian currency, called the Naira. This was in an attempt to ensure that the 
Nigerian economy had developed its own identity and independence, whilst severing all 
remaining dependent ties with the British economy in particular, and colonial powers in 
general. Following the indigenisation of the Nigerian currency, the prompt indigenisation of 
the economy at large was his next step. He declared the Enterprises Decree of 1972, which saw 
the country reduce the shares of foreign companies in the economy to acceptable minimums. 
It must be noted that the Nigerian economy was predominantly occupied by foreign companies 
at the time, with British companies owning a lion’s-share of the oil economy. In addition, 
several American, Syrian, Lebanese and Indian companies dominated Nigeria's markets and 
manufacturing industry, with about 65% of the economy belonging to these foreign interests. 
Of course, this foreign dominance of the Nigerian economy was the subject of widespread 
                                                 
4 'NYSC - About Scheme' (Nysc.gov.ng, 2017) <http://www.nysc.gov.ng/aboutscheme.html> accessed 24 April 
2017. 
5 'OPEC : Nigeria' (Opec.org) <http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/167.htm> accessed 24 April 2017. 
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resentment of Foreign Direct Investment in the country. This Enterprise decree essentially 
forced foreign companies to sell a majority of their shares to Nigerians, and Section 12 of this 
decree, subsequently limited foreign equity participation to 60%.6 
Following Nigeria's membership of OPEC, the Yom Kippur war was started by Syria and 
Egypt. This war was influential in destabilising global oil markets, as Western support for Israel 
was met with negative reception from Arab countries. The Arab oil-producing states imposed 
an embargo on oil exports, subsequently causing global scarcity of oil. Seventy percent of oil 
exports had been removed from the global economy. Nigeria was quick to capitalise on this 
scarcity, promptly increasing productivity to meet world demands. This scarcity also increased 
the price of oil by almost 400%, resulting in incredible profits for Nigeria. 7 
The impression that Nigeria was still essentially under a military dictatorship, became 
more apparent, as the unprecedented profits that Nigeria was amassing during the oil boom, 
did come with negative implications for the leadership structure. Gowon's government 
demonstrated that it was capable of just as much corruption as the civilian government which 
Aguyi-Ironsi deposed.8 The mismanagement of national income was made possible when the 
Nigerian State announced a massive N2,625b (that’s 2.6 Trillion Naira) annual budget. These 
expenditures facilitated the squander of oil revenues by senior military officials, and elite 
politicians. For the average Nigerian, the benefits of such a massive budget only had minimal 
effect, as the proportion squandered by the Nigerian elite, meant that national projects and 
schemes were left underfunded. In addition, the foreign companies that were nationalised, were 
promptly swept up my members of the political and military elite, who utilised the proceeds 
from the sale of oil to buy the majority of shares in foreign companies operating in Nigeria.9  
Interestingly, the wealth of several elite Nigerian families today can be traced back to the 
indigenisation decree of 1973, which benefitted them. The Easterners, specifically Igbo 
tribesmen, were unable to participate in this windfall of profits however. As one would recall, 
Chief Awolowo was the finance minister, and in charge of funds earmarked for Eastern 
rehabilitation. Awolowo utilised his position as finance minister for the enrichment of himself 
and his peers, to the disadvantage of Easterners. The Easterners after the civil war, were unable 
to reclaim their wealth which was left behind in Nigerian banks prior to their exit from Nigeria, 
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and Awolowo was instrumental in elongating investigations into the repatriation of Eastern 
wealth. These delays resulted in a majority of Easterners losing their wealth and forced them 
to start from scratch. Awolowo essentially forced Easterners to forfeit all this wealth, which 
was also redistributed to his Northern and Western comrades.10 
Also at this time, the Nigerian State was observed to have identified an Extremist MNSA, 
operating within Nigerian territory. Maitatsine. By 1973, a religious extremist popularly known 
as Marwa, had been the subject of low-level policing in the Northern region, owing to his 
leadership of a religious extremist group known as Maitatsine. Maitatsine was essentially an 
Islamic extremist group, which was most notable for its violent intimidation of Nigerian 
citizens in the Northern Nigerian city of Kano. During previous administrations, Marwa had 
repeatedly been arrested, detained and deported by the NPC-led regime.11 However, Marwa's 
activities were not observed to be prioritised in a manner which was anywhere as significant 
as AG and UMBC prioritisation. Marwa only served numerous, short prison sentences for his 
activities. Marwa and his followers were simply not viewed as a threat requiring significant 
attention, and this led to his recurrent release from police custody in 1962 and 1966.12 Gowon's 
regime, for the first time in 1973, pursued Maitastine MNSA after it had been preoccupied with 
Biafra MNSA from 1967-1970, and Marwa was arrested and detained in 1973, re-released, and 
then detained in 1975. However, Maitastine activities should have received far more attention 
from the FMG, as it gained popularity within the Northern region, and many civilians were 
aware of its notoriety.13 It is very probable, that Maitastine activities between 1975 and 1980, 
were left unchecked, as the FMG was then preoccupied with the looming instability within the 
SMC, which led to the next military coup.  
On the 1st of October 1974, Gowon announced in his Independence Day speech, that he 
had reneged on his promise to return Nigeria to civilian rule in 1976. He instead promised a 
return of Nigeria to civilian rule in 1979, thereby elongating his tenure as Supreme commander. 
This decision was met with negative reactions, as it was believed that most probably, Gowon 
would postpone the handover to civilian leadership again after 1979. It only took three months 
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for Gowon's decision to negatively impact his regime. He was subsequently overthrown in a 
bloodless coup on the 29th of January 1975, by Murtala Mohammed, whilst he was attending 
an African Union meeting. 
Like Aguyi-Ironsi, Gowon's overthrow was effected by his head of personal security, (who 
was also commander of the Brigade of Guards) Col. Joseph Garba. "A bloodless coup which 
overthrew the nine-year-old government of gen Yakubu Gowon took place yesterday" In a 
newspaper article published by the Daily Times on the 30th of January 1975, the details of the 
coup gradually sifted through to the Nigerian public: “in a dawn announcement over the 
network of radio Nigeria, the commander of the brigade of guards, col. Joseph Garba, 
announced that gen Yakubu Gowon had been removed as head of state and commander in chief 
of the Armed forces”14. This coup signified the end of a 9-year military dictatorship by Gowon, 
and ushered in a new phase of military leadership under Murtala Mohammed. A dusk to dawn 
curfew was imposed on the entire country by Murtala to ensure that there were no reprisal 
attacks by supporters of Gowon. Gowon, away at the African Union summit, declined to make 
any comments about the development and subsequently lived in exile in the United Kingdom. 
7.2.1.1.2 Murtala Mohammed 
This coup which ousted Gowon, was unique in the fact that it was an entirely bloodless 
coup, an unprecedented development in Nigeria's history of coups. The coup was carried out 
by the same man who was instrumental in the overthrow of Aguyi-Ironsi, and was the ruthless 
commander of 2nd division during the civil war -Murtala Mohammed.  
Gowon's overthrow was also the first time in Nigeria's history, whereby the military 
government was overthrown by another senior officer. Murtala by virtue of this, set a precedent 
which would be repeated by other senior military officers. In order to ensure that there was not 
a self-perpetuating military government in power, Murtala was obliged to share power with 
another Northerner, and Westerner. These two officers were Brigadiers Olusegun Obasanjo 
(the commander who led the final push into Biafran-held territories in the civil war), and 
Theophilus Danjuma (another individual who was influential in the first military coup). This 
coup was instrumental in perpetuating the Northern-Western domination of the country, with 
the Northerners wielding the most political power, and the Westerners acting as their 
subordinates. In a statement wherein Murtala addressed the nation after his takeover, he said: 
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Fellow Nigerians, events of the past few years have indicated that despite our 
great human and material resources, the government has not been able to fulfil 
the legitimate expectations of our people. Nigeria has been left to drift. This 
situation if not arrested, would inevitably have resulted in chaos and even 
bloodshed. In the endeavour to build a strong united and virile nation, 
Nigerians have shed much blood. The thought of further bloodshed for whatever 
reasons, must I'm sure be revolting to our people.15 
Murtala subsequently enforced the forceful retirement of all senior military officials, 
and elite politicians from political power. Forceful retirement and a purge of all senior 
politicians, was also unprecedented. Because of this cleansing, his coup was viewed by 
Nigerians as a revolution of the masses, opposed to the power structure which Nigeria had 
become accustomed to from 1960-1975. There was only one individual from Gowon's supreme 
military council who was allowed to continue in this capacity, and that was Brigadier I.D. 
Bissala. Bissala who was the Commander of the Nigerian Defence Academy, would 
subsequently demonstrate why this was a fatal mistake on Murtala's part. Murtala also enforced 
investigations into all senior politicians he had deposed; perusing through their financial 
transactions and ethical conduct while they were serving under Gowon. He aimed to halt the 
mismanagement of the proceeds from Nigeria's oil-boom, and redirect these profits to the 
average citizen. In addition, he declared that the military abstain from all forms of ostentatious 
behaviour, and civilian suppression. As a result of all Murtala's declarations, he enjoyed the 
popular support of an overwhelming number of Nigerians. It is interesting to note that 
Nigerians viewed him so positively, considering how instrumental he was to the ethnic 
cleansing of Easterners during the civil war. Murtala frequently professed that all actions taken 
by his government were guided by a determination to alleviate the sufferings of average 
Nigerians: 
…By the timely intervention of the armed forces, the people of Nigeria, have 
another opportunity to start again in the task of rebuilding the nation…16 
 In a recently declassified memo of the United States, State department, Murtala was 
viewed by the American government as follows:  
The leader of the coup against General Yakubu Gowon is an erratic, 
vainglorious, impetuous, corrupt, vindictive, intelligent, articulate, daring 
Hausa. Brigadier Murtala Mohammed was a prime force in the Nigerian coup 
of July 1966, which brought Gowon to power, and is one of the two principal 
plotters against Gowon for the past two years. He commanded a division during 
the Nigerian civil war, and was involved in the only documented cases of 
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genocide, won one important battle, and thereafter coasted upwards of two 
years until Gowon finally removed him from command and placed him in 
charge of Army signals, a position which he held until last month, though he 
combined his military role with the civilian position of commissioner (minister) 
of communications from July 1973, until the coup.17 
7.2.1.1.3 Olusegun Obasanjo 
Whether Murtala's declarations of overwhelming reform were truth, or mere fiction 
designed at garnering popular support, would remain unknown, because Murtala's leadership 
of the country was cut short by an abortive coup, which occurred on the 13th of February 1976 
-barely a year after he took over from Gowon. This day marked the fourth military coup in 
Nigeria. Murtala was assassinated on his way to work by shooters, who riddled his car with 
bullets whilst he was in traffic, without his security detail. The plotters also had plans to 
assassinate Obasanjo and Danjuma, but were unsuccessful. Obasanjo and Danjuma, promptly 
organised reprisal attacks led by Col. Babangida, to ensure that the coup plotters were tracked 
down.  
In the meantime, a replacement was required after Murtala's death. Northern politicians 
and officers insisted that he be replaced by a Northerner, to maintain Northern dominance. 
Murtala's position was offered to Danjuma, but for some reason, he refused this offer and 
instead recommended that Obasanjo be appointed as a replacement. Obasanjo was installed as 
Supreme commander. To ensure Northern consolidation of power, another Northerner was 
required to share power with Obasanjo and Danjuma. As a result, Lt. Col. Yar'adua was 
promoted to become the third member of the trio. The coup plotters were tracked down by Col. 
Babangida, and the FMG published information confirming the events which led to the coup.  
The daily Times reported that: “The Federal Government has launched full-scale 
probes into last Friday’s abortive coup. An official statement last night said a six-man military 
board of inquiry had been set up and had begun work”18 The main assailant, who led the 
abortive coup, was identified as Lt. Col Dimka, a Northerner. “Lieutenant colonel B.S Dimka 
the army officer who led last Friday’s abortive coup in which general Murtala Mohammed was 
killed, is now on the run”19 Subsequent statements released by the press narrated how Dimka 
was able to assassinate Murtala: “The fugitive B.S Dimka is related to General Gowon by 
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marriage. The Federal Government said yesterday that Kwara state police commissioner S.K. 
Dimka and Lt. Col. B.S Dimka are related and that General Gowon's elder sister is the wife of 
the police commissioner…the government said that for all practical purposes, the intention of 
Lt. Col. Dimka was to restore General Gowon and he ousted state governors to power...it 
however, gave the assurance that the futile coup had neither religious nor ethnic motivation”20 
These news reports insinuated that General Gowon who was living in exile in the United 
Kingdom, was instrumental in orchestrating the coup, calling on loyal members of his deposed 
government to eliminate the new government. The press statements suggested that Gowon had 
given direct orders to Lt. Col. Dimka, whilst Dimka was on a foreign assignment: 
The leader of the abortive coup, Lt. Col Dimka had been in touch with Gen. 
Gowon for some time before last Friday’s attempted coup, the Federal 
Government said in Lagos yesterday21 
Yar'adua also narrated the coup plots which they had uncovered from their 
investigation, suggesting that there was more than one group of coup plotters, with the aim of 
assassinating Murtala and others: 
The coup was originally conceived as a major's plot in Kaduna, during a 
conversion exercise which brought a number of these plotters together. An inner 
circle of three, started these discussions. Their main grievances at the time 
centred around the conversion exercise itself…this group headed by 
Major…was extended to include other similar disgruntled elements. 
Simultaneously, Bissala on his own started a similar group also mainly 
composed of disgruntled elements of the ranks of Colonels and Lieutenant 
Colonels. The two groups soon got to know of their mutual existence. It was 
around this time that Dimka travelled to Madrid on official duties, he was then 
invited to spend a few days in London on his way back... for further discussions. 
While there Dimka met and held discussions with General Gowon who told him 
that everything was ready and he Dimka would be fully briefed by Bissala on 
his return to Nigeria22 
Although Yar’Adua had narrated the FMG’s version of events which led to the abortive 
coup, the authenticity of Yar’Adua’s claims are questionable. Nevertheless, Nigerian citizens 
were shocked at Gowon's involvement in the bloody coup. In the same vein Brig. Bisalla had 
been the only person allowed to stay in Murtala's government, from Gowon's government. The 
only link to Gowon's government turned out to be all that was needed for Murtala's downfall. 
Bisalla however, cited the perceived neglect of his office as Defence Minister, which created 
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the impression that there was no need for his appointment in the SMC, thus his reason for 
involvement in the failed coup.23  
The new SMC leaders were intent on making a ruthless example of the coup plotters, 
to discourage any further attempts by others to emulate their actions. As an example, the coup 
plotters were subsequently executed by firing squad in public view. Obasanjo, then went on to 
ensure that Murtala's leadership agenda was fulfilled, with the inclusion of handing over 
government to civilian leadership in 1979.  
7.2.1.2 1979-1989 
7.2.1.2.1 Shehu Shagari 
On the 1st of October 1979, Alhaji Shehu Shagari was sworn in as Nigeria's president, 
and Obasanjo returned the military to the barracks. In line with Nigeria's existing power 
structure, Shagari was a Northerner. This handover by Obasanjo to Shagari, marked the 
beginning of what we consider to be the Second Nigerian Republic. As usual, the 
overwhelming majority of Nigerians welcomed this development and the mood was optimistic 
once again, as was evidenced by the numerous festivities which were held to mark Shagari’s 
victory. Shagari's government however, proved to be as corrupt as its predecessors, and 
political violence, protests and allegations of government corruption was the norm during this 
period. One notable development in Nigeria's power structure, was the fact that Arc. Alex 
Ekwueme, an Easterner was elected as Vice-President. This signified the very first time in more 
than a decade, that an Easterner occupied such an executive post in the country, and represented 
what seemed to be a Northern-Eastern partnership.  
However, in addition to government corruption and the mismanagement of national 
income, this civilian government was just as brutal and repressive as the military dictatorships 
prior to it. Individuals who were critical of the government, were promptly silenced by the 
Nigerian police force, on the orders of the President. This suppression went as far as censoring 
musicians who were critical of the government in song. 24 One of such notable musicians who 
were critical of the government was Fela Anikulapo Kuti. Nigerians were already accustomed 
to this suppression, however, Fela was remarkably resilient to government persecution. In one 
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of his interviews, Fela brought attention to the physical nature of government brutality, after 
he was released from police detention.25 Fela was quoted as saying: 
One thing I want to assure them, if they think I'm gonna change or compromise 
in my attitude in my way of life or in my expression or in my goal towards 
politics, they're making me stronger...I'm surprised I'm so well after the beating 
I got…you want to see the beating, I must show you...they can't kill me26  
Fela's plight was not unique to him, however, because of his considerable popularity, Nigerians 
soon became aware of the repercussions of speaking against the Nigerian State.  
At the same time, global oil prices were drastically sliding as a result of an oil glut. 
Nigeria suffered as a result of this slump in oil prices, and soon entered an economic recession. 
This economic recession was a driver for political violence as daily life became more difficult 
for the already struggling average Nigerian. Notwithstanding, Nigerian political and military 
elite continued to live lives of unimaginable luxury, in the face of recession. The distribution 
of wealth between rich and poor within the country was widening significantly, and many 
Nigerians were aware of this inequality.  
Meanwhile, in the Northern Region, religious fundamentalism went unchecked. The 
Maitatsine MNSA had enjoyed 5 years of virtually uninterrupted operation. This MNSA was 
able to expand from a core followership of under 2,000 personnel in 1975, to almost 12,000 in 
1980. Such an alarming expansion of an MNSA went mostly undetected, as the FMG was 
preoccupied with house-keeping, coup foiling and dissent within the SMC. Maitastine 
personnel were blatantly in control of swathes of territory within the city of Kano, and residents 
of that city were routinely subjected to violent acts carried out by the MNSA.27 By the time 
Shagari's government would enforce an order to ban all public processions by Maitastine on 
the 18th of December 1980, it was perhaps too little, too late.28 Policemen who were sent to 
enforce the order were significantly outmanned and outgunned.29 A few of the Police officers 
lost their lives in the confrontation, and Maitatsine MNSA subsequently utilised police 
equipment and weapons to wreak havoc in Kano. The siege of Fagge mosque in Kano which 
lasted from the 18th of December, to the 30th of December 1980, served as an example of just 
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how ruthless and violent this sect was.30 Only after this episode of violence, was the Nigerian 
Army called upon by the government to compress Maitatsine. The Army subsequently moved 
in quell the violence, with brute military force. Marwa, during this episode, was fatally injured 
from gunshot wounds which he sustained from the confrontation with the Army. 
In 1983, a development quite similar to the persecution of Easterners in 1966, began to 
filter through international media. Nigerians were quick to blame the influx of foreign migrant 
labour as the reason for the persistent economic recession. During the oil boom, Nigeria 
witnessed the influx of millions of Africans, specifically from its neighbouring country of 
Ghana. These Ghanaians like other Africans, were attracted to the significant wealth created 
by Nigeria during the boom. What was unimaginable, was the violent backlash these 
immigrants would soon face during the recession. Nigerians became infuriated by the presence 
of Ghanaians living within the country, and blamed them for 'taking all our jobs'. This rhetoric 
was also supported by the Nigerian government, which promptly ordered the deportation of 
about 900,000 undocumented Ghanaians within the country.31 
In what can only be described as a flawed political move by Shagari's government, 
almost a thousand Maitatsine prisoners were released along with other political prisoners on 
Nigeria's Independence Day celebrations of 1982. It remains unclear why these prisoners were 
released. Almost immediately, Maitatsine MNSA resumed its attacks on civilians, in the city 
of Maiduguri and Kaduna, with a total death-toll ranging from at least 3,700 people to 4,000.32 
However, the expulsion of Ghanaians seemed to be granted priority, and soon took a 
xenophobic turn. In addition to illegal migrants in Nigeria, even legal migrants were subject to 
harassment and abuse by members of the public. Some of these Ghanaians were beaten up by 
civilians as well as officers of the Nigerian Police Force, if they could not present their 
immigration documents upon request. In total an overwhelming 1.7 million Africans fled from 
Nigeria so as to avoid brutality at the hands of Nigerians.  
The internal situation in Nigeria was rapidly deteriorating, due to the economy showing 
little signs of recovering from the recession. To the Northerners, Maitatsine attacks were left 
uncontrolled by the government, which only intervened with periodic reprisal attacks against 
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the sect. In 1983, another presidential election was held following the expiration of Shagari's 
tenure. Shagari had become a very unpopular leader, and the prospects of him winning the 
1983 elections were thin. However, when the results were announced that Shagari had won the 
elections with an overwhelming victory, it was difficult to ignore the political violence, voter 
intimidation and ballot -box stuffing that influenced the election results. Nigerians who refused 
to accept the election results, promptly turned to violence and numerous riots engulfed the 
country. Despite the opposition to his government, Shagari chose to stay in power. On the 1st 
of October 1983, Shagari was sworn in for his second term in office.  
This tenure did not last very long. On the 31st of December 1983, Nigeria witnessed its 
fifth military coup. The leader of this coup, was Major-General Muhammadu Buhari, a military 
officer who had been involved in all military coups since 1966 with the exception of the 4th 
abortive coup. Buhari was also a Northerner. In his first address to the Nation, Buhari had this 
to say: 
Indiscipline, corruption, squandermania, misuse and abuse of public offices for 
self or group aggrandisement, which had assumed debilitating proportions in 
the last few years will be dealt with ruthlessly no matter who ever may have 
been involved33  
He further went on to state that: 
The private sector has also its share of crimes against the Nigerian economy. 
Especially in the area of distribution of basic commodities. Reports reaching us 
confirm large-scale hoarding of commodities. I have already warned that 
hoarding will not be tolerated. Gentlemen, I must point out that your assignment 
as military governors is a service posting. You are therefore subject to 
redeployment at any time...34 
7.2.1.2.2 Muhammadu Buhari 
Buhari's coup, was similar to Murtala's coup in two respects. Firstly, Buhari forced the 
resignation of Shagari, as Murtala did to Gowon. Secondly, Buhari and Murtala both 
orchestrated and directly benefitted from the coup, as opposed to the Jan 1966 and Jul 1966 
coups, where middle-ranking officers orchestrated coups which subsequently benefitted higher 
ranking officers; thereby fuelling the belief that, firstly, if one aspired to overthrow government 
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in Nigeria, one had to be part of the Military elite. Secondly, it became obvious that the leader 
who was being deposed did not necessarily have to be killed -just forced to resign. 
Buhari was regarded as an uncompromising and ruthless military officer, who had 
stayed on the side-lines in many of the coups prior to his takeover. He was the first Military 
leader of the country, to declare a war against an idea. He called it 'the War Against 
Indiscipline'. Buhari was seconded by his deputy leader, Major-General Tunde Idiagbon (a 
Westerner), who was also notoriously popular for his heavy handed approach to issues. 
Idiagbon, formally declared a war against indiscipline, and outlined the government's plan of 
action in this war:  
I want you to bear in mind, the need to emphasise self-discipline, and leadership 
by good example. Begin my drawing public attention, to little but 
important…manifestations of indiscipline, such as ruching into buses, driving 
on the wrong side of the road…littering…cheating, taking undue advantage of 
scarcity to inflate prices for quick monetary gains, constituting ourselves into 
public nuisances, working without commitment and devoting little or no time to 
the upbringing of our children. Up till this time there has been no formal 
declaration of war against indiscipline. It is my pleasure therefore to declare 
today, the launching day for the war against indiscipline35 
Buhari's Implementation of this campaign was brutal. Considering the numerous issues 
which the government considered to be within its jurisdiction, such as the use of militarised 
means to fight an economic crisis and intrude on personal affairs of Nigerians, this was a bizarre 
development -even for a country where the bizarre had become the norm. One could argue that 
this turn of events, echo Mbembe’s ideas regarding the banality of power in post-colonies.36 
Government was very unpopular amongst Nigerians who had become accustomed to everyday 
manifestations of corruption and disorder.37 Numerous individuals were arrested without trial, 
and critics were brutalised. In many instances politicians were detained without trial, and the 
prospects of them having their day in court, simply did not exist.  
In March 1984, Maitatsine MNSA still proved to be a lethal organisation, involved in 
the massacre of upwards of 600 people, in the town of Yola.38 Buhari's government sent in the 
Nigerian Army to quell the violence, and eliminate any Maitatsine MNSA on sight.39 Buhari's 
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hard-handed military response, was eventually effective at permanently dismantling Maitatsine 
MNSA subsequently in 1985. 
On the 17th of April 1984, Buhari passed decree no. 4, which was the ‘public officer’s 
protection against false accusation decree'.40 This decree made it virtually impossible to be 
openly critical of the government's policies. In many cases, anyone who spoke negatively about 
the government, was arrested and detained by virtue of this decree. The Buhari government 
went as far as attempting to kidnap an individual from the United Kingdom, to bring him back 
to Nigeria to face corruption charges. Umaru Dikko was allegedly wanted for the theft of over 
1 billion dollars from the Nigerian government.  For a government that claimed to be fighting 
corruption, Umaru Dikko’s kidnap attempt, signified a blatant disrespect for international laws 
and conventions. The kidnap attempt was outsourced to Israeli mercenaries, who were paid to 
snatch Dikko, inject him with sedatives, haul him to London Stanstead airport, and stuff him 
into diplomatic cargo on a Nigerian Airways flight bound for Lagos.41 This kidnap attempt was 
discovered by UK officials, who claimed that they heard noises from inside the diplomatic 
cargo which was not adequately labelled as such. Cmdr. William Hucklesby, then Head of 
Scotland yard spoke on the issue in an interview to British press. After only 20 months in 
power, the Buhari government was toppled in a palace coup. 
7.2.1.2.3 Ibrahim Babangida 
This was Nigeria's 6th military coup. Members of the SMC were concerned about the 
nature of the repressive government, and admittedly, Buhari was not admired for his 
unsophisticated style of leadership. The main coup plotter was General Ibrahim Babangida (the 
Colonel who was in charge of investigating the perpetrators of the abortive coup). In August 
of 1985, Babangida (a Northerner) had managed to force Buhari and Idiagbon to resign, 
following the new style of coups which Nigeria had become accustomed to. Babangida became 
the Head of State. He renamed the Supreme Military Council, to the Armed Forces Ruling 
Council of Nigeria. This change of name was required as Babangida broke all existing protocol 
in his configuration of the council. He essentially created a cartel-style government, wherein 
he was only surrounded by loyalists, in an attempt to ensure that he was not ousted by another 
coup, as Gowon and Buhari had been ousted by insiders within the SMC.  
                                                 
40 'Social Media Bill: APC Bringing Back Buhari’S Decree 4 Of 1984 - Ekiti Attorney-General' (Vanguard News, 
2015) <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/12/social-media-bill-apc-bringing-back-decree-4-of-1984-ekiti-
attorney-general/> accessed 24 October 2017. 
41 Alex Last, ‘The Foiled Kidnap Plot (BBC News 2012)’ <www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-20211380> 
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In his opening statement to the country, Babangida announced his agenda, which was 
in no way unique to all agendas announced by his predecessors, except for the fact that he 
promised to ensure the freedom of the press; a promise which, in hindsight, was never kept:  
I am pleased to take this opportunity, to declare once again therefore, that this 
administration attaches the greatest importance to constructive and helpful 
criticisms as well as the freedom of the press. And to declare further that the 
admin also attaches the greatest importance of fundamental human rights42 
7.2.1.3 1989-1999 
7.2.1.3.1 Ibrahim Babangida 
This string of successive coups, had become the norm in the Nigerian State. Ever since 
the first military coup, Nigerian officers were well aware of the requirements to obtain the title 
of Supreme Commander or Head of State. All that was required was for one to be a member of 
the Nigerian Military, specifically the Army, and orchestrate the assassination of, or force the 
resignation of the current military leader -usually at gunpoint. The idea of discipline within the 
country was merely the rationale to explain the brutalisation of Nigerians by the Nigerian 
Military and Police Force.. Larry Diamond of Stanford University, commented on the 
repercussions of the successive coups, and the lack of discipline within Nigeria, on its youth.  
The most successful people in the country, tend to be those who have 
accumulated their fortunes in corrupt means. And therefore young people, 
students and other immigrants take their cue, from that sort of social 
structure”43 
For most of Babangida's leadership, he was concerned with personal enrichment and 
the longevity of his regime. There were hardly any noticeable developments, except for his 
introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme in 1986, which was very poorly received 
by the general public, as it was a measure designed by the International Monetary Fund, as an 
austerity programme, which saw the earnings of a majority of Nigerians lose significant 
value.44  It appeared that his maintenance of the status-quo in Nigeria, was a strategic means 
of staying in power.  
                                                 
42 'Text Of General Ibrahim Babangida’S Coup Speech August 27 , 1985 Fellow Nigerians - Scannews Nigeria' 
(ScanNews Nigeria, 2015) <http://scannewsnigeria.com/news/text-of-general-ibrahim-babangidas-coup-speech-
august-27-1985-fellow-nigerians/> accessed 23 June 2017. 
43 Larry Diamond (Web.stanford.edu) 
<https://web.stanford.edu/dept/iis/democracy/Seminar/DiamondAfrica.htm> accessed 16 June 2017. 
44  Toyin Falola and Eghosa E. Osaghae, 'Structural Adjustment And Ethnicity In Nigeria' [1996] African 
Economic History. 
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In 1992 however, Babangida announced the return to civilian rule by 1993. He was 
instrumental in the creation of two political parties, namely the Social Democratic Party and 
the National Republican Convention -Two parties that were almost indistinguishable in terms 
of their ideology or ethnic makeup. On the 12th of June 1993, both parties contested in a 
presidential election. Subsequently, it was presumed that an individual named Chief Moshood 
Kashimawo Abiola (a Westerner), was the winner of the presidential elections. To Nigerians' 
surprise, Babangida stepped in and annulled the election results, and held on to Nigerian 
leadership. This unprecedented move sparked public outrage (which had become the norm), 
and there were violent demonstrations all over the country. The intensity of public outrage was 
not easy to ignore. Abiola had been very active in openly criticising Babangida, and criss-
crossed the country, proclaiming himself as the President of Nigeria. Abiola was quoted as 
proclaiming in an interview: "I challenge General Babangida, to walk on any street in Nigeria 
with me without security, and see how long it will take... [Stammering] before people actually 
lynch him. That is the type of leader Babangida is…’45  
Babangida actively orchestrated the elimination of influential Nigerians, either by 
threatening these individuals with treason charges, or forcing them to flee overseas for fears of 
their personal safety. Nobel Laureate Wole Soyinka was one of such notable personalities.46 
Babangida's downfall was not necessarily as a result of him losing popular support. He in no 
way required that to stay in power. Rather, it was the amount of popular support which Abiola 
received, that made Babangida's position as Head of State untenable. As a result of Abiola's 
reprisals and speeches, the Armed Forces Ruling Council forced Babangida to resign from 
office. 
7.2.1.3.2 Earnest Shonekan 
In Babangida's resignation, he installed an individual, Chief Earnest Shonekan (a 
Westerner) as Interim President, on the 26th of August 1993, to lead the Interim National 
Government . As Shonekan's Minister of Defence, an individual named General Sani Abacha 
(a Northerner), occupied perhaps the most powerful position in cabinet. Abiola remained very 
active in his campaign against the government, and refused to recognise Shonekan's 
presidency, referring to it as a sham. Abiola's supporters were vehemently against this 
                                                 
45 'MKO ABIOLA Biography, The Nigerian President That Never Was' (Takemetonaija.com, 2016) 
<http://www.takemetonaija.com/2016/02/historymko-abiola-biography-nigerian_8.html> accessed 17 February 
2017. 
46 'Wole Soyinka: The Plight Of Writers In Exile' (the Guardian, 2002) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/books/2002/jul/13/poetry.wolesoyinka> accessed 24 October 2017. 
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installation as well. In the meantime, Gen. Abacha was making plans of his own to take over 
power from the civilian government.  
7.2.1.3.3 Sani Abacha 
These plans materialised on the 17th of November 1993, when Abacha forced 
Shonekan's resignation (following the new style of coups) and took over power for himself, 
after only three months of civilian rule. Abacha established the Provisional Ruling Council of 
Nigeria, and in an administrative overhaul, also created a cartel-style government, populated 
with only loyalists. Abacha's opening statements, were a sign of the brutality that would follow. 
Without caring for elaborate speeches and promises, he proclaimed: 
This regime will be firm, humane and decisive. We will not condone any acts of 
indiscipline. Any attempt to test our will, will be decisively dealt with47 
And so, Nigeria entered another five years of a brutal military dictatorship, which was 
unrivalled in its history. Arbitrary arrests and detention were the norm, and there were 
persistent rumours of torture and inhumane treatment in Abacha's detention camps. Abacha, in 
December of 1993 created Decree 107, a decree which essentially made him sovereign, with 
the powers to create and abolish laws without any other individual's approval. Abacha was also 
swift in detaining Abiola, who was still actively proclaiming himself the president of Nigeria. 
In June of 1994, Abiola was arrested, while on the phone to a British Broadcasting Corporation 
(BBC) journalist. Excerpts from the phone call are represented below: 
I am being arrested... I'm just going out now with the police…there is a large 
crowd here...I am being escorted out to detention  , by singing the national 
anthem… they are arresting me on the allegation of namely treason or 
something like that…"48 
When asked by the journalist why he was still allowed to be on the phone with the BBC, 
Abiola replied: "they have come to arrest me, not to arrest my mouth. It is all part of democracy 
here…I am not in any way disturbed by it…any sacrifice is in order, if it would bring 
democracy, peace and prosperity to Nigeria…" The journalist then proceeded to ask Abiola 
how he felt about the arrest. Abiola replied: "well, Mandela was in jail for 27 years, Kenyatta 
was in jail, I suppose that is one of the qualifications you need in this part of the world, don’t 
                                                 
47 Nehi Igbinijesu, 'DISCOVER NIGERIA: The Coup Speeches Of General Abacha' (Connect Nigeria, 2012) 
<http://www.connectnigeria.com/articles/2012/11/discover-nigeria-the-coup-speeches-of-general-abacha/> 
accessed 18 June 2017. 
48 'MKO ABIOLA Biography, The Nigerian President That Never Was' (Takemetonaija.com, 2016) 
<http://www.takemetonaija.com/2016/02/historymko-abiola-biography-nigerian_8.html> accessed 17 February 
2017. 
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worry yourself my friend”49 Abiola would subsequently die in detention, four years later. Other 
notable personalities who were arrested and detained by Abacha were, Gen. Obasanjo, on the 
15th of March 1995, along with Gen Yar'adua, who died in detention. Human rights activist 
and author, Ken Saro-Wiwa, who was hanged on the 10th of November 1995, with eight other 
activists.  
Abacha's government was also allegedly involved in the targeted assassination of 
political critics, utilising explosives, with 18 such incidents taking place between May of 1995 
and April of 1998.50 Abacha was undeterred by public opinion within and outside Nigeria, and 
remained in power until his death on the 8th of June 1998. Abacha died of a heart-attack. A 
Northerner, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, was selected as chairman of the Provisional 
Ruling Council. 
7.2.1.3.4 Abdulsalami Abubakar 
Following Abacha's demise, Nigerian Nobel Laureate Prof Wole Soyinka was quick to 
charge the interim government, specifically Gen. Abubakar, to return Nigeria to civilian rule. 
Speaking to the Cable News Network (CNN):  
The struggle on the democratic front against Abacha has not been against him 
personally, but against military dictatorship… there is only one course for the 
military to follow. That is to understand that they now have a graceful, very 
fortunate way of retreating to the barracks. And allowing the will of the 
Nigerian people to go forward”51 
Abdulsalami Abubakar, promptly responded to calls for him to return Nigeria to civilian 
leadership, and on the 15th of June 1998, Abubakar released all political prisoners from 
detention. One notable personality released, was Obasanjo (a former military Head of State), 
who subsequently won the presidential elections of February 1999. On the 29th of May 1999, 
Obasanjo was sworn in as Nigeria's civilian president. 
                                                 
49 'MKO ABIOLA Biography, The Nigerian President That Never Was' (Takemetonaija.com, 2016) 
<http://www.takemetonaija.com/2016/02/historymko-abiola-biography-nigerian_8.html> accessed 17 February 
2017. 
50 Frank Osanugor argued that at least 18 bombing incidents were attributable to Abacha's government between 
May 1995 and April 1998. See; Frank Sochukwu Osanugor, Terrorism: The Nigerian Experience (1995-1998) 
(Advent Communications ltd. 2004) 
51 'CNN - Nigerian Junta Charges Nobel Winner, Dissidents With Bombings' (Edition.cnn.com, 1997) 
<http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9703/12/nigeria.treason/index.html> accessed 20 January 2016. 
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7.3 INSIGHTS FROM 1970-1999 
Following Nigeria's independence from the United Kingdom in 1960, the newly formed 
government operated a parliamentary system of government. As mentioned in the fifth chapter, 
there were three major political parties headed by influential Nigerian political leaders at the 
time - The three political parties in existence, which constituted this parliament, were the 
Northern People's Congress (NPC) with 134 seats, The National Council of Nigerian Citizens 
(NCNC) with 89 seats, and the Action Group (AG) with 73 seats. However, Nigeria's 
parliamentary system would have seemed somewhat alien, as the configuration of parliament 
reflected an underlying tribal system which was still very influential at the time. The 
overwhelming majority of seats were taken up by the NPC, which was mostly a pro-Northern 
party. NPC dominance was significant to the observer because it aided the delineation of the 
core state apparatus from MNSAs. This delineation required an in-depth understanding of the 
division of political power within the country, which could be gained by a scholastic 
investigation into archives, newspapers and other sources. Within the NPC party, Sir Ahmadu 
Bello, and Sir Tafawa Balewa were identified as the most influential personalities and wielded 
the most political power. The broader implications of this power dynamic became apparent 
when NPC dominance in the political scene was taken into account. Sir Balewa and Sir Bello 
were the most influential individuals in Nigeria during the Formation case-study, because of 
the power they possessed within the most powerful political party in Nigeria. Accordingly, Sir 
Bello was the Northern Premier, and Sir Balewa was the Prime-Minister -both Northerners.  
For the most part, Nigeria's system of government only represented an avenue through 
which its former colonial masters could maintain formal contact and trade with its previously 
established assets in the country. Therefore, when tribal sentiments began to play an overt role 
in Nigerian governance, attention was focused on the manifestation of tribalism in the highest 
echelons of government, where these tensions were perceived as possible threats to the 
continuous link between former colonial powers and their assets in Nigeria. The manifestations 
of tribal tensions at the grassroots level however, were considered to be of little consequence 
if they did not jeopardise the existing post-colonial dynamic. 
The interests of power structures identified both within and outside of Nigeria pointed 
towards the expectation of Nigeria to remain as a single political entity, maintaining the borders 
created by colonial masters in its sub-region. In addition, if the post-colonial dynamic was to 
be preserved and developed predictably, individuals who were already familiar faces, serving 
in various governmental posts during colonial rule, were to remain within Nigerian 
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government, in a way guiding the newly independent country during its formative years. 
Unsurprisingly, the champions of Nigerian independence (whom most Nigerians today refer to 
as the founding fathers of Nigeria) either served in one capacity or another during colonial rule, 
or were involved in negotiating the terms of Nigeria's independence from the United Kingdom. 
The noticeable absence of an inclusive democratic political system in Nigeria before 
independence, would have made it unfeasible, even nearly impossible for popular legitimacy 
to have been granted to these founding fathers to represent Nigeria's interests in the first place. 
Thus the foundations of elitist politics in Nigeria had been established, and this influenced the 
Nature of Nigerian leadership from the period spanning 1970-1999. 
The Nigerian State through 1970-1999, was characterised by the centralised nature of Nigeria's 
power structure, which enabled the personalisation of state power by successive rulers. These 
rulers ultimately determined the political entities that were treated as MNSAs during this 
period. This centralised style of leadership, largely remained unchanged in the periods 
following the Nigerian civil war, and explains why certain MNSAs such as Maitatsine were 
able to operate and expand undetected, in comparison to those such as Biafra, AG or UMBC. 
One factor, which was very evident through surveying Nigeria's leadership structure, was 
the deliberate preservation of Northern domination. Although Gowon's attempts at enhancing 
tribal integration with his introduction of the NYSC program seemed laudable, equal 
participation of individuals from different regions, was absent in Nigeria's leadership. Cohesion 
barely transcended tribal lines. Notably, none of the military coups were actually carried out 
by Easterners of Westerners. Westerners' participation in military regimes, were determined by 
the Northern beneficiaries of the coups. One exception to Northern dominance during military 
leadership, was Obasanjo, who was only made Head of State after the demise of Murtala, and 
Danjuma's rejection of the position. The balance of Northern and Western interests at the 
centre, conspicuously excluded the East -with the exception of Arc. Ekwueme's tenure as Vice-
President (and subordinate to Shagari). The table below shows the distribution of leadership, 
from 1960-1999:52 
  
                                                 
52 This table only includes Nigerian leaders, who were also Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Hence 
Dr. Azikiwe's absence. 
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Table 13. Distribution of Power in Nigeria 1960-1999 
Western Northern Eastern 
 Tafawa Balewa 1960 - 1966  
  Aguyi-Ironsi 1966 - 1966 
 Yakubu Gowon 1966- 1975  
 Murtala Mohammed 1975 – 1976  
Olusegun Obasanjo 1976 - 1979   
 Shehu Shagari 1979- 1983  
 Muhammadu Buhari 1983 - 1985  
 Ibrahim Babangida 1985 - 1993  
Earnest Shonekan 1993 - 1993   
 Sani Abacha 1993 - 1998  
 Abdulsalami Abubakar 1998 - 
1999 
 
Olusegun Obasanjo 1999 - 2007   
 
As the table shows, the leadership structure remained to the disadvantage of the 
Easterners, who lacked adequate representation of their interests throughout this period. In 
many ways, this alienation of Easterners from central political power, represented the 
preservation of social realities, which met the Easterners with suspicion, and as distinctly 
outside the interests of preserving Nigeria as a unified political entity. The persistence of 
Northern domination during this period, was representative of the lack of interest in 
diversifying political norms which would result in a balanced sharing of political power, in the 
absence of an inclusive political system. Riots and political violence in various regions of the 
country, had little or no effect in facilitating any political change, and it appeared that such 
change remained impossible from outside the upper echelons of government. The Nigerian 
State essentially remained a coalition of the most powerful individuals within the political elite, 
with the authority to enforce their will through the utilisation of coercion vis-à-vis the Nigerian 
Military and the Police Force. 
The execution of military coups by middle ranking officials, remained a persistent feature 
from 1966-1976. These coups served to merely facilitate the transfer of state power, from the 
civilian political elite, to the military elite, or from one Senior Military official to another. None 
of the coups, facilitated a transfer of power from a senior military official to a lower-ranking 
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official, or from the military elite, to civilians. From 1976 however, military coups were 
executed by their benefactors, thereby enabling the personalisation of state power by the 
benefactors of coups:  
Table 14. Coup Executors versus Benefactors 
Military Coup Executed By Benefactor 
Jan. 1966 Major. Nzeogwu Lt.Gen. Aguyi-Ironsi 
Jul. 1966 Major. Murtala 
Mohammed 
Lt. Col. Gowon 
Jan. 1975 Col. Garba Brig. Gen. Murtala Moh'd 
Feb. 1976 Lt. Col. Dimka Brig. Gen. Obasanjo 
Dec. 1983 Maj. Gen. Buhari Maj. Gen. Buhari 
Aug. 1985 Gen. Babangida Gen. Babangida 
Nov. 1993 Gen. Abacha Gen. Abacha 
 
These dynamics created by elitist politics, meant that the role of citizenry in Nigeria's 
political process was already relegated before Nigeria gained independence. It was only a 
matter of time before the average Nigerian understood that their administration had merely 
been transferred from foreign colonial masters to Nigerian elites who harboured similar 
interests to those of colonial masters. During the formation period, the observer witnessed the 
gradual unravelling of this post-colonial arrangement, on two fronts. Firstly, the tribal divide 
inherent in Nigerian politics meant that there was little or no hope for any form of political 
cohesion that transcended tribal lines -bar the occasional political alliances of parties to win a 
majority of seats in Nigerian parliament. Secondly, a class divide meant that only the political 
elite could afford to influence the political processes in Nigeria, as they had most likely served 
within the colonial government which granted them means and considerable influence in 
comparison to the average Nigerian. These divides were to the disadvantage of the average 
Nigerian, as the riots in the Western Region and the Middle-Belt Zones highlighted. It seemed 
that no matter how much the average Nigerian campaigned, change was simply impossible 
from outside the upper echelons of government. 
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The Nigerian State, therefore, was identified as the coalition of the most powerful 
individuals within the political elite, with authority to enforce their will through the utilisation 
of coercion vis-à-vis the Nigerian Military and the Police Force. As a result, less influential 
individuals resorted to the organisation of Nigerian citizens as Personnel of MNSAs. These 
MNSAs were headed by disenfranchised members of the political elite, articulating the 
concerns of their tribal kinsmen, utilising extrajudicial means. These MNSAs were made 
possible, because of the existence of individuals such as Awolowo and Tarka accentuating the 
tribal divides, and exploiting class divisions. Awolowo, Tarka and other MNSA leaders were 
viewed by average Nigerians as being one of the few individuals capable of influencing 
governance to the advantage of the average Nigerian, as a result of their familiarity with 
Nigerian elites. The subsequent suppression of these MNSAs by the Nigerian state, however, 
further destabilised Nigeria as a whole, and crushed the belief that average Nigerians could 
achieve their political objectives if they were to rally around influential individuals and remain 
persistent. As a by-product of the militarised suppression of MNSAs by the Nigerian State 
during the formation period, the Nigerian military was ever-present at polling booths, as Aides 
de Camps of various senior politicians, as security providers within governmental buildings, 
as enforcers of the Nigerian State’s will in areas of political violence.  
7.3.1 Military Preservation of Civilian Elitism 
It came as no surprise that the military became aware of its importance in determining 
the strategic interests of the government, and subsequently capitalised on this. The fact that 
middle-ranking officers of the Nigerian military sought to eliminate all individuals which they 
believed to be part of the political elite, represented another dimension of the class struggle. 
Notably, whilst most senior politicians in Nigeria during the Formation and Secession period 
were part and parcel of the elite, progression within the Nigerian army, up until the first military 
coup, was based on merit and military hierarchy. This realisation serves as a reasonable 
explanation for the reception of the first military coup, as average Nigerians believed that the 
coup was a revolution, representing the extermination of the political elite, which were seen as 
remnants of colonial powers. The downside of this dimension of the class struggle, was the 
failure on the part of these middle-ranking officers to fully appreciate the roles of senior 
military officials within the Nigerian power structure. Being in a senior military position, 
required frequent contact with the political elite, at formal meetings as well as social gatherings. 
This frequent contact with the political elite blurred the class stratification (if it were to be 
called so) Individuals who occupied these senior military positions, such as Aguyi-Ironsi, were 
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an example of this. Prior to his assumption of leadership of the county, Aguyi-Ironsi was ever 
present at state functions, private gatherings and informal meetings. He was also a close friend 
of Sir. Ahmadu Bello, and was opposed to the coup as it unfolded. The introduction of military 
coups by middle-ranking officials, served to merely facilitate the transfer of state power, from 
the civilian political elite, to the military elite, whom politicians were familiar with. A transfer 
which in reality, did little to eliminate the elitist dimension of Nigerian politics. This transfer 
of political power within the elitist echelons of Nigerian politics, was only neutralised by the 
counter-coup. Therefore, as at August 1966, the Nigerian State was structurally configured as 
a Military Dictatorship, which suspended the 1960 Nigerian constitution. It was primarily 
governed by the Supreme Military Council, which was comprised of ten positions, all of which 
oversaw specific facets of governance. This structure of leadership was devised by Aguyi-
Ironsi. The Supreme Military Council, reported directly to Lt. Col. Gowon. By virtue of this 
leadership structure, Gowon’s occupation immediately assimilated him with elitist politics, and 
politicians, and the interests of the SMC remained quite similar to those of the NPC-led 
government. As a result, the Nigerian NSSP was observed to remain constant, as the SMC 
remained pre-occupied with ensuring national unity, and watching over its shoulder to 
discourage dissent within the military, which could lead to another coup. With the exception 
of compression strategy, the NSSP of the Formation and Secession Case studies remained 
largely the same, as the actual power structure which was facilitated by tribal considerations 
and elitism, remained unchanged. Gowon, like Balewa, was an individual wielding enormous 
power within his Northern party, (considering that the military was acutely divided along ethnic 
lines) who then transposed this influence to lead the entirety of Nigeria. 
The incursion of the Nigerian military into politics, hardly changed the social realities 
of the average citizen. All that was accomplished by the initial coup plotters, was the facilitation 
of a transfer of political power from the civilian to the military elites. The initial coup plotters 
failed to envisage the repercussions of the targeted assassinations of influential individuals 
from specific tribes, as they inadvertently interfered with the fragile tribal balance of power 
which underscored Nigerian government in both case studies. Through this period, a new 
precedent was established. This precedent, demonstrated that the assumption of Nigerian 
leadership, was possible through violence and blood-shed. In addition to the implications of 
the class divide in Nigeria, the underlying tribal tensions in Nigerian politics, and the possibility 
of assuming territorial control within the country through blood-shed, Nigerian NSSP through 
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this period could be reasonably described as conforming to the Introverted, Interest-centric, 
Constraining model, in line with Nigerian NSSP during the Formation and Secession periods 
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8 CHAPTER EIGHT: THE EXPLOSION CASE STUDY 2009-2014 
This period of analysis, investigated the nature of Nigerian NSSP in the face of the 
emergence of various percieved MNSAs within its borders. Nigerian NSSP in this period was 
analysed in light of the observations made concerning Nigerian NSSP prior to this chapter. 
This case study was unique in the sense that it witnessed the simultaneous explosion of tribal 
tensions which plagued the Formation and Secession periods, religious extremism which was 
resurgent through the formation period to 1999 and militant agitations for resource control, 
which were highlighted during the Nigerian Civil War. 
8.1 ASSESSMENT QUESTION 1 - DELINEATING BETWEEN THE STATE AND ITS PROPOSED MNSAS 
The State 
As at January 2009, The Federal Government of Nigeria operated a federal system of 
government. Nigeria made up of 36 states headed by Governors. These states were carved out 
of its regions, and share sovereignty with the Federal Government. In addition to the 36 States, 
Nigeria also possesses a Federal Capital Territory which is administered by the Federal 
Government, through a Minister for the Federal Capital Territory. Nigeria's President and 
Commander in Chief at the time, was Alhaji. Umaru Yar'Adua, a Northerner, who was 
democratically elected in 2007. Yar'Adua exercised executive powers, and was head of 
government. Following Yar'Adua's death in 2010, he was replaced by his deputy, Dr. Goodluck 
Ebele Jonathan, who led the country as the Acting-President until his election April 2011, after 
which he led the country as President until May 2015. 
Malicious Non- State Actors 
2009 was a unique year in Nigeria's history. This year, saw the full-blown emergence 
of Islamist Jihadism in the country. This year was explicitly selected by the author to begin this 
case-study period, as it witnessed the simultaneous mitigation of an already identified MNSA 
(MEND), and the identification of a new, and even more violent MNSA (Boko-Haram). The 
Nigerian government was essentially fighting two wars within its territorial borders. Both of 
which, were very different manifestations of similar underlying socio-economic and political 
inadequacies, which have plagued Nigeria from as far back as the Formation case-study.  
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From the Period spanning 2009-2014, Nigeria identified MNSA actors, which were 
predominantly located in the North-Eastern region of Nigeria, and the Niger-Delta Region. 
Most prominent was, the Jama`at ahl al-Sunna li-da`wa wa-l-qital terrorist group popularly 
known as Boko-Haram. The other principal MNSAs identified during this period, were mainly 
militant groups agitating for more inclusion in the distribution of oil revenues, which were 
extracted from the Niger Delta region. These were: 
 The Niger Delta Liberation Front (2005-2014) 
 Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force NDPVF led by Alhaji Asari Dokubo (2003-2009) 
 Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta led by Henry Okah (2004-2014) 
The Nigerian State was actively involved in the mitigation and elimination of all these 
MNSAs, (sometimes simultaneously) during the observed period. Because of the numerous 
activities of the MNSAs, which sometimes occurred simultaneously, this case study analysis 
produces a chronology of events spanning 2009-2014, wherein the activities of all MNSAs are 
documented chronologically, as well as government responses and critical developments 
within the Nigerian State which have direct bearing on Nigerian NSSP during the period.  
The author has represented the activities of MNSAs from 2009-2012 below: 
8.2 CHRONOLOGY OF THE EXPLOSION CASE STUDY 
8.2.1 2009 
The beginning of 2009, saw the reemergence of hostilities between the Federal 
Government of Nigeria, and MEND. On the 30th of January 2009, the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), resumed its hostilities against the Nigerian 
government and foreign companies involved in the exploitation of oil reserves in the Niger 
Delta region. The MEND MNSA, claimed that the rationale behind its resumption of activities, 
was due to an attack by FGN soldiers on one of its camps, run by the Niger Delta Vigilantes. 
This resumption of activities marked the end of a four month cease-fire brokered between 
MEND and the FGN in September of 2008. 1  The FGN, in line with already established 
Nigerian NSSP, had already established Joint Task Force. This Task force, sought to suppress 
civil unrest and militancy in the Niger Delta region, through the utilisation of brute military 
force. On the The 15th of May 2009, another military operation by the FGN was undertaken 
                                                 
1 'BBC News - Nigeria Militants 'End Truce In Delta Oil Region' (News.bbc.co.uk, 2017) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8488772.stm> accessed 18 October 2017. 
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by a Joint Task Force (JTF). This task force launched military offensives against MEND as a 
reprisal aimed at stemming the kidnapping of Nigerian soldiers as well as foreign employees 
of multinational corporations in the Niger Delta.  It was reported that thousands of Nigerian 
citizens evacuated their villages in the wake of these offensives, which saw hundreds of 
civilians killed.2 MEND MNSA emerged in 2006, as a direct repercussion of the exploitation 
of oil resources in the Niger Delta region. The proceeds of oil exploitation have repeatedly 
been siphoned by multinational corporations, and the FGN since the discovery of oil deposits 
in 1956. The obvious marginalisation of the local population, coupled with the environmental 
degradation of the Niger Delta, were factors instrumental to the emergence of MEND and other 
militant groups in the region. It is arguable that the heavy handed military suppression of all 
civilian agitations for resource control in the Niger Delta, legitimised the militant approach of 
MEND and similar organisations. For example, the execution of human rights and 
environmental activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other MOSOP (Movement for the Survival 
of the Ogoni People) leaders in 1995, demonstrated the futility of non-violent activism in the 
region. A subsequent movement, the Ijaw Youth Council, issued a vacation ultimatum to the 
FMG in 1998, which was brutally suppressed by the Abacha led government.3 Subsequent 
activist groups which emerged in the Niger Delta, have been characterised by an increasingly 
militant stance and violent expression. 
Simultaneously in the Northern Region of Nigeria, the emergence of Boko-Haram as a 
violent terrorist organisation had become undeniably obvious. A group which was initially 
conceived as a locally active, radical Islamic sect, became more recognised as a violent 
extremist group with the means and capability to orchestrate major terrorist attacks on the 
Nigerian State and neighboring countries. Some have even suggested that Boko-Haram was 
the resurgence of the Maitatsine Islamic sect, which was prominent in Nigeria, in the 1980s.4 
Although conflicting accounts exist on the early characteristics and activities of the group, 
scholars appear to agree on the fact that Boko-Haram morphed into the terrorist organisation 
as we recognize it, in June of 2009. On the 11th of June 2009, Boko-Haram members were 
interrupted by the Nigerian Police Force, during a funeral procession. The police were allegedly 
barring members of the sect who were riding motorbikes without helmets, from continuing in 
                                                 
2 'Thousands Flee Violence, Hundreds Suspected Dead' (IRIN, 2017) 
<http://www.irinnews.org/report/84512/nigeria-thousands-flee-violence-hundreds-suspected-dead> accessed 23 
October 2017. 
3 The National Defence College Abuja, 'The Niger Delta Crisis And National Security: Challenges For The 
Nigerian Armed Forces' (National Defence College 2009). 
4 A. Adesoji, Africa today july 2012  
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the procession. The situation took a violent turn, which resulted in the injury of about 20 
members of the sect, some of whom survived gunshot wounds. 
 
Figure 9. MNSA activity in Nigeria, 2009 
From the 11th to the 12th of June 2009, Boko-Haram leader, Mohammed Yusuf 
threatened the FGN with attacks, as a result of the killing of 14 Boko-Haram members by FGN 
security operatives. The threats were published via Video, and was addressed to the President. 
An armed reprisal attack was carried out by Boko Haram in the Northern State of Bauchi, 
wherein Boko Haram members attacked a police station and freed hundreds of their 
incarcerated colleagues. The violent situation escalated, lasting days, and resulted in an armed 
military response by the FGN, which saw many Boko-Haram members killed. Boko-Haram 
MNSA launched sporadic offensives in various towns in 6 Northern states. This lasted from 
the 26th to the 31st of July, 2009. The violence left at least 800 people dead, mainly civilians 
and some Boko-Haram members.5 The FGN stopped the uprising with military offensives 
which led to the capture of hundreds of Boko-Haram members and its leader, Yusuf. Initially, 
Yusuf was arrested by the Nigerian Police Force, which handed him over to the Nigerian 
Military for interrogation. On the 30th of July 2009, Yusuf was extrajudicially executed by the 
Nigerian Army while he was still in custody. Another individual, Alhaji Foi, was arrested and 
executed in the same manner - this time at the Police Headquarters in Maiduguri. However, the 
                                                 
5  'Cameroon: Confronting Boko Haram' (Crisis Group, 2016) <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-
africa/cameroon/cameroon-confronting-boko-haram> accessed 24 May 2017. 
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killing of Boko-Haram's leader, did little to quell the looming insurgency. In time, Boko-Haram 
regrouped under Shekau (Yusuf's deputy) and took on a more aggressive posture towards the 
FGN and Nigerian citizens alike. The constraining compression instantly operationalised by 
the FGN in the wake of Boko-Haram violence, was perhaps a crucial determinant in enabling 
the sect to enjoy sympathy from some of the local population, and eventually, more recruits. 
In total, MNSA activity in Nigeria claimed at least a thousand lives in 2009. 
8.2.2 2010 
In 2010, Boko-Haram resurfaced under Shekau's leadership. Shekau was identified as 
the MNSAs operational and ideational leader, who structured Boko Haram into a loosely 
connected, splinter-celled organisation. This change in organisational configuration, enabled 
Boko-Haram to be more resilient to Nigerian State compression in two ways. Firstly, Boko-
Haram's decentralised organisation, made it incredibly difficult for FGN security operatives to 
detect. Secondly, a splinter-celled organisation, made it difficult for FGN security services to 
infiltrate.6  The FGNs militarised responses to such a fluid and undetectable group, were 
becoming increasingly outmaneuvered.  
In the Niger Delta Region, the FGN was also tasked with suppressing the rise of militant 
activities. Although it was Boko-Haram that attracted considerable attention due to their use of 
IED (Improvised Explosive Device), it was MEND MNSA which utilised explosives in warfare 
in 2010. On the 15th of March 2010, MEND attacked a government building, interrupting an 
on-going 'post-amnesty dialogue'. MEND claimed responsibility for the attack, which was 
characterised by the detonation of two bombs, which killed three people and injured others.7 
The FGN responded by increasing JTF presence in the Niger delta. However, these JTF 
deployments were focused on infrastructure and instalments belonging to multinational 
corporations operating in the Niger Delta. The JTF also began launching attacks on the anti-
Amnesty faction of MEND, to repel further vandalism of assets in the region.8 
On the 7th of September 2010, Boko Haram infiltrated a prison in Bauchi, North-East 
Nigeria. This prison break freed over 700 individuals, with about 100 of them being members 
                                                 
6 'Nigeria: Fundamental Issues | Editorial' (the Guardian, 2012) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jan/27/boko-haram-nigeria-fundamental-issues> accessed 
14 July 2017. 
7  'Bomb Blasts Rock Warri Amnesty Talks - Vanguard News' (Vanguard News, 2010) 
<https://www.vanguardngr.com/2010/03/bomb-blasts-rock-warri-amnesty-talks/> accessed 18 April 2016. 
8  'Nigeria Militants 'Behind Attack' (BBC News, 2010) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11820294> 
accessed 20 May 2017. 
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of the MNSA. 7 people were killed as a result of this attack, and this proprietary break-in, 
signified the beginning of a series of prison breaks which freed up hundreds more in Northern 
Nigeria.  
The severity of the insurgency the FGN was supressing, became apparent on the 1st of 
October 2010, when two bombs were reported to have exploded in Abuja (the capital). These 
explosions were meant to coincide with the Independence Day celebration, at Eagle's square. 
This attack left 12 dead, and about 20 people injured. It was reported that these explosions were 
in relative proximity to President Jonathan at the time. Subsequently, MEND claimed 
responsibility for this attack. 
On the 24th of December 2010, Boko-Haram killed about a hundred civilians in the 
Northern towns of Jos and Maiduguri. The attacks were characterised by a spate of explosions 
which targeted predominantly Christian dwellings. There were also recorded shootings in at 
churches in Jos. These attacks led to civil unrests, especially in Jos where inter-religious 
conflict was rife. The FGN responded to these attacks, with military offensives against Boko-
Haram and MEND respectively. In the case of Boko-Haram, these offensives by the FGN were 
conspicuously late, only coming months after Boko-Haram had initiated a series of attacks on 
various prisons where they freed their colleagues and significantly increased in numbers. 2010, 
would end on a violent note, when in what was later characterised as the new-year bombings, 
explosives were detonated outside military barracks in the Nigerian capital, Abuja. The 
bombings which occurred on the 30th and the 31st of December 2010, killed at least four 
people.9 In total, around 149 deaths were recorded as a result of MNSA activity. Most of these 
deaths were attributed to Boko-Haram activity. 
Below is a graphical representation of MNSA activity in 2010 
                                                 
9  '2Nd Bomb Explosion Rocks Abuja - Vanguard News' (Vanguard News, 2010) 
<https://www.vanguardngr.com/2010/12/breaking-news-bomb-explosion-rocks-abuja-details-later/> accessed 24 
October 2017. 
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Figure 10. MNSA activity in Nigeria, 2010 
8.2.3 2011 
In January 2011, the FGN appeared more proactive in its stance. The FGN created the 
Counter Terrorism Center at the Office of the National Security Adviser.10 Also, the FGN 
appointed its first Presidential Adviser on Terrorism, in a bid to ramp up its counterterrorism 
efforts. A month later in February, the Terrorism Prevention Bill was passed into legislature, 
thereby creating a legislative framework which would guide counterterrorism implementation 
in the country. As the FGN was ramping up counterterrorism efforts, MEND continued their 
operations in the Niger Delta. On the 16th of March 2011, MEND detonated a bomb on an 
Agip platform in the Niger Delta. It was not clear if there were any casualties. In the meantime, 
Boko-Haram was ramping up its activities in the Northern region. The 6th of June 2011, 
marked the beginning of targeted assassinations of Muslim preachers who were critical of 
Boko-Haram's ideology. The assassination of Ibrahim Birkuti, marked the beginning of this 
modus operandi. These targeted assassinations were followed up by the first recorded suicide 
bombing in Nigeria. This occurred on the 16th of June 2011, when a Boko-Haram member 
detonated a car bomb in the Police Headquarters, Abuja. At least two people were killed, and 
several others (including the author) sustained injuries. This attack on the police Headquarters, 
signified the expansion of Boko-Haram's targets, from attacking unprotected civilians, to 
launching daring attacks on government buildings, including that of the Police Force which 
                                                 
10 Scott Nicholas Romaniuk and others, The Palgrave Handbook Of Global Counterterrorism Policy(Springer 
2017). 
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was meant to be supressing them. In May 2011, President Jonathan alleged that political 
opposition was involved in the sponsoring of Boko Haram and terrorism in general. In May of 
2011, FGN authorised airstrikes against MEND in the Niger Delta region.  
In July of 2011, the FGN created a Joint Task Force in Borno State, to tackle the menace 
of Boko-Haram. In the same month, the FGN created a special panel, tasked with exploring the 
possibility of negotiations with Boko-Haram, but a month later, dismissed the possibility of 
negotiations.11 In the Niger Delta region, MEND activity continued despite JTF presence and 
airstrikes. On the 14th of September 2011, 23 foreign sailors were kidnapped by MEND from 
an oil tanker. They were subsequently released on the 26th of September. 
On the 17th of September 2011, a close relative of Mohammed Yusuf, one Mr. Fugu, was 
killed near his Maiduguri home. It has remained unclear who the murderers were. Mr. Fugu, 
was an intermediary between Boko-Haram and representatives of the FGN. Boko-Haram 
denied involvement in this attack.  
In the Niger Delta, the FGN increased JTF offensives against the anti-Amnesty faction 
of MEND in October. But, on the 19th, MEND personnel hijacked an ExxonMobil tanker, 
stealing large amounts of oil. It seemed as though both MNSA were simultaneously 
intensifying their activities in October of 2011. Boko-Haram continued its targeted 
assassinations in the Northern region, and attacks on civilians despite JTF presence in Borno. 
For example, on the 22nd of October 2011, a cameraman working for the Nigerian Television 
Authority was killed by Boko-Haram members, for allegedly spying on the activities of the 
sect. On the 4th of November 2011, in what is not categorised as the Damaturu attacks, Boko-
Haram launched coordinated offensives all over Yobe state northern Nigeria. The attacks left 
at least 100 people dead. On the 17th of December 2011, Boko-Haram engaged in a prolonged 
shoot-out against Kano state police officers. This shootout was intended to resist an FGN raid 
of a Boko-Haram hideout. Seven people were reportedly killed, including police officers. On 
the 22nd of December 2011, Boko-Haram carried out a spate of bombings in Maiduguri, whilst 
simultaneously, the sect launched gun and bomb attacks in Yobe state. As a result, about 130 
people were reported to have been killed. On the 25th of December, as Christmas and New 
Year festivities were approaching, the FGN ordered the visible deployment of Police and State 
security forces around public places of worship, to deter Boko-Haram attacks in Abuja. But, 
on the same day in what is now known as the Christmas day bombings, Boko-Haram carried 
                                                 
11 Ahmed Mari (Allafrica.com, 2011) <http://allafrica.com/stories/201107260898.html> accessed 17 May 2017. 
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out bomb and shooting attacks. Killing about 41 people in Christmas day celebrations in 
churches, in Niger State. Another attack was planned in Jos; however one policeman lost his 
life whilst thwarting Boko-Haram's plans. 
On the 31st of December, the FGN declared a State of emergency in the northern region, 
specifically Yobe, Plateau, Niger and Borno States. The State of Emergency was to last six 
months.12 The FGN also announced that all Northern borders to neighbouring states be closed.  
Below is a graphical representation of MNSA activity in 2011 
 
Figure 11. MNSA activity in Nigeria, 2011 
8.2.4 2012 
2012, started off on a particularly poor note. First of all, on the 9th of January 2012, a 
secret police operative was assassinated by Boko-Haram. In response, President Jonathan 
announced that Boko-Haram had infiltrated all spheres of government and were able to identify 
secret police officers working for the FGN. Four days later, on the 12th of January 2012, 
MEND operatives bombed a hotel in Warri. There were no reported civilian casualties. On the 
same day, 6 suspected Boko-Haram dissidents were assassinated by the sect in Maiduguri. 
Boko-Haram spokesman announced that any sect dissidents would be hunted and assassinated 
                                                 
12 Nick Squires, 'Nigeria's President Declares State Of Emergency After Christmas Attacks' (Telegraph.co.uk, 
2012) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/nigeria/8987229/Nigerias-president-
declares-state-of-emergency-after-Christmas-attacks.html> accessed 18 June 2017. 
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in the same manner.13 As MNSA activity was intensifying so early on in the year, the FGN 
made a crucial error. On the 18th of January, the suspected plotter of the 2011 Christmas day 
bombings, managed to escape from Police custody. So embarrassing was this event, that as a 
result, the then Inspector General of Police was forced to resign.  
In Kano, on the 24th of January, FGN security operatives killed two suspected Boko-
Haram members, following suspicions of their involvement in assaults, two days earlier. 
MEND MNSA on the other hand, showed no signs of relenting in their attacks on the oil 
industry. On the 13th of February 2012, MEND operatives killed the captain and another crew 
member of a cargo vessel off the coast of Nigeria.  
The 9th of March, saw the arrest of a suspected Al-Qaeda member, Abu Mohammed. 
Abu Mohamed was suspected as being a leader of an Al-Qaeda affiliated group operating in 
Nigeria. Muhammad was suspected of kidnapping two engineers, one British and one Italian, 
in May of 2011.14 Muhammad was interrogated until he gave up the location of the hostages. 
However, the hostages were killed when FGN attempted to raid the hideout where they were 
being held. Boko-Haram never suggested that it was affiliated with Muhammad, or involved 
in the abduction. Not long after the discovery of Al-Qaeda cells in Nigeria, Boko-Haram 
attacked news media outlets in Abuja and Kaduna, on the 26th of April 2012. In this attack, 
Boko-Haram detonated bombs at complexes belonging to "This Day" newspaper in Abuja, 
killing four, and bombed another media outlet in Kaduna, killing three. 
On the 10th of May 2012, an Islamic sect leader is assassinated by suspected Boko-
Haram operatives. The FGN expressed concern over this development, citing that such an 
incident could instigate armed conflicts between various extremist sects in the country as a 
result. From the 17th to the 19th of June 2012, an estimated 100 civilians are killed by Boko-
Haram's attacks on churches in Kaduna and Zaria. These spate of attacks also left more than 
300 people injured. This incident sparked confrontations between Christians and Muslims, with 
the Christians killing over twenty civilians suspected to be of the Hausa-Fulani ethnic tribe, in 
revenge. 
                                                 
13  Barnabas Manyan, 'Gunmen Kill 43 Students - The Nation Nigeria' (The Nation Nigeria, 2012) 
<http://thenationonlineng.net/gunmen-kill-43-students/> accessed 13 June 2017. 
14  Jacob Zenn, 'Boko Haram’S International Connections | Combating Terrorism Center At West Point' 
(Ctc.usma.edu, 2013) <https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/boko-harams-international-connections> accessed 17 May 
2017. 
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These confrontations did little to dissuade the sect, which, on the 6th of August 2012, 
launched a suicide bombing attack, which left 7 police officers dead, in Sokoto. This bombing, 
occurred near Alhaji Shehu Shagari's residence. Following the suicide bombing attack, Boko-
Haram murdered a Muslim cleric and one of his followers. This occurred in a mosque in 
Maiduguri, on the 21st of August 2012. From the 5th to 6th of September 2012, Boko-Haram 
then turned its attention to vandalism. In a spate of attacks, the sect destroyed about 26 
telecommunications towers, in protest of telecommunications companies' information sharing 
with the FGN intelligence agencies. On the 26th of August, a Boko Haram suicide bomber 
detonated a car bomb at the United Nations office in Abuja. This attack killed about 21 people 
and injured more than a hundred. This attack, attracted considerable international attention, as 
it signified the first time that Boko-Haram targeted an international organisation. 
Following weeks of a lack of observed activity from FGN security operatives, the FGN JTF 
announced that it had killed more than 35 Boko-Haram operatives, and arrested about 60 more 
in Yobe State, on the 23rd of September. The next day, FGN Army announced that it had killed 
one Abubakar Yola, believed to be a regional commander for Boko-Haram. It was also 
announced that they had arrested 156 other Boko-Haram operatives in Adamawa State, 
following a coordinated action.  
Meanwhile, in the Niger Delta region, MEND MNSA were observed to resume spates 
of attacks in October. On the 6th of October 2012, it was reported that militants closely 
affiliated to MEND seised an oil tanker off the coast of Ivory-Coast. The militants kept the 
crew of over 25 men captive for three days, then subsequently stole large quantities of oil from 
the ship. The next day, FGN announced that they had once again killed 30 Boko-Haram 
operatives, in Yobe State. The FGN also announced that Boko-Haram’s leader, Shekau, had 
also been killed in Kandahar.  
On the 8th of October 2012, an FGN JTF soldier was killed by a IED, planted by Boko-
Haram in Maiduguri. This IED was clearly intended to destroy the JTF convoy, as it patrolled 
Maiduguri. JTF soldiers subsequently attacked and killed civilians whom they believed were 
sympathetic to Boko-Haram, and then set over 50 houses alight. This incident claimed over 30 
civilian lives. Following this attack on civilians by the JTF along with other extrajudicial 
killings, Amnesty international published a report on the 1st of November, wherein they alleged 
that FGN security operatives were involved in committing grave human rights violations in 
their quest to crush Boko-Haram. 
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In the Niger Delta, on the 15th of October 2012, MEND operatives abducted 7 sailors, 
whom they subsequently released on the 1st of November 2012 for an undisclosed ransom. 
Boko-Haram continued its relentless attacks on civilians, and on the 28th of October 2012, 
launched an attack on a church in Kaduna, killing 8 and injuring about 150 people. As was the 
case in the last Boko-Haram attack in a Kaduna church, Christian youth launched sporadic 
attacks on Muslims in the vicinity, in revenge. For the third year in succession, Boko-Haram 
launched Christmas day attacks, and killed 27 Christians in Maiduguri. Following these attacks, 
on the 28th of December 2012, unidentified assailants killed 15 Christians in Musari.  
Below is a graphical representation of MNSA activity in Nigeria, 2012: 
 
Figure 12. MNSA activity in Nigeria, 2012 
8.2.5 2013 
Due to the copious amounts of MNSA activity identified in 2013 and 2014, the author has 




                                                 
15 Author’s compilation. See note 42 in Chapter 5 
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Table 15. MNSA Activity in Nigeria 2013 
                                                 
16 The pipeline exploded killing 7 operatives, 3 Nigerian Soldiers and 40 people in the village. 
17 The Emir of Kano gets attacked by gunmen. The Emir survives, however, his driver and guards are killed. 
18 : Nine female polio vaccinators are killed in two separate shootings in health centers of Kano. Three days later, 
three North Korean doctors are hacked to death in Potiskum. Boko Haram is suspected of both attacks.  
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19 Ansaru, a splinter group of Boko Haram, kidnaps seven foreign expatriates from a Lebanese construction 
company, Setraco, at Jama’are in Bauchi. It is the largest kidnapping in northern Nigeria in recent times.  
20  6 Russian sailors were kidnapped aboard the Armada Tuah 101 cargo ship. All 6 men were released on February 
26 for 200 million Naira ($1.3 million) ransom. 
21 Four children and three adult members of the French Moulin Fournier family are kidnapped by gunmen in 
northern Cameroon while visiting the Waza National Park, near the border with Nigeria. 
22 3 Malaysian sailors were kidnapped aboard the Armada Tuah 22. The 3 men were freed on March 22 after the 
Joint Task Force raided a MEND camp while also capturing 4 militants. 
23  Mike Pflanz, 'British Hostage Killed Because Kidnappers Thought UK Was Launching Rescue Mission' 
(Telegraph.co.uk, 2013) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/nigeria/9920655/British-hostage-killed-
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24 MEND spokesman Jomo Gbomo sent an e-mail to Bloomberg News threatening to "bomb mosques, hajj camps, 
and other Islamic institutions." Gbomo calls this "Operation Save Christianity" and says this is in response to the 
bombings of churches in northern Nigeria. 
25 9 oil workers were kidnapped by MEND gunmen off an oil installation operated by Royal Dutch Shell. The 
kidnappers are thought to be responsible for the murder of 12 police officers 3 weeks earlier. 
26 8 ex-militants were killed by MEND gunmen in Yenagoa after they were found out to be collaborating with the 
Joint Task Force. A gunfight erupted when the MEND gunmen were spotted by Nigerian Police. 
27 MEND gunmen kidnapped the daughter of Nigerian supreme court judge Bode Rhodes-Vivour. A ransom was 
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28 9 children are killed in Maiduguri and 13 students and teachers are killed in Damaturu by Boko Haram 
29 Pirates affiliated to MEND hijacked the French oil tanker Adour 48 km (30 mi) off the coast of Togo. The 
pirates took one sailor hostage before fleeing from the Nigerian Navy. The sailor was eventually freed on June 18 
when the Joint Task Force seized the pirates' camp. 
30 Yobe State school shooting, more than 42 are killed by Boko Haram gunmen in a Yobe State school. 
31 Pirates hijacked the Saint Kitts and Nevis flagged oil vessel MT Notre. The pirates were able to keep the entire 
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In 2013 alone, MNSA activity claimed over 800 lives in Nigeria: 
                                                 
32 An attack on the College of Agriculture in Gujba, Yobe by suspected Boko Haram members kills forty students. 
33 An attack at Damboa leaves at least 20 killed (15 suspected militants and 5 civilians).  
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Figure 13 MNSA activity in Nigeria, 2013. 
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8.2.6 2014 
Table 16. MNSA Activity in Nigeria 201435 
                                                 
35 Author’s compilation. See note 42 in Chapter 5 
36 90 Christians and 9 Nigerian soldiers are killed in Gwosa by Boko Haram. 
37 Federal Government College attack, 59 male students killed in a school massacre in Yobe State. 
38 Boko Haram attacks the heavily fortified Giwa military barracks in Maiduguri, freeing comrades from a 
detention facility. The military then executes about 600 unarmed recaptured detainees, according to Amnesty 
International. 
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39 May 2014 Abuja bombing, 19 killed in Abuja by a car bomb. 
40 Gamboru Ngala attack, at least 300 people are killed in the twin towns of Gamboru and Ngala in Borno State 
by Boko Haram militants. 
41 The third emir of Gwoza, Idrissa Timta, is assassinated during a Boko Haram ambush. 
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In 2014, MNSA activity in Nigeria claimed over 3000 lives: 
 
Figure 14. MNSA activity in Nigeria, 2014 
8.3 ASSESSMENT OF ORIENTATION 
Within the Explosion case-study, instances of Inflationary Containment and 
Compression were observed to be primarily within Nigerian territory, reflecting the 
overwhelming occurrence of MNSA activity within Nigeria, specifically in the Northern region 
and the Niger-Delta. One notable exception, was President Jonathan's meeting with the French 
president at the time, Francois Hollande, to discuss possible joint military efforts to compress 
Boko-Haram MNSA. Therefore, in utilising Orientation as an independent variable within the 
NSSP theoretical framework, it must be noted that Nigeria was essentially an Introverted State, 
as out of the observed instances of Inflationary Containment and Compression, only one was 
outside Nigeria's territorial boundaries. Below, is a measurement scale of Nigeria’s orientation 
during the Explosion period43: 
  
                                                 
43 Author’s compilation. See note 42 in Chapter 5 
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Table 17. Independent Variable Measurement: Orientation 
Introverted Extroverted 
Date State Territory Neighbouring State Sub-
Region 
Other Continent 
 7 DIVISION OF 
NIGERIAN ARMY 
CREATED IN BORNO 
STATE44 
   
 FGN REPELS BH 
ATTACK, REPRISAL 
KILLS OVER 50 BH 
   
 FGN REACHES OUT TO 
LOCAL LEADERS FOR 
SUPPORT 
   
2010 FGN MAINTIANS JTF 
PRESENCE IN NIGER 
DELTA, FOCUSED ON 
OIL INSTALLATIONS 
   
2010 JTF LAUNCH ATTACKS 
ON KNOWN MEND 
BASES AND 
AFFILIATES 
   




   
                                                 
44 'Nigerian Army Establishes 2 New Divisions In Borno, Niger Delta - Premium Times Nigeria' (Premium Times 
Nigeria) <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/196707-nigerian-army-establishes-2-new-
divisions-in-borno-niger-delta.html> accessed 24 July 2017. 
45 FGN operatives within the Joint Task Force (JTF) begin to distribute video-tape recordings which promulgate 
counter-Boko-Haram narratives to locals in Maiduguri. 
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46 On the 19th of May 2011, the FGN carried out airstrikes in the Niger Delta. These airstrikes killed John Togo, 
who was an influential member of MEND MNSA. 
47 In July 2011, the FGN announced proposed negotiations with Boko-Haram. In an unprecedented move, the 
FGN also ensured that five police officers were held responsible for the extrajudicial killing of Yusuf 
48 The FGN however, reneged on its attempt to initiate negotiations with Boko-Haram, on the 3rd of August 2011, 
with the FGN explicitly rejecting negotiations with a terrorist group. 
49 Following the intensification of attacks in the North, on the 31st of December 2011, President Goodluck 
Jonathan declared a State of Emergency in Borno state, Niger state, Plateau state, and Yobe state. He also 
announced that all northern borders were to be closed. 
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50 On the 18th of January 2012, a suspected plotter of the 2011 Christmas day bombings, escaped from police 
custody. 
51 On the 24th of January 2012, FGN security operatives killed two suspected Boko-Haram members for their 
suspected involvement in the assaults in Kano, four days prior. 
52 On the 9th of March 2012, FGN Army arrests one Abu Muhammad, suspected as being a leader of an Al-Qaeda 
affiliated group operating in Nigeria. Muhammad was suspected of kidnapping two engineers, one British and 
one Italian, in May of 2011. Muhammad was interrogated until he gave up the location of the hostages. However, 
the hostages were killed when FGN attempted to raid the hideout where they were being held. Boko-Haram never 
suggested that it was affiliated with Muhammad, or involved in the abduction. 
53 On the 23rd of September 2012, The FGN JTF announced that it had killed 35 Boko-Haram operatives in Yobe 
state, and arrested about 60 more. 
54 on the 24th of September 2012, The FGN Army announced that they had killed Abubakar Yola, believed to be 
a regional commander for Boko-Haram. 
55 Furthermore, they announce the arrest of 156 other Boko-Haram operatives in Adamawa State, in a coordinated 
action. 
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56 On the 7th of October 2012, JTF operatives announced that they had killed 30 Boko-Haram operatives, in Yobe 
state. They also declared that they had killed Boko-Haram leader, Shekau, and arrested 10 more in Kandahar. 
57 On the 8th of October 2012, an FGN JTF soldier was killed by a IED, planted by Boko-Haram in Maiduguri. 
This IED was set for the JTF convoy. JTF soldiers subsequently attacked and killed civilians whom they believed 
were sympathetic to Boko-Haram, and then set over 50 houses alight. This incident claimed over 30 civilian lives. 
58 On the 1st of November 2012, Amnesty International published a report which alleged that Boko-Haram and 
the FGN ' security operatives were involved in committing grave human rights violations, in Northern Nigeria. 
On the same day, Boko-haram declared willingness to negotiate with the FGN 
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8.4 ASSESSMENT OF INFLATIONARY CONTAINMENT 
In light of the information gathered from the Explosion case study, the measurement 
scale, which characterizes the nature of Inflationary Containment within Nigeria’s NSSP is 
represented below59:  
Table 18. Independent Variable Measurement: Inflationary Containment 
Date People Interests 
 
 
7 DIVISION of Nigerian Army Created 
in Borno State 
 
 
FGN REPELS BH ATTACK, 
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FGN JTF DISTRIBUTE 
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59 Author’s compilation. See note 42 in Chapter 5 
60 FGN operatives within the Joint Task Force (JTF) begin to distribute video-tape recordings which promulgate 
counter-Boko-Haram narratives to locals in Maiduguri. 
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61 On the 19th of May 2011, the FGN carried out airstrikes in the Niger Delta. These airstrikes killed John Togo, 
who was an influential member of MEND MNSA. 
62 In July 2011, the FGN announced proposed negotiations with Boko-Haram. In an unprecedented move, the 
FGN also ensured that five police officers were held responsible for the extrajudicial killing of Yusuf 
63 The FGN however, reneged on its attempt to initiate negotiations with Boko-Haram, on the 3rd of August 2011, 
with the FGN explicitly rejecting negotiations with a terrorist group. 
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64 Following the intensification of attacks in the North, on the 31st of December 2011, President Goodluck 
Jonathan declared a State of Emergency in Borno state, Niger state, Plateau state, and Yobe state. He also 
announced that all northern borders were to be closed. 
65 On the 18th of January 2012, a suspected plotter of the 2011 Christmas day bombings, escaped from police 
custody. 
66 On the 24th of January 2012, FGN security operatives killed two suspected Boko-Haram members for their 
suspected involvement in the assaults in Kano, four days prior. 
67 On the 9th of March 2012, FGN Army arrests one Abu Muhammad, suspected as being a leader of an Al-Qaeda 
affiliated group operating in Nigeria. Muhammad was suspected of kidnapping two engineers, one British and 
one Italian, in May of 2011. Muhammad was interrogated until he gave up the location of the hostages. However, 
the hostages were killed when FGN attempted to raid the hideout where they were being held. Boko-Haram never 
suggested that it was affiliated with Muhammad, or involved in the abduction. 
68 On the 23rd of September 2012, The FGN JTF announced that it had killed 35 Boko-Haram operatives in Yobe 
state, and arrested about 60 more. 
69 on the 24th of September 2012, The FGN Army announced that they had killed Abubakar Yola, believed to be 
a regional commander for Boko-Haram. 
70 Furthermore, they announce the arrest of 156 other Boko-Haram operatives in Adamawa State, in a coordinated 
action. 
71 On the 7th of October 2012, JTF operatives announced that they had killed 30 Boko-Haram operatives, in Yobe 
state. They also declared that they had killed Boko-Haram leader, Shekau, and arrested 10 more in Kandahar. 
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72 On the 8th of October 2012, an FGN JTF soldier was killed by a IED, planted by Boko-Haram in Maiduguri. 
This IED was set for the JTF convoy. JTF soldiers subsequently attacked and killed civilians whom they believed 
were sympathetic to Boko-Haram, and then set over 50 houses alight. This incident claimed over 30 civilian lives. 
73 On the 1st of November 2012, Amnesty International published a report which alleged that Boko-Haram and 
the FGN ' security operatives were involved in committing grave human rights violations, in Northern Nigeria. 
On the same day, Boko-haram declared willingness to negotiate with the FGN 
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JUL 2014  AIRSTRIKE KILLS CIVILIANS 
OCT  
2014 
 CEASEFIRE BROKERED WITH BH 
In light of the information gathered during the Explosion case study, the FGN was 
observed to be overwhelmingly interest-centric in its inflationary containment. An underlying 
characteristic of most of the inflationary containment incidents identified, was its reactionary 
nature. The FGN response to militancy and terrorism during this period, appeared to be 
sporadic, reactionary and ad-hoc. FGN responses usually coincided with periods where an 
MNSA was able to attract considerable international attention after an attack, or significant 
economic assets were within reach of an MNSAs expansion. This period, exposed a 
conspicuous absence of pre-emptive strategy, with the exception of NACTEST, which was 
only produced in April 2014.74 As evident in the first chronology, Boko-Haram and MEND 
MNSAs were responsible for thousands of civilian deaths during this period, and the author 
failed to identify inflationary containment primarily aimed at eliminating the interaction 
between MNSAs and people as referent objects. As a matter of fact, in some instances, the 
opposite occurred. Worthy of note, was also the JTF's involvement in the deliberate massacre 
of civilians in 2012 and 2013, in addition to the high loss of civilian lives as a consequence of 
JTF airstrikes in 2014. At the same time, the FGN was not observed to carry out any actions, 
which deliberately isolated MNSAs from civilian populations, indicating that people, were not 
the primary referents of Nigerian NSSP. Instead, civilian assistance and sympathy was 
observed especially in MEND MNSA activity in the Niger Delta. 
In earlier chapters, the author identified one of the necessary preconditions to achieve a 
state of security, as the evidence of a conscious and continuous provision of security towards 
referent objects. Judging by the information gathered, Nigerian citizens were not prioritised as 
the referent objects of Nigeria’s NSSP during this period. 
8.5 ASSESSMENT OF COMPRESSION AGAINST MNSAS 2009-2014 
From the period spanning 2009 to 2014, instances of FGN compression against MNSAs 
were observed 47 times. Out of these instances, the FGN was observed to employ Compelling 
Compression, 18 times, as opposed to Coercive compression which occurred 7 times and 
                                                 
74 'Boko Haram: Nigeria Rolls-Out Soft Approach To Counter Terrorism - Premium Times Nigeria' (Premium 
Times Nigeria, 2014) <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/157111-boko-haram-nigeria-rolls-soft-
approach-counter-terrorism.html> accessed 4 July 2017. 
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Constraining compression which was observed in 22 instances. However, many instances of 
constraining compression were observed to have been in effect for periods spanning several 
months, as the FGN was essentially engaged in an all-out war against MNSAs. Coupled with 
the severity of constraining compression, which was characterised by an overwhelming number 
of civilian deaths from both MNSAs and the FGN, the author assesses that Nigerian NSSP was 
constraining during the case study period. One must be aware that, these observed instances of 
compression, cannot merely be reduced to quantitative margins of measurement, such as 
simply counting and tabularizing incidents. Considering the assessment of Inflationary 
Containment, in conjunction with Compression strategy, enables us to understand the severity 
of compressive strategy in a different light. Had it been that analysis of Inflationary 
containment strategy, resulted in the conclusion that the Nigerian NSSP was people-centric in 
nature, it would be more readily confirmed in its compressive strategy, which would be more 
cognizant of collateral damage, civilian casualties and the exclusion of civilians who might be 
mildly sympathetic to perceived MNSA objectives.  The reality however, is that compression 
strategy was constraining, characterized by brute physical force, intended to protect the 
prioritized referent objects (interests) of the Nigerian state. 
Table 19. Independent Variable Measurement: Compression 
Date  Constraining Coercive Compelling 
   
7 DIVISION of Nigerian Army 
Created in Borno State 
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ATTACK, REPRISAL 
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75 FGN operatives within the Joint Task Force (JTF) begin to distribute video-tape recordings which promulgate 
counter-Boko-Haram narratives to locals in Maiduguri. 
76 On the 25th of October 2009, MEND announced the cessation of hostilities against the FGN, and accepted the 
FGN's peace settlement, showing a willingness to negotiate terms with the FGN. See; 'BBC NEWS | World | 
Africa | Nigeria Militants Reinstate Truce' (News.bbc.co.uk, 2009) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8324638.stm> 
accessed 16 February 2017. 
77 On the 19th of May 2011, the FGN carried out airstrikes in the Niger Delta. These airstrikes killed John Togo, 
who was an influential member of MEND MNSA. 
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78 In July 2011, the FGN announced proposed negotiations with Boko-Haram. In an unprecedented move, the 
FGN also ensured that five police officers were held responsible for the extrajudicial killing of Yusuf 
79 Following the intensification of attacks in the North, on the 31st of December 2011, President Goodluck 
Jonathan declared a State of Emergency in Borno state, Niger state, Plateau state, and Yobe state. He also 
announced that all northern borders were to be closed. 
80 On the 24th of January 2012, FGN security operatives killed two suspected Boko-Haram members for their 
suspected involvement in the assaults in Kano, four days prior. 
81 On the 9th of March 2012, FGN Army arrests one Abu Muhammad, suspected as being a leader of an Al-Qaeda 
affiliated group operating in Nigeria. Muhammad was suspected of kidnapping two engineers, one British and 
one Italian, in May of 2011. Muhammad was interrogated until he gave up the location of the hostages. However, 
the hostages were killed when FGN attempted to raid the hideout where they were being held. Boko-Haram never 
suggested that it was affiliated with Muhammad, or involved in the abduction. 
82 On the 23rd of September 2012, The FGN JTF announced that it had killed 35 Boko-Haram operatives in Yobe 
state, and arrested about 60 more. 
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83 on the 24th of September 2012, The FGN Army announced that they had killed Abubakar Yola, believed to be 
a regional commander for Boko-Haram. 
84 Furthermore, they announce the arrest of 156 other Boko-Haram operatives in Adamawa State, in a coordinated 
action. 
85 On the 7th of October 2012, JTF operatives announced that they had killed 30 Boko-Haram operatives, in Yobe 
state. They also declared that they had killed Boko-Haram leader, Shekau, and arrested 10 more in Kandahar. 
86 On the 8th of October 2012, an FGN JTF soldier was killed by an IED, planted by Boko-Haram in Maiduguri. 
This IED was set for the JTF convoy. JTF soldiers subsequently attacked and killed civilians whom they believed 
were sympathetic to Boko-Haram, and then set over 50 houses alight. This incident claimed over 30 civilian lives. 
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8.6 THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIC PERSONALITY OF NIGERIA DURING THE “EXPLOSION 
PERIOD” 
Based on State behaviour observed during this case study, it is reasonable for an observer 
to characterise Nigeria’s National Security Strategic Personality, as Introverted in its outlook, 
Interest-Centric in its provision, and Constraining in its severity. 
Table 20. Dependent Variable Measurement: NSSP 
Orientation Inflationary Containment Compression 
Introverted * People-Centric  Constraining * 
Extroverted  Interest-Centric * Coercive  
8.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter performed an in-depth empirical validation exercise of the NSSP theory, 
through the utilisation of the case-study methods of analysis, which investigated the 
interactions between the Nigerian state, and Malicious Non-State Actors, from 2009 to 2014. 
The author was able to reasonably identify and characterise the National Security Strategic 
Personality of the Nigerian State. Also, the author was made aware of the following 
methodological considerations; 
Unlike the challenges which the author faced with regards to data collection in the 
Formation and Secession case study, the author was able to access copious amounts of data 
regarding Nigerian state behaviour, thus enabling the author to offer a comprehensive account 
of events that occurred during the Explosion period. The availability of data spanning this 
period, also enabled the author to test the effectiveness of the NSSP theory, when copious 
instances of observable state behaviour were input. Nigerian NSSP identified in the Explosion 
case study, appears consistent with NSSP identified from previous case studies, suggesting that 
Nigerian NSSP proves to be lasting constant through Nigerian history, regardless of the nature 
of governance in place.  
The next chapter is an overview of this research. Within the next chapter, the author 
collates the highlights of this study, as well as a summary of major findings. This conclusion 
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draws from the entire body of research, and highlights key findings. The author proposes 
recommendations for policy and further academic research at the end of the chapter.  
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9 CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents an overview of this research which is centred primarily on the 
development of the National Security Strategic Personality theory, and the empirical validation 
of the NSSP theory, which simultaneously sought to identify and characterise Nigerian NSSP 
from 1960 to 2014. This conclusion was drawn from the entire body of research, and highlights 
key findings. The author proposes recommendations for policy and further academic research 
at the end of this chapter.  
9.2 HIGHLIGHTS OF THE STUDY 
This research, set out with the initial aims of developing an explanatory typology, to 
reveal the underlying reasons for variances observed in the operationalisation of National 
Security. In achieving this task, the author carried out a systematic investigation of the 
existence and character of a National Security Strategic Personality, utilising various case study 
periods, extracted from Nigerian history. The author’s quest to proffer a potentially novel 
means through which one could understand the ways of national security was initially driven 
by the insight gained from generations of scholarship which emerged within strategic culture, 
aided by constructivist ontology, empirically tested through case study analysis, and findings 
presented as an explanatory typology. 
The author surveyed the ability of the Strategic Culture theoretical framework to 
characterise these varying types of National Security. However, while each of the generations 
of strategic culture offered novel ways in which one could identify different types of national 
security, the lack of an exhaustive definition of strategic culture, coupled with grave 
methodological disparities, hindered the strategic culture theory from enabling a better 
understanding of national security types. Focusing on a constructivist interpretation of Security 
and National Security as concepts. The author went further, to analyse the utility of the 
Strategic Culture theoretical framework, tracking the development of the theoretical 
framework, identifying the questions which necessitated the strategic culture theoretical 
framework, and critically appraising its evolution through three generations of scholarship. The 
author argued that different versions of National Security exist, based on the information 
gathered about National Security strategy. The subjectivity of value within distinct human 
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societies was observed to influence the prioritised referent objects of security within these 
societies. It was also argued that a constructivist ontology was the most appropriate to 
accommodate the complexities of characterising such a broad range of possible National 
Security types.  
The identified inability of the aforementioned theories, necessitated the development 
of a proposed theoretical framework that could (in theory) adequately merge the descriptive 
and interpretive qualities of both the strategic culture and the national strategic personality 
theoretical frameworks. Utilising the careful deconstruction of strategic culture as a starting 
point, as well as the constructivist approach to national security, the author was able to propose 
a working definition of national security, which guided the development of an explanatory 
typology that could potentially capture the essence of national security in various states.  
The author's focus on observable state behaviour as the starting point for such a hybrid 
theoretical framework led to the development of the National Security Strategic Personality 
theoretical framework. The development of the explanatory typology, was guided by the 
national strategic personality typology, which sought to identify a state’s ultimate concerns, 
and categorise different states according to this. Ziemke’s typology was adapted in a manner 
which enabled the researcher to dissect observable state behaviour along the lines of identifying: 
Security for Whom? From what threats? By what means? and Where? The author developed 
elements of the NSSP theoretical framework, based on these questions. The Inflationary 
Containment element focused on answering the question: Security for Whom? The Orientation 
element focused on answering: From what threats? and Where? Finally, the Compression 
element focused on answering: By what means? 
The author then proceeded to construct the National Security Strategic Personality 
NSSP framework in a manner applicable to case studies. In achieving this research objective, 
the author explained how a National Security Strategic Personality could be identified, and 
expanded on the key elements which constitute such. The author also expanded on the qualities 
and modes of interaction among the elements within the NSSP framework. Notably, the 
identification of the sub-elements of the NSSP theoretical framework, and their subsequent 
utility in creating the independent variables of the framework was explained in the third chapter. 
The three independent variables were consequently placed on measurement scales, to enable 
the characterisation of the three dimensions of observable state behaviour within an NSSP.  
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The author then proceeded to apply the NSSP theory on the Nigerian case study, 
wherein it was observed that the Nigerian way of national security, was, in fact, attributable to 
its NSSP, which had been forged and modified to suit both the material and ideational context 
within which the Nigerian State was situated. The collation of Nigerian strategy, served as the 
basis for proffered interpretations of Nigerian National Security Strategy within this research. 
Instances of observed State behaviour against MNSAs, were utilised as the primary sources of 
information, which the author dissected by utilising the three proposed independent variables 
of the NSSP theoretical framework.  
The author was reasonably successful in tracking and characterising the coercive moves 
carried out by the Nigerian State against its perceived Malicious Non-State Actors over time, 
and identified specific patterns of strategy, which revealed the habitual behaviours of the 
Nigerian State, and its conditioned responses to MNSA. These patterns of strategy, not only 
exposed deeply rooted assumptions about the efficiency of Nigeria's preferred strategic means, 
but they also enabled the author to identify periods wherein the Nigerian state made attempts 
to innovate and evolve.  
The second principal objective of this dissertation was also achieved. It involved the 
empirical validation of the NSSP theoretical framework, and an assessment of the NSSP 
dependent variables identified. Detailed steps were taken in the fourth chapter, to introduce the 
reader to the Nigerian environment. This chapter also identified the case studies which were 
subjected to the NSSP empirical validation exercise in the fifth to eighth chapters. 
9.3 SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS 
9.3.1 The State 
The behaviour of Nigeria as a State actor, depended primarily on the wishes of the 
rational human actors (such as Sir Bello, Lt. Col Gowon or Gen. Abacha), who, utilising the 
institutional structures of the state, carried out actions on behalf of the State, and legitimised 
their actions by rationalising them as necessary in the pursuit of National Ideals, National 
Interests, National Unity, and National Security. The most powerful Nigerians who occupied 
the highest positions of power, were regarded as expressions of agency within the state, who 
utilised the structure of the state to operationalise strategy.  
Utilising a constructivist ontology, the author considered this personalisation of 
National interests, as a result of the mutual dependence of agency and structure, being 
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inseparable determinants of State behaviour as an outcome. Nigerian State behaviour could not 
have been exerted exclusively by institutional structures without the influence of individual 
agents, and vice-versa. Therefore, viewing the State as a unitary actor within the case-studies, 
enabled the observer to track the development not only of State strategy, but the interdependent 
relationship between powerful Nigerians and the strategic inclination of Nigeria, through its 
history as an independent State. 
The methodology used in this research was highly beneficial to the observer, as it 
enabled the adequate characterisation of Observable State Behaviour. In the same vein, it also 
enabled the observer to adequately identify and characterise Nigeria’s perceived MNSAs, 
specifically in those periods of the case studies, where certain individuals simultaneously 
occupied formal positions within government and championed the causes of an MNSA (such 
as when Gen Ojukwu was the Military Governor of the Eastern Region and Biafra MNSA 
leader, or when Chief Awolowo was the head of official opposition and the AG MNSA leader). 
This methodology was also very valuable, in enabling the observer to delineate the State from 
other actors during times of rapid, and often violent changes of government (such as during the 
First and Counter coups). 
9.3.2 MNSAs 
The term Malicious Non-State actors, was coined by the author to refer to organisations 
or individuals, whose existence, objectives and actions, are perceived as proximally threatening 
to the Referent Objects of a State. The author argued that the perception of a Malicious Non-
State Actor as a threat, is determined by the existence of a State that perceives the Non-State 
Actor as a threat to its interests. While it might have seemed unreasonable to theoretically 
categorise Terrorist Organisations, Organised Criminal Networks, Secessionist Movements, 
and Armed Militias under a unifying term, this research revealed that these threats had enough 
characteristics in common, to justify their joint classification. 
The case studies observed by the author, witnessed the emergence of MNSAs with 
similar objectives and configuration. MNSAs within this research were a retaliation of 
numerous disenfranchised citizens to the prevailing power structures of the Nigerian State. 
These MNSAs were readily identifiable for two reasons. Firstly, MNSAs identified themselves 
as opposed to the National interests of the State which identified them as threats. Leaders of 
these MNSAs were often vocal in their criticism of the State. In the same vein, they were 
defensive of their modus operandi which capitalised on the use of political violence, riots and 
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violent dissidence, which they claimed was necessary as there were no means with which they 
could demonstrate their grievances in compatibility with the existence of the State. Secondly, 
MNSAs were readily identifiable because, the professed concerns of the Nigerian state, implied 
that the existence and functions of MNSAs were primary obstacles to National ideals. MNSAs 
were also identifiable because, Governments in observed case-studies, tended to concentrate 
their resources towards any organisations which they believed to be embodiments of 
underlying socio-political and economic grievances. Thus, following government responses to 
areas within which these tensions were expressed through political violence, aided the 
researcher to identify MNSAs that were the focus of government strategy. 
9.3.2.1 Evolution of MNSAs  
Another consideration worthy of note, was the homogenous nature of MNSAs in the 
beginning of the Formation period. The AG and the UMBC were entirely made up of 
individuals belonging to the same ethnic tribes, with the Yorubas and Tivmen populating both 
MNSAs respectively. However, after 1962, the observer witnessed cooperation between both 
AG and UMBC MNSAs. This cooperation signified the relegation of tribal differences by 
MNSAs, which was replaced with an understanding of the similar objectives, and modus 
operandi of both MNSAs. This trend, was much more identifiable in the Secession case study, 
as Biafra MNSA was not an ethnically homogenous MNSA. Instead, the Biafra MNSA was a 
coalition of numerous minority tribes within the Eastern region, who believed that they were 
subjected to Northern oppression. Admittedly the Biafra MNSA was mostly populated by Igbo 
tribesmen from the Eastern region. But, this Igbo dominance within Biafra MNSA was merely 
a representation of the ethnic demographics of the Eastern region, and not because of an Igbo-
centric ideology. However, in subsequent case-studies, there were no instances of observed 
cooperation between MNSAs, as MNSAs in the Niger Delta and those in the North, were 
observed to have completely different objectives and were increasingly dissimilar in that 
regard. However, the author did observe the utilisation of similar types of violence by MNSAs 
in the Explosion period. With exception to the utilisation of suicide bombing by MEND and 
Boko Haram, repeatedly detonated explosives around government buildings, and even 
abducted civilians and foreigners alike.  
By the end of the Formation case study, and through the Secession case study, MNSAs 
in were; A political movement, which sought emancipation from central rule, spurred by 
feelings of marginalisation of an ethnic group or region, championed by an organisation willing 
to utilise violence in response to militaristic suppression. From the 1970s onwards, however, 
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MNSAs were increasingly violent, largely homogenous, and dissimilar in their objectives. One 
similarity within the first two case studies were the leaders of MNSAs. These leaders were 
mostly individuals who embodied the aspirations of a particular ethnic group or geo-political 
region, to be either more included in governance, or exempt from central suppression by way 
of secession from the Nigerian union. These individuals believed that they had exhausted all 
legitimate avenues to achieve their aspirations, and resorted to unconventional means of 
challenging the government in question. Mr Tarka championing the emancipation of the 
Middle-Belt Zones (Tiv tribesmen), Awolowo championing the emancipation of the Western 
region (Yoruba tribesmen), and Gen Ojukwu championing the emancipation of the Eastern 
Region (Igbo and other minority tribesmen). However, in the Explosion case study, leaders of 
MNSAs were more exploitative of local grievances towards the government, and relied on the 
continuation of Constraining Compression by the FGN, to legitimise their means of violence, 
and recruit more followers. This shift in the characteristics of MNSA leaders, was reflective of 
the crystallisation of Nigerian NSSP, to the extent where MNSA leaders could even anticipate 
a militarised suppressive response from the FGN, if such an MNSA was observed to interact 
significantly with FGN referent objects. 
9.3.3 Nigerian NSSP as a Dependent Variable 
9.3.3.1 Orientation 
Taking into account the proposition of an extroverted Nigerian strategic outlook by Sir. 
Balewa at the beginning of the Formation case study, it is ironic that Nigeria never achieved 
this, as a result of political instability and in-fighting within Nigeria. Various manifestations of 
political instability within the Formation and Secession case studies made it impossible for 
such a new country, with limited means, to pursue such an extroverted strategy. Nigeria's 
immediate goals of development and leadership within the West-African geopolitical sphere, 
would be met with timely resistance from within the Nigerian State. The fragile nature of 
Nigeria's union during the Formation and Secession periods, limited the focus of Nigerian 
NSSP to MNSAs, which were viewed as a direct threat to Nigeria's unity. 
In the Formation case study, Nigeria had become so engulfed in domestic political 
issues, that in practice, its Orientation was “Introverted". The same could be said during the 
secession case-study, as instances of Inflationary Containment and Compression were 
predominantly within Nigerian territory, except the Aburi conference in Ghana, which is a 
neighbouring State. In the period spanning 1970-1999, the Nigerian government was also 
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predominantly introverted in its outlook, with the exception of periodic deployments of FGN 
soldiers on peacekeeping missions in the sub-region. However, these peacekeeping 
deployments were short-lived, and the occasional withdrawal of FGN troops to mitigate 
domestic political violence, was a recurring feature. 
In the case studies, the internal configuration of governmental institutions could not 
have been more different, with Nigeria operating a parliamentary system of government during 
the Formation case-study, and a Military dictatorship during the Secession case study, several 
periods of Military dictatorship and brief democratic intermissions were observed in 1970-
1999, and the FGN was typified by an American Style Presidential system in the Explosion 
period. However, these differences did not reflect on Nigeria’s Orientation, and the nature of 
threats which it perceived as MNSAs that had to be tackled. Therefore, the preservation of an 
Introverted Orientation was evident throughout the case studies. 
9.3.3.2 Inflationary Containment 
In all case studies, it was established that Nigeria’s prioritised Referent Objects were 
Interests. Whilst the specific interests which Nigerian NSSP prioritised were marginally 
different, People were not observed to be the core focus of Nigerian NSSP for various reasons. 
The Nigerian State was primarily observed to operationalise strategy with the aim of protecting 
interests such as National Unity, and its longevity in power, or Regime security. In the 
Formation case study, the deployment of the Army to police elections, at specific polling 
stations where MNSAs were active, indicated the manifestation of State interests in the 
electoral processes of these specific areas. The nature of military deployment amidst the 
violence between civilians at the grassroots level during the Formation case study, indicated 
that the Nigerian State was explicitly interested in the security of ballot boxes, as opposed to 
the well-being of civilians resident in those areas. In the Secession case study, the nature of 
Inflationary Containment represented similar interests of the Nigerian State. These interests 
were observed to have been prioritised over the security of people. As the Biafra MNSA 
developed and expanded, Nigeria's police action, its prioritised recapture of territory with 
significant assets, the indiscriminate killing of civilians, and its dismissal of recommendations 
devised during negotiations, vividly illustrate to an observer, that; Regime Security, Territorial 
Sovereignty, Valuable Assets and the Preservation of Nigeria as a single political entity, were 
the Prioritised Referent Objects. This interest-centric nature of Nigerian NSSP was further 
typified by the reactive nature of FGN National Security efforts in the Explosion period. In the 
chronology of events, the observer vividly identified lengthy periods of MNSA activity and 
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interaction with people, followed by brief and brutal compressive responses by the FGN. 
Coupled with the grave human rights violations, and the occasional slaughter of civilians by 
FGN security operatives, and it becomes increasingly clear that people were not the core focus 
of Nigerian NSSP strategy in the Explosion period. Therefore, Nigerian NSSP remained 
Interest Centric in all case studies observed. 
9.3.3.3 Compression  
The dimension of Nigerian NSSP which, at first glance, seemed to vary considerably 
from the Formation to Secession case study, was the compression of MNSAs. It is apparent 
that the Nigerian State in both case studies were constraining in their extermination of MNSAs. 
However, it could be said that the brutality of compression in the secession case study greatly 
outweighed that of the Formation case study. In the Formation case study, the observer noted 
that the Nigerian State targeted peripheral interests of MNSAs with higher frequency when 
compared with the core interests of MNSAs. Arrests and Detention of UMBC and AG 
personnel was the most frequently recorded compression strategy during the Formation Case 
study. However, there was a specific trend of intensification during the Formation case study, 
and this was gradual. In the earlier periods of the Formation case study, the Nigerian State did 
attempt to negotiate with UMBC leaders. The Nigerian State also actively participated in the 
promulgation of counter-narratives to those expressed by MNSA leaders. The unrelenting 
momentum of MNSAs during this period, necessitated the arrests and detention of MNSA 
personnel. At the tail end of the Formation period, the mobilisation of the Nigerian Army and 
Police force on some occasions, signified the beginning of the State’s reliance on constraining 
strategy to eliminate MNSAs.  
Surprisingly, this reliance on constraining compression was seemingly reversed by the 
FMG led Nigerian State at the beginning of the Secession case study. The FMG led Nigerian 
State facilitated, and actively participated in negotiations with Biafra MNSA at the beginning 
of the Secession case study. Initially, the Nigerian State sought to utilise more diplomatic, as 
well as tactical means (administrative reform), at delegitimising the positions of MNSA leaders, 
utilising strategy that could be viewed as equally affecting all regions of the country, to target 
Ojukwu's formal position of authority subliminally. The constraining compressive strategy was 
very efficient in terms of neutralising Biafra MNSA. However, these successes were marred 
because of collateral damage, and the fallout of this episode in Nigeria's history, continues to 
influence Nigerian politics and governance today. It can be argued that the reliance on 
constraining compression by the FGN in the Explosion case study, was as a consequence of 
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the inability of compelling communication to immediately compress the objectives of MNSAs 
in the preceding case studies. Thus, the heavy-handed implementation of constraining 
compression by the FGN was expected in the Explosion case study, as this style of strategy 
was viewed as the most effective means of exterminating MNSAs, as learned from the earlier 
periods. 
9.3.3.4 Collation of Nigerian State NSSP from 1960-2014 
The NSSP dependent variable of all case studies are intimately connected. Analysis of 
the Formation period, revealed that the Nigerian State in its initial experience of MNSA 
elimination, set a precedent for NSSP strategy in subsequent case studies. The ramifications of 
Nigeria's first NSSP, meant that the gradual crystallisation of Nigeria's NSSP, would result in 
an observer identifying a similar NSSP strategy today 
Table 21. Nigerian NSSP in Formation 
Orientation Inflationary Containment Compression 
Introverted * People-Centric  Constraining  
Extroverted  Interest-Centric * Coercive * 
 
Table 22. Nigerian NSSP in Secession 
Orientation Inflationary Containment Compression 
Introverted * People-Centric  Constraining * 
Extroverted  Interest-Centric * Coercive  
 
Table 23. Nigerian NSSP in Explosion 
Orientation Inflationary Containment Compression 
Introverted * People-Centric  Constraining * 
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Extroverted  Interest-Centric * Coercive  
 
9.4 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Nigeria is plagued with various security issues, which have deeply rooted origins in 
Nigeria’s history. Boko-Haram, Mend and other MNSAs all appear to be reincarnations of 
earlier MNSAs such as Maitatsine and Biafra. Nigerian NSSP has remained mostly introverted, 
interest-centric and constraining throughout its history, and it is arguable that current MNSAs 
in Nigeria are, in part, a repercussion of Nigerian NSSP. MNSAs in Nigeria have repeatedly 
blamed the government, citing mismanagement of national income and the marginalisation of 
the masses as grievances which necessitates their existence. The author suggests, that the 
Nigerian government takes informed decisions towards perhaps a revision of state strategy. It 
is arguable, that dire conditions of poverty and illiteracy especially at the grassroots level, 
enable the emergence of MNSAs. It is also arguable, that militaristic responses to MNSAs by 
the Nigerian government have only served to exacerbate tensions, and increase the resilience 
of MNSAs. While it is true that MNSAs from 1960 through 2014 have been repeatedly 
eliminated through brute physical force, it is also true that theses MNSAs have dispersed, and 
regrouped severally, under new leaderships and identities, and are becoming increasingly 
resilient to militaristic suppression. The NSSP theory has shown that there has been little or no 
change in Nigerian NSSP, and perhaps the time has come for some strategic revision of 
Nigerias NSSP, if Nigeria is to expect different results. Two considerations of significance, 
relate to the increased prioritisation of People as referent objects of Nigerian national security. 
Till date, as evidenced in this study, the Nigerian State has focused primarily on interests as 
the prioritised referent objects of its NSSP. This disposition, has had far reaching consequences 
on the nature of its compressive strategy, which has been identified to be overwhelmingly 
militarised and brutal. With people prioritised as Nigeria’s referents, perhaps such a change 
might usher in a new era of political stability within the country, where its citizens can seek for 
change within the political system, using appropriate avenues of suffrage, negotiation and 
political participation. Another recommended change to Nigerian NSSP, would be the 
implementation of negotiation strategies with perceived MNSAs, as opposed to the 
implementation of brute physical force. As the Secession case study showed, the potentials of 
negotiated settlements between the Nigerian State and its perceived MNSAs have had superior 
influence on the strategic choice of MNSAs, when compared to brute physical force, which in 
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many cases has only served to strengthen the resilience of MNSAs who utilise the brutality of 
the Nigerian state, as a rationale to reciprocate with further violence. In prioritising negotiation 
as the primary compressive strategy of Nigerian NSSP, compromise, inclusion and truly 
representative interests of Nigerians as whole, would be permitted to flourish, thereby setting 
the conditions where ethnic, religious and class rivalry would become primitive and 
uninfluential factors in Nigerian governance. 
9.5 AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
Looking to the future, the author believes that further research into national security 
strategy, would only benefit from an incorporation of the realist, strategic culture and 
constructivist ontological approaches. This incorporation of ontology serves to enable a more 
comprehensive approach to security challenges in today’s security climate. The emergence of 
malicious non-state actors, operate rather differently from the entities which the traditional 
realist theories of security studies were designed to understand. However, the emergence of 
malicious non-state actors does not in any way diminish the importance of realist 
understandings of conventional threats, which are still very much in existence today.  
The NSSP theory is one of many possible explanatory typologies, which could be created 
through the careful deconstruction and modification of existing theories, and the author 
believes there is still a great amount of insight which could be gained from the generation and 
application of such theories, especially within security studies. The author also believes that 
the applicability of the NSSP theory is not limited to the Nigerian context. Rather, the NSSP 
theory is expected to be a suitable explanatory typology in the wider context of analysing the 
national security strategy of states, by focusing on observable state behaviour. Therefore, the 
author encourages researchers, to utilise this theory on case studies beyond Nigeria. 
There is still room for refinement with regards to the NSSP theory, which could possibly 
be attempted in the near future. Firstly, the NSSP theory offers no hierarchical classification of 
state national security strategy according to its development. While it is common knowledge 
that every state possesses different capabilities, states national security strategies have not been 
classified as being developed, semi-developed or underdeveloped with the NSSP theory as is. 
Secondly, the author believes that while the qualitative nature of the NSSP theory seems 
adequate, the independent variables of the NSSP theory could be improved on in a manner 
which could enhance its predictive capabilities, and in time, quantitative methodology can be 
developed which would enable the analysis of significantly more instances of observable state 
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behaviour. As our awareness of events around the world continues to increase exponentially, 
due to globalisation and technological means through which events are recorded, the NSSP 
theory might become tedious if it is applied to case studies with infinitely more instances of 
observable state behaviour, in comparison to the earlier case studies which have been observed 
in this thesis. This is why the author believes that the quantification of NSSP variables, might 
enable researchers to create automated computer generated programs which could classify 
observable state behaviour, according to the basic tenets of the NSSP theory.   
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